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Abstract        
 
Residential demand-side response (DSR) is a key strategy for meeting the challenges facing the 
UK electricity system. Leveraging residential flexibility should help to enhance system 
reliability, reduce carbon emissions, support the integration of renewables into the energy mix 
and deliver a lower-cost electricity system. However, the viability of residential DSR hinges on 
two critical factors: consumers will first need to switch to DSR programmes in sufficient 
numbers and then successfully respond by adjusting their consumption patterns accordingly. 
 
This thesis explores how to optimise the impact of residential DSR by examining the enablers 
and constraints of uptake and response. While participation is primarily encouraged through 
financial incentives, studies suggest that some consumers may be willing to participate for non-
financial reasons. As such, this thesis also explores how environmental and pro-social 
motivations could be leveraged to help promote uptake and response. 
 
The thesis contributes to the knowledge on DSR by testing UK consumer preferences for 
different programme models through a large-scale online survey and identifying measures 
which could help to maximise uptake. It also explores the potential afforded by dynamic 
information-only programmes through a trial based on available wind generation. The thesis 
further makes a theoretical contribution by exploring how the Fogg Behaviour Model (FBM) 
can be used to conceptualise the enablers and constraints of uptake and response. By mapping 
these factors to the FBM’s core components of ability, motivation and trigger, the model is 
refined as a tool for understanding how to optimise the impact of residential DSR.  
 
The research reveals that information-only DSR programmes may represent a significant 
untapped resource. Approximately 8% of a representative sample of UK consumers indicated a 
preference for this model over more conventional price-based programmes; while trial 
households succeeded in reducing electricity consumption by 9.9% on average when asked to 
consume less and increasing consumption by 4.4% on average when asked to consume more. 
These promising findings may help to inform policy and programme design as the UK energy 
system evolves towards a renewables-based future. 
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
The UK electricity system faces considerable challenges over the coming decades. The 
government has committed to reduce carbon emissions by 57% below 1990 levels by 2030 and 
80% below 1990 levels by 2050 (Committee on Climate Change, 2016). This will primarily be 
achieved through the decommissioning of carbon-intensive power plants, the gradual 
electrification of heating and transport, and increased generation from low-carbon sources such 
as wind and nuclear (Carbon Trust and Imperial College London, 2016). However, this 
transformation will come at a cost: the electrification of heating and transport will increase peak 
demand, and as more electricity is generated from renewables, supply will become less flexible 
and less predictable.  This heightened variability in generation presents difficulties, given that 
supply and demand must be balanced to maintain the stability of the electricity system.  
 
In this context, leveraging flexibility on the demand side could result in more efficient use of 
existing generation and transmission assets, reduce the need for additional investment in energy 
infrastructure and generate significant financial savings (Borenstein, 2012; Carbon Trust and 
Imperial College London, 2016).  
 
Section 1.2 of this chapter defines demand-side response (DSR) and explains how it can help to 
meet the challenges facing the UK energy sector. Section 1.3 explains the rationale for the focus 
of this thesis on residential demand and Section 1.4 outlines the different residential DSR 
programme1 models available. Section 1.5 defines the aims of the thesis and the central research 
questions that underpin it; while Section 1.6 concludes and outlines the structure of the thesis. 
 
1.2 Demand-side response  
  
The term ‘demand-side management’ refers to a range of technologies and interventions 
designed to achieve greater efficiency and flexibility on the demand side of the electricity 
system (DECC, 2008). These include energy efficiency and conservation programmes, as well 
                                                
 
 
1 The term ‘programme’ is used throughout this thesis to refer to the different models for DSR that have been 
developed, and includes price-based tariffs, direct load control and information-only programmes. 
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as electricity management strategies such as demand-side response (DSR) – the focus of this 
thesis.  
 
DSR can be distinguished from other demand-side management approaches in that it is 
specifically aimed at shifting consumption times, rather than at reducing overall consumption 
(Owen et al, 2011). There are various definitions of the term in the energy literature (eg, 
Element Energy, 2012; Owen et al, 2011; Ofgem, 2013),2 but this thesis adopts Sustainability 
First’s definition of ‘DSR’ as:  
 
changes in electricity usage by end-use customers from their normal consumption 
patterns… Designed (1) to induce lower electricity use at peak periods or to encourage 
use in off-peak periods and / or (2) to provide flexibility at any time of the day in 
support of cost-efficient balancing of the electricity system overall. (Owen et al, 2011, 
p.22) 
   
DSR has many potential benefits: it can help to integrate renewable sources into the energy 
mix,3 support system reliability, reduce carbon emissions and deliver a lower-cost electricity 
system (Albadi and El-Saadany, 2008; Carbon Trust and Imperial College London, 2016; Ward 
and Darcy, 2014). For instance, a report prepared for the National Infrastructure Commission 
(Strbac et al, 2016) predicts that DSR – alongside increased interconnection and storage – could 
save consumers4 up to £8 billion a year by 2030 and help the UK to meet its carbon targets.5  
 
Although DSR programmes have been available for some time for large customers in the 
industrial and commercial sectors in the UK (Owen and Ward, 2010; Torriti et al, 2009),6 until 
recently no DSR programmes were available for residential customers, apart from the legacy 
                                                
 
 
2 Demand-side response is also often referred to as ‘demand response’ in the energy literature (Aghaei and 
Alizadeh, 2013; Owen et al, 2011; Parrish et al, 2015). However, since ‘demand response’ is sometimes used 
in a narrower sense to refer to reduced demand only, and does not always encompass the notion of increasing 
electricity consumption at certain times (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 2012), the term ‘DSR’ is 
preferred in this thesis.   
3 By encouraging greater consumption when surplus generation from renewables is available and reduced 
consumption when generation from renewables is low. 
4 The term ‘consumer’ is used throughout this thesis to refer to residential electricity customers. 
5 Research conducted at Imperial College estimates that the cumulative total net savings from flexibility over 
the next 30 years would amount to between £1.4 billion and £2.4 billion in 2030 (CarbonBrief, 2017). While 
lower than the National Infrastructure Commission’s figures, the Imperial College estimates are for savings net 
of the costs of achieving flexibility and are based on meeting a weaker carbon target (100 grammes of carbon 
dioxide per kilowatt-hour) than those that used in the National Infrastructure Commission analysis (50 
grammes of carbon dioxide per kilowatt-hour) (ibid).  
6 Some 117,000 end users that consume large amounts of electricity are participating in DSR programmes 
(Houses of Parliament, 2014). Since 2016, National Grid’s Demand Turn Up scheme has provided financial 
incentives for non-residential energy users to increase consumption at times when electricity is oversupplied 
(National Grid, 2015). 
 12 
Economy 7 and Economy 10 tariffs7 which provide cheaper electricity at night.8 However, this 
situation is now changing: Tide - the first ‘second-generation’ residential static time of use 
(ToU) electricity tariff (see Section 1.4) was introduced by Green Energy UK in January 2017 
(The Guardian, 2017).  
 
Other technical, regulatory and commercial developments serve as further indications that 
opportunities for residential DSR are likely to grow. These include the ongoing roll-out of smart 
meters: if government targets are met, around 53 million of these will be installed in over 30 
million households and business premises across the UK by the end of 2020 (Smart Energy GB, 
2017). Smart meters are a key facilitator of residential DSR programmes, as they can precisely 
record electricity consumption in real time and transmit this information to suppliers. 
  
Smart meters are also vital to Ofgem’s ongoing half-hourly settlement reform, which aims to 
create an environment conducive to efficient system-wide use of DSR (Ofgem, 2016). Under the 
current settlement arrangements - which are set out in the Balancing and Settlement Code and 
estimate actual electricity use for each half-hour based on a profile of the average consumer - 
“suppliers remain insulated from the true value of any changes in when their customers use 
energy” (Ofgem, 2014, p.11). This disincentivises them from promoting DSR: essentially, those 
suppliers which choose to implement DSR programmes cannot capture the full benefits of their 
investment, while their efforts make the system more cost efficient to the benefit of competitors 
(Owen et al, 2011). By contrast, the planned introduction of elective half-hourly settlement for 
domestic customers will expose “the true cost of supplying that customer in any given half-
hour” (Ofgem, 2016, p.4), and encourage “suppliers to identify commercial opportunities to 
offer time-of-use and other smart tariffs” (ibid, p.9). 
  
Rising non-commodity costs - the compulsory charges, levies and taxes imposed on suppliers in 
delivering electricity9 - may further spur the roll-out of DSR programmes. At present, these 
costs are passed directly onto end consumers (ibid) and account for a growing percentage of 
their total electricity bills; this figure is predicted to rise to over 60% by 2020 (Utilitywise, 
                                                
 
 
7 The term ‘tariff’ is used throughout this thesis to refer specifically to price-based programmes only. 
8 Although around 4.5 million UK consumers are still on these multi-rate tariffs, they were primarily designed 
so that customers using electrically charged thermal storage heaters could meet their space heating needs and to 
complement the nuclear power programme in the 1960s (Torriti, et al, 2010). 
9 These include Transmission Network Use of System charges, Distribution Use of System charges, the 
Balancing Service Use of System charge, the Climate Change Levy, the Carbon Reduction Commitment, the 
Capacity Market Supplier Charge, the Renewables Obligation, the Feed-in Tariff and contracts for difference. 
(Inenco, 2017).  
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2016). As Ward and Darcy (2014) suggest: “Arguably, this will become a very significant 
portion of the bill simply to pass through to each customer on a wholly flat p/kWh averaged-
cost basis” (p.16) - which may prompt calls for reforms in how such costs are recovered. 
 
Were non-commodity costs to be recovered from suppliers based on actual real-time supply, this 
would leave them significantly more exposed to peak-related variations - which would 
incentivise them to implement programmes that encourage customers to use less electricity at 
peak times (ibid).  
 
1.3 Research scope: residential demand  
 
The research presented in this thesis focuses on residential demand, given that this represents a 
substantial load for National Grid, totalling 108.2 terawatt hours in 2015 (DUKES, 2016). The 
residential sector accounted for 30% of total consumption in 2015 – more than either the 
commercial or industrial sector - and contributes disproportionally to peak demand: household 
consumption accounts for around half of all electricity demand during the system peak between 
5:00pm and 7:30pm (Hesmondhalgh et al, 2014). 
  
These trends are expected to intensify in future with the increased electrification of heating and 
transport. Full penetration of electric vehicles and heat pumps could see daily consumption rise 
by around 50%, while doubling the system peak (Pudjianto et al, 2013).  Figure 1 illustrates the 
potential scale of the problems that this could cause, depicting hypothetical electricity demand 
for a typical day in the UK with heating and transport electrified, but with no measures 
implemented to address attendant increases in peak demand.  
 
In this context, residential DSR could play an important role in mitigating peak demand and 
reducing the need for system reinforcement.  As Pudjianto et al (2013) explain: “By optimising 
demand response the increase in the peak demand could be restricted to only 29% [rather than 
200%], resulting in massively improved utilisation of generation and network capacity, and 
significantly reduced network investment.” (p.77) 
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Figure 1. Possible future daily demand scenario with sub-optimal power system (Source: National 
Infrastructure Commission, 2016) 
 
  
Residential DSR programmes could also generate substantial financial savings for suppliers. 
DECC’s predictions (DECC, 2014) that 20% of residential and small and medium-sized 
enterprise consumers will have switched to static ToU tariffs by 2030 could yield annual 
savings of £26 million from short-run marginal cost savings,10 £23 million from displaced 
infrastructure investment, £10 million from reduced carbon emissions and £1 million from 
network capacity investment savings.11   
 
In this thesis – as in many previous DSR studies (EU-DEEP, 2009; Faruqui et al, 2010a; 
Feuerriegel and Neumann, 2013; Owen and Ward, 2014) – it is thus assumed that, at least in the 
short term, most DSR programmes will be supplier led, given the attendant advantages they 
present. Suppliers have direct commercial exposure to the wholesale, capacity and balancing 
markets, and can use DSR programmes to reduce their payments to other parts of the energy 
system supply chain through cheaper wholesale energy purchase and lower charges for network 
use and system balancing (Ward and Darcy, 2014). 
  
However, suppliers are not the only electricity stakeholders12 likely to be interested in 
implementing residential DSR programmes. Distribution network operators (DNOs) may be 
able to use DSR to defer upgrading parts of their network by reducing demand in specific areas 
                                                
 
 
10 Short-run marginal savings occur because shifting demand off-peak makes it possible to generate electricity 
at a lower average cost (DECC, 2014). 
11 Savings from DSR could end up even higher than these estimates: DECC’s figures only include savings from 
static ToU tariffs, when in reality a range of DSR programmes might be available for residential consumers 
before 2030 (see Table 1). 
12 The term ‘electricity stakeholders’ is used throughout this thesis to refer to all entities with an interest in the 
successful implementation of residential DSR, including suppliers, DNOs, government, regulators etc.  
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at certain times (Pudjianto et al, 2013).13 Indeed, the imperatives for DNOs to implement DSR 
programmes are likely to increase as heating and transport are electrified, leading to greater 
demand at network hotspots at peak times.  
 
Aggregators or energy service companies could also compete to sell DSR services and reward 
consumers for modifying their consumption patterns (Gkatzikis et al, 2013; Owen et al, 
2011).14 Should this model succeed, it could represent a stable DSR system resource which 
could be used to provide services such as spinning reserve, frequency control or short-term 
operating reserve (Pallonetto et al, 2016).  
 
The various electricity stakeholders that are relevant in the context of residential DSR are shown 
in Figure 2. 
  
Figure 2. Electricity stakeholders relevant for residential DSR (Source: adapted from Houses of Parliament, 
2014) 
 
 
1.4 DSR programme models  
 
DSR programmes can be classified into two main models: incentive-based programmes and 
price-based programmes (Albadi and El-Saadany, 2008).  
 
Incentive-based programmes may be sub-divided into:  
                                                
 
 
13 See, for example, the Power Saver Challenge (Electricity North West, 2016). 
14 In this regard, the government’s Smart Systems and Flexibility Plan includes proposals to allow DSR 
aggregators to participate in the balancing market (HM Government and Ofgem, 2017).  
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• ‘classical’ programmes - such as direct load control15 and interruptible/curtailable load 
programmes - which reward customers for participation, usually through a bill credit or 
discount rate; and 
• market-based programmes - such as demand bidding, emergency DSR programmes, the 
capacity market and the ancillary services market - where rewards are contingent on the 
extent to which customers reduce their load during critical periods (ibid).  
 
Although incentive-based programmes are offered to large consumers in the industrial and 
commercial sectors in the UK, they are not currently available for residential consumers. 
 
Price-based programmes, on the other hand, involve dynamic pricing under which electricity 
rates vary at different times. These programmes aim to flatten the demand curve using higher 
prices during peak periods and lower prices during off-peak periods (ibid), or to encourage 
customers to vary their consumption patterns depending on available generation (Owen et al, 
2011). Many different price-based programmes exist, with common variants including static 
ToU pricing, critical peak pricing and real-time pricing (see Table 1 for a summary of the most 
common DSR programme models).16 
 
Figure 3 shows how two of these price-based programmes - static ToU tariffs and real-time 
pricing - can help to manage demand. Static ToU pricing encourages consumers to shift some 
of their consumption off-peak (Figure 3(a)), while real-time pricing helps to smooth fluctuations 
in the balance of supply and demand in real time (Figure 3(b)). 
 
                                                
 
 
15 That is, where electricity system stakeholders such as suppliers and DNOs temporarily control specific 
appliances – including central air conditioning, electric storage heaters and water heating cylinders – in return 
for a one-off payment and/or monthly bill reductions (Finn et al, 2011). 
16 Hybrid tariffs also exist which combine ToU pricing and critical peak pricing. These have the fixed daily 
peak and off-peak periods which are characteristic of ToU tariffs, together with critical peak prices on a certain 
number of days per year (Faruqui and Sergici, 2010). 
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Figure 3. Effects of DSR on typical UK demand profile (Source: Houses of Parliament, 2014) 
 
Of the various price-based programmes, static ToU programmes are considered the most likely 
to be offered to residential consumers in the UK in the short term (until at least 2020), since by 
reducing peak consumption, they can help to lower wholesale electricity purchase costs for 
suppliers and maximise the use of existing generation assets (Darby and McKenna, 2012; 
Hesmondhalgh et al, 2014). In future, however, as more of the UK’s electricity is generated 
from renewables,17 the value of dynamic forms of DSR – including real-time pricing, critical 
peak pricing and dynamic ToU pricing – is expected to increase. Suppliers may be able to use 
these programmes to hedge their wholesale electricity purchases over different timeframes and 
thereby reduce market risks (Ward and Darcy, 2014). 18 As Feuerriegel and Neumann (2013) 
explain: 
 
Rising electricity prices and increasing price volatility will encourage electricity 
retailers to implement and extend their demand response activities. The underlying 
reason is, as the literature on renewables suggests, that an increase in intermittent wind 
and solar generation comes at the cost of an increase in the spot-price variance. (p.366) 
 
 
 
                                                
 
 
17 Both BEIS (2016b) and the Committee on Climate Change (2015) estimate that onshore wind and solar will 
be as cheap or cheaper than gas by 2020, and BEIS estimates that renewable capacity will reach 36 gigawatts 
by 2030. 
18 Since these tariffs can additionally be used to encourage greater consumption at times of oversupply, they 
can also contribute to lower prices by preventing the need to ‘spill’ excess generation. 
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Table 1. DSR programme models  
Price-based 
programmes 
Description Examples  
Static time of use  
(static ToU) 
Customers are charged two or three fixed rates 
which occur during the same periods each 
day.19 
The Customer Led Network 
Revolution (CLNR) ToU trial20 
(Bulkeley et al, 2014); 
Ontario’s time of use 
programme (Faruqui and 
Sergici, 2010a) 
Dynamic time of use 
(dynamic ToU) 
Customers are charged two or three fixed rates 
which occur at different times each day. 
Notification of when these different rates will 
apply is provided one day in advance. 
The Low Carbon London 
(LCL) dynamic ToU trial 
(Schofield et al, 2014)21 
Critical peak pricing  Customers are charged higher prices on a 
limited number of event days per year when 
wholesale market prices for electricity are 
expected to be high or when system stability is 
threatened. 
California Statewide Pricing 
pilot (Charles River Associates, 
2005) 
Real-time pricing  The price of electricity fluctuates depending 
on the wholesale market price. The price may 
vary instantaneously or over shorter time 
periods (eg, every 15 minutes or hourly). 
ComEd Hourly 
Pricing programme 
(ComEd, 2017) 
 
Incentive-based 
programmes 
Description Examples  
Direct load control  Customers receive payments for allowing their 
supplier or an aggregator to control energy-
intensive appliances such as electric heating 
systems or central air-conditioning.  
 
California Statewide Pricing 
pilot (Rocky Mountain 
Institute, 2006) 
Critical peak rebate  Customers receive billing credits for reducing 
their demand at critical times below a baseline 
level of consumption. 
 
Ontario Energy Board Smart 
Price Pilot (Faruqui and 
Sergici, 2010a) 
 
Non-price based 
programmes 
Description Examples  
Information-only Customers receive notifications asking them to 
voluntarily reduce or increase their 
consumption at certain times. Programme 
notifications could be based on factors such as 
peak demand, security of supply or generation 
from renewables. 
Onzo Smart Energy Kit Trial 
(Onzo, 2011) 
 
 
 
                                                
 
 
19 Rates on static ToU tariffs can vary on weekdays and weekends, as well as seasonally. Hybrid DSR 
programmes also exist which combine static ToU pricing with critical peak pricing.   
20 The CLNR ToU trial was a Low Carbon Network funded project involving 650 British Gas customers 
(Bulkeley et al, 2015). 
21 The Low Carbon London Dynamic ToU trial was a Low Carbon Network funded project involving 1,119 
customers living in the London Power Networks area (Schofield et al, 2014). 
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In addition to the price-based programmes described – and of particular relevance to this thesis 
– a number of initiatives eschew financial incentives altogether and instead seek response24 by 
asking consumers to voluntarily reduce or increase their consumption at certain times. While in 
much of the DSR literature – and in the industry’s approach to DSR to date – “the fundamental 
assumption has been that there is no better signal than price and that socially optimum 
behaviour can be brought about with ‘high’ prices” (Gyamfi, 2013, p.76), these ‘information-
only’ programmes may also hold promise for residential DSR. They are discussed in further 
detail in Chapter 2.  
 
1.5 Research objectives 
 
Although residential DSR programmes could offer many benefits for suppliers, their roll-out is 
likely to be expensive, requiring dedicated resources for marketing, data handling, billing and 
customer support (Carmichael et al, 2015; Ofgem, 2010; Stromback et al, 2011). Consequently, 
consumers will need to sign up in sufficient numbers to ensure their commercial viability. As 
Stromback et al (2011) explain: “Any smart meter enabled program rollout is costly and entails 
risk… The cost/benefit of a program will therefore be directly impacted by the number of end-
customers who successfully engage with it.” (p.35) 
 
The US Electric Power Research Institute has further highlighted that the success of such 
programmes is also contingent on the extent to which consumers successfully respond by 
changing their electricity consumption patterns once enrolled (EPRI, 2012). Similarly, 
Hobman et al (2016) explain that for DSR programmes to satisfy the desired outcomes of 
suppliers, “there are at least two critically important and inextricably linked requirements: first, 
there must be sizeable and widespread uptake among customers; and second, there must be 
optimal usage (i.e., appropriate demand response) that is sustained over time” (p.456). 
  
A simple thought experiment demonstrates the equal significance of these two factors. If 10% of 
consumers switched to a DSR programme and rescheduled 1% of their consumption off peak, 
0.1% of their electrical load would be shifted. Likewise, if 1% of consumers switched to a DSR 
programme and rescheduled 10% of their consumption off peak, 0.1% of their electrical load 
                                                
 
 
24 The term ‘response’ is used throughout this thesis to refer to the various actions that participants on DSR 
programmes take to adjust their electricity consumption according to the requirements of the programme.  
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would be shifted. As such, it is clear that uptake and response are of equal importance if 
residential DSR programmes are to achieve their objectives. 
  
This reality informs the two central research questions explored in this thesis: 
 
• What measures could electricity stakeholders – energy suppliers, DNOs, aggregators 
and other parties with an interest in promoting DSR – implement to maximise uptake25 
of residential DSR programmes?  
• What measures could electricity stakeholders implement to maximise response on such 
programmes? 
 
To answer the first question, a large-scale online survey of consumer preferences for residential 
DSR programmes was conducted (the ‘switching survey’). This explored consumer willingness 
to switch (WTS) to several different DSR programme models which are well suited either to the 
current UK electricity system or to conditions which are likely to prevail as renewables become 
an increasingly important part of the UK energy mix. 
 
Secondary research questions in this regard included the following: 
 
• Do any specific consumer characteristics – such as socio-demographic, economic or 
attitudinal factors – increase WTS? 
• To what extent are consumers willing to participate in DSR programmes when no 
financial incentives are provided? 
• Can uptake of DSR programmes be increased by protecting consumers from financial 
losses if they choose to participate?  
 
The second question was explored by conducting an information-only DSR trial, analysing the 
results and interviewing participants to learn more about the enablers and constraints of 
response experienced on the trial.  
 
                                                
 
 
25 The word ‘uptake’ is used throughout this thesis to refer to the act of switching to residential DSR 
programmes. 
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Secondary research questions in this regard included the following: 
 
• What specific barriers prevent consumers from responding and what measures could 
help to mitigate those barriers?  
• What consumer motivations can be leveraged to increase response? 
• How can the way in which consumers are notified of periods when response is sought 
be optimised to increase response? 
 
As the success of residential DSR programmes is contingent on high levels of consumer 
engagement, the research questions were analysed through the prism of the Fogg Behaviour 
Model (FBM) – a framework for driving behavioural change conceived at the intersection of 
computer science and psychology. By mapping the different aspects of switching and response 
to the FBM, the thesis aimed to identify strategies that would optimise the impact of residential 
DSR.26 
 
1.6 Conclusions and thesis structure 
 
This chapter began by outlining the role that residential DSR can play in the future UK 
electricity system. It also described the rationale for focusing this thesis on residential DSR and 
framed the principal research questions which the thesis sets out to answer.   
  
The chapter went on to highlight the importance of both consumer uptake of new programmes 
and response once enrolled to the success of residential DSR, and explained how these 
considerations informed the principal research questions. 
  
The remaining chapters of this thesis are structured as follows:  
  
• Chapter 2 reviews the existing literature on consumer WTS to DSR programmes and 
response on such programmes, and explores the various factors that have been found to 
enable and constrain both uptake and response. 
• Chapter 3 explores the different frameworks that have previously been used to 
conceptualise energy behaviours and explains the choice of the FBM as the main 
                                                
 
 
26 That is, elicit the greatest possible response from the greatest possible number of participating households. 
 22 
theoretical framework for this thesis. It also describes how the framework was applied 
to understand the various factors involved in WTS and response.  
• Chapter 4 presents details of the research methodology, explaining the rationale behind 
each method applied in furtherance of the research and the steps taken to ensure the 
reliability and validity of the data collected at each stage. 
• Chapter 5 presents the results of the switching survey, which was conducted to explore 
consumer preferences for DSR programmes and to identify factors which might 
increase WTS. Drawing on the analysis of the survey data, this chapter also proposes 
measures for maximising uptake of DSR programmes.  
• Chapter 6 discusses the DSR trial which was conducted to explore consumer response 
on an information-only DSR programme, describing the trial design and presenting the 
results of the quantitative analysis used to test response. 
• Chapter 7 presents the findings from qualitative interviews conducted with trial 
participants and draws on this feedback to propose various measures which would help 
to maximise response.  
• Chapter 8 outlines the main findings of the thesis and its contribution to the knowledge 
on residential DSR, and presents conclusions. The chapter also addresses limitations of 
the research and highlights avenues for future study that could build on the work 
presented in this thesis.  
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2. Residential DSR literature review 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter reviews the literature on residential DSR in order to analyse the current thinking on 
how best to maximise uptake and response among UK consumers – the two central questions of 
this thesis.  
 
In relation to uptake, the following is reviewed: 
 
• literature which examines consumer preferences for different DSR programmes;  
• literature which explores the factors that influence consumer decisions to switch to DSR 
programmes; and 
• literature which identifies measures that might be adopted to increase WTS. 
 
In relation to response, the following is reviewed: 
 
• literature which examines consumer response on DSR programmes; and 
• literature which explores the enablers and constraints of response on DSR programmes. 
 
Given the focus of this thesis on UK consumers, the literature is predominantly UK based, 
although international literature was also reviewed where this helped to contextualise the 
analysis. The review encompasses both academic literature and policy-oriented papers and 
reports, since there is a growing body of research on DSR by UK government departments, 
Ofgem and other industry organisations.27  
 
Section 2.2 of this chapter explores consumer preferences for different DSR programmes and 
discusses estimates of predicted uptake. Section 2.3 examines the factors which have been found 
to influence WTS, while Section 2.4 discusses measures for increasing WTS. Section 2.5 
explores the response recorded on different DSR programmes and Section 2.6 explores enablers 
and constraints of response. Section 2.7 summarises the main findings from the literature review 
and identifies gaps which informed the empirical research for this thesis.  
 
                                                
 
 
27 The methodology used to identify the literature for this review is discussed in Appendix I. 
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2.2 Consumer preferences for DSR programmes 
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, for DSR programmes to be viable, a sizeable number of consumers 
will first need to switch to them and then successfully respond once enrolled. However, given 
the liberalised electricity supply market in the UK and the limited political and public appetite 
for energy demand reduction initiatives, DSR programmes are likely to be introduced on an opt-
in basis (Faruqui et al, 2010; Ofgem, 2010). As such, it is important to understand what types of 
programme would be most acceptable to UK consumers, so that suppliers can tailor their 
offerings to maximise uptake. As Dütschke and Paetz (2013) observe: “the question of 
consumer preferences is crucial, because even if (some) dynamic pricing programs could 
influence electricity demand in a desired way, this presumes that consumers are also willing to 
opt for them.” (p.227) 
 
2.2.1 Predicted uptake of DSR programmes 
 
Several studies have estimated the potential uptake of DSR programmes once these are rolled 
out (BEIS, 2016; DECC, 2010; DECC, 2012; DTI, 2005; Fell et al, 2015). While a 2005 
government report calculated the potential benefits of residential DSR on the assumption that 
10% of customers would switch to static ToU tariffs (DTI, 2005), subsequent government 
reports have forecast that 20% of consumers will have switched to static ToU tariffs by 2030 
(DECC, 2010; DECC, 2012).28  
 
However, this estimate may be optimistic. A systematic international review of residential DSR 
trials, pilots and programmes revealed that voluntary recruitment to such programmes rarely 
results in participation rates of more than 10% (Parrish et al, 2015). Likewise, in an analysis of 
19 different DSR programmes offered in the US – including static ToU, critical peak pricing, 
critical peak rebate and variable peak pricing tariffs29 – the US Department of Energy (2013) 
found that on average, 11% of consumers chose to switch.  
 
The lacklustre uptake of DSR programmes thus far has been blamed on inertia and loss aversion 
(Hobman et al, 2016; Letzler, 2006). Loss aversion is the tendency to place greater weight on 
                                                
 
 
28 In addition to those consumers on existing time-varying tariffs, such as Economy 7 and Economy 10. 
29 Variable peak pricing is similar to static TOU pricing, except that peak period prices change daily instead of 
seasonally, to reflect daily changes in system costs and reliability conditions (US Department of Energy, 2013). 
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potential losses than on similarly sized potential gains (Kahneman et al, 1991; Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1986). In the context of residential DSR, the potential losses that consumers 
associate with such programmes – whether financial or in terms of reduced utility from having 
to reschedule appliance use – could thus disproportionality reduce WTS: 
 
loss-aversion does not just apply to money…switching from a flat-rate to a TOU tariff 
also means losing flexibility over when household appliances can be run, which could 
reduce comfort and convenience (losses), which studies of loss-aversion suggest will be 
weighed twice as high as the potential gains (savings from off-peak usage) (Nicolson et 
al, 2017, p.83). 
In a recent study of British consumers (N=2020), Nicholson et al (2017) found that 93% of the 
electricity bill payers surveyed were loss averse and had lower WTS to the ToU tariff presented 
(p < 0.001). Their findings suggest that financial incentives alone may be insufficient to 
overcome this pervasive tendency, and that alternative engagement strategies will likely be 
required to encourage people to switch (ibid). 
Given the power of loss aversion in decision making, some scholars have suggested that the 
benefits of DSR tariffs should be framed in ways that focus on how they can help consumers to 
avoid losses or minimise risks (Hobman et al, 2016). Despite the apparent logic of this 
approach, however, studies have found that framing savings on DSR tariffs as avoided losses 
does not in fact increase WTS (Fell et al, 2015a; Nicolson et al, 2017). 
A further potential obstacle to uptake of DSR programmes is the significant financial 
compensation that consumers may demand in exchange for greater flexibility in their 
consumption (Broberg and Persson, 2016; Richter and Pollitt, 2016). This may not align with 
the financial incentives on offer in practice: analysis commissioned by DECC predicts that 
between 2025 and 2030, households on static ToU programmes would save around £15 per year 
while those on critical peak pricing tariffs would save around £50 per year (Redpoint and 
Element Energy, 2012).30 These figures may be insufficient to motivate many consumers to 
switch. 
 
The low uptake of opt-in DSR programmes thus far – together with the fact that the financial 
incentives on offer may not be sufficiently attractive to encourage participation – underscores 
                                                
 
 
30 Even these estimates may be optimistic, since they assume that all savings – including operational, DNO 
reinforcement and open cycle gas turbine plant build costs – will be passed on to consumers (Redpoint and 
Element Energy, 2012).  
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the importance of understanding how such programmes can be best designed and marketed to 
maximise WTS. 
 
2.2.2 Preferences for different programme models 
 
Fell et al (2015a) conducted a representative survey of British consumers (N=2148) to examine 
WTS to five different DSR programmes:  
 
• a static ToU tariff (with and without automation); 
• a dynamic ToU tariff (with and without automation); and  
• direct load control of electric central heating systems.  
 
The direct load control programme proved most popular, with 37% of respondents agreeing or 
strongly agreeing that they would switch to this programme if it were available, compared to 
30% for the static ToU tariff without automation and 25% for the dynamic ToU tariff without 
automation (see Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4. Preferences for ToU and direct load control programmes (Source: Fell et al, 2015a) 
 
According to the authors, these findings demonstrate that “the principle of external control is 
acceptable to many people, in a context where the limits of control are strictly defined and the 
option of overriding it clearly available” (Fell et al, 2015a, p.8). Notably, the direct load control 
arrangements applied only to space heating, which was guaranteed to remain within one degree 
Celsius of user-determined settings and could be overridden at any time without penalty. While 
the authors acknowledge that these features may have increased the appeal of the proposed 
programme, there are further reasons for scepticism as to whether the findings of Fell et al (ibid) 
could be replicated in a real-world setting.  
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First, any benefit which might be derived from direct load control of central heating systems 
will be reduced if consumers are free to override external control at will. In practice, limits on 
the number of permitted overrides or override penalties will likely be a necessary feature of any 
such arrangements, since suppliers ‒ and other electricity stakeholders such as DNOs and 
aggregators ‒ will need to have confidence that response will be ‘firm’ to enable them to reduce 
wholesale, network and balancing costs (Owen et al, 2013; Owen and Ward, 2010; Workstream 
Six Interim Report, 2014). However, such restrictions would likely detract from the popularity 
of these programmes. As Fell et al (2015) themselves acknowledge, “there is clear prior 
evidence...that having an override function made, for some people, the unacceptable acceptable” 
(p.8).  
 
Second, as many respondents did not have electric heating, they were asked to imagine how 
they would respond if they had an alternative heating system; the hypothetical nature of this 
question may have distorted their response.  
 
Finally, the fact that many respondents indicated that they would be willing to accept direct load 
control of their heating systems does not necessarily imply that this acceptance would extend to 
other types of external control. In this regard, a willingness to pay study conducted in Sweden 
revealed that consumers demanded greater financial compensation (Kr1,409) for accepting 
restrictions on electricity use between 5:00pm and 8:00pm than for allowing their heating 
systems to be controlled during the same period (Kr643) (Broberg and Persson, 2016).  
 
The findings of Fell et al (2015) also contrast with those of several other studies (BEIS, 2016; 
Buryk et al, 2015; Darby et al, 2013) which suggest that consumers tend to prefer ToU tariffs to 
direct load control. A UK government survey which explored consumer preferences for 
different DSR programmes (N=1000) found that static ToU and dynamic ToU tariffs were both 
favoured over direct load control (BEIS, 2016). In Darby et al’s (2013) focus group research, 
which also explored UK consumer preferences for various DSR programmes (N=47), 
participants voiced concerns about the uncertainty and risk of direct load control, expressing 
“visceral unease” about “what was seen as invasion or disruption of household decision-
making” (Darby et al, 2013, p.2330).  Richter and Pollitt’s 2016 survey of British consumer 
preferences for smart electricity service contracts (N=1892) likewise revealed that nearly 50% 
of respondents had reservations about external control of appliances – primarily due to privacy 
issues, but also over concerns that this could damage appliances or reduce the flexibility of 
appliance use. Finally, Buryk et al’s (2015) survey of US and EU consumers (N=160) similarly 
found that “services that ceded customer control of shifting to the utility were seen 
unfavourably” (p.193). 
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The literature further reveals that consumers prefer static ToU tariffs to dynamic ToU tariffs 
(BEIS, 2016; Buryk et al, 2015; Dütschke and Paetz, 2013; Fell et al, 2015a; Hall et al, 2016). 
For instance, a UK government study found that when offered the opportunity to save up to 
£200 annually on their electricity bills, 71% of respondents indicated WTS to a static ToU tariff, 
compared to 66% to a dynamic ToU tariff (BEIS, 2016).31 Further, 34% indicated that they 
would not be willing to switch to a dynamic ToU tariff under any conditions, compared to 17% 
for a static ToU tariff. The preferences that respondents expressed for the DSR programmes 
presented in the study are shown in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5. Annual savings that would persuade people to switch to DSR programmes (Source: BEIS, 2016)  
 
 
Qualitative research has confirmed this consumer preference for static ToU tariffs over dynamic 
ToU tariffs; for instance, Darby et al (2013) found that focus group participants (N=47) had 
greater WTS to static ToU tariffs than to dynamic ToU tariffs. As such, both quantitative and 
qualitative studies suggest that – at least initially – suppliers will likely see greater uptake of 
DSR programmes where these are based on static ToU tariffs.  
 
Static ToU tariffs may thus represent a “staging post” on the consumer DSR journey, “preparing 
the way for real time pricing by accustoming users to the time-dependent value of electricity” 
                                                
 
 
31 These estimates are likely over-optimistic, as it is unlikely that annual savings of £200 could be realised in 
the foreseeable future (see Redpoint and Element Energy, 2012 and also Section 4.4). Furthermore, the 
preferences expressed may have been affected by hypothetical bias (see Chapter 4 for a discussion of how 
hypothetical bias can affect the results of stated preference studies).  
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(Darby and McKenna, 2012, p.768). This transition reflects the evolution of the UK electricity 
system itself. At present, the periods when residential DSR would afford the greatest benefits 
for suppliers ‒ in terms of reduced wholesale costs – correspond closely to peaks in residential 
demand, which occur in the winter months on weekday mornings (7:00am-9:00am) and during 
the early evening (4:00pm-7:00pm) (Dudeney et al, 2014; Owen and Ward, 2010). However, 
from 2020 onwards – due to the predicted increase of renewables in the energy mix – these 
periods will not always coincide with peak residential demand (ibid). Consequently, dynamic 
DSR programmes are likely to become increasingly important for suppliers after 2020; in the 
meantime, static ToU tariffs can help to acclimatise consumers to new pricing models, promote 
awareness of the rationale for DSR and initiate changes in consumption patterns.  
 
2.3 Factors that influence WTS 
 
2.3.1 Ability and willingness 
Many commentators suggest that WTS is primarily determined by two factors: consumers’ 
ability and willingness to adapt their consumption patterns in response to changes in electricity 
prices (Ericson, 2011; Ofgem, 2010; Salies, 2013). As Ericson observes: “Whether consumption 
is flexible enough and suited for adjustment to the price will vary across households according 
to their ability and willingness to change behaviour.” (2011, p.2542) 
Ability depends on multiple factors, including household occupancy (Darby et al, 2012; Torriti, 
2013), household composition (Ofgem, 2010), the types of appliance in households (Broberg 
and Persson, 2016; Ericson, 2011; Reisse and White, 2005), and whether those appliances have 
timers to facilitate unattended use (Fell et al, 2015a).  
Studies suggest that consumers’ ability to adapt their consumption patterns influences WTS. For 
instance, using a discrete choice model to analyse data from a residential dynamic pricing 
experiment in Norway, Ericson (2011) found that greater demand flexibility32 increased WTS to 
a dynamic ToU tariff. Similarly, in a survey choice experiment involving US and EU consumers 
(N=160), individuals who thought that it would be easy to shift consumption off-peak were 
prepared to accept smaller financial rewards in exchange for switching: the discount they 
demanded was 17.5% lower than that sought by respondents who thought that shifting would be 
                                                
 
 
32 The study identified a number of household characteristics as indicators of flexibility, including whether 
households possessed home energy management systems or electric central heating, or were detached homes. 
All of these indicators were associated with increased WTS (Ericson, 2011). 
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difficult, effectively meaning that they would be willing to switch for almost any level of 
financial saving (Buryk et al, 2015). However, the authors note that the study involved a 
convenience sample and as such its indicative results should not be generalised; it should rather 
“be viewed as a feasibility study for a larger study with a more representative sample” (p.194). 
This suggests further scope for investigating how perceived ability to shift consumption 
influences WTS among a representative sample of the UK public.  
That said, some consumers already use a significant amount of their electricity off-peak and 
may thus be in a position to save money on ToU tariffs without having to change their 
consumption patterns. This is potentially problematic for suppliers, as they would end up losing 
revenue if ToU tariffs were primarily taken up by these consumers (Ericson, 2011). As Ericson 
acknowledges: 
 
Offering electricity consumers time-differentiated tariffs may reduce peak consumption 
if consumers choosing the tariffs are demand responsive. However, one concern is that 
time-differentiated tariffs may attract consumers who benefit without responding to the 
price, simply because they have a favourable consumption pattern. (2011, p.2541) 
 
Several studies have explored whether consumers choose to switch to static ToU tariffs because 
their existing consumption patterns will enable them to save money, but the results of these are 
inconclusive. Aigner and Ghali (1989), Train (1987) and Patrick (1990) found that consumers 
who switched to these tariffs already had more favourable consumption patterns than consumers 
on standard rates. However, Caves et al (1989), Baladi et al (1998) and Mountain and Lawson 
(1995) found no difference in consumption patterns; while Ericson (2011) likewise found that 
pre-existing favourable consumption patterns did not influence WTS to dynamic ToU tariffs.  
 
These conflicting results mean that it is uncertain whether existing consumption patterns in fact 
influence WTS. Arguably, however, consumers may increasingly base switching decisions on 
their consumption patterns once the wider availability of technological devices such as smart 
meters and in-home displays gives them greater insight in this regard (Ericson, 2011).  
 
Meanwhile, consumers’ willingness to adapt their consumption patterns will largely depend on 
whether the benefits of doing so will outweigh the costs (Broberg and Persson, 2015; Ericson, 
2011). These costs include the time and effort required to monitor pricing information, and any 
inconvenience associated with rescheduling household activities (ibid; Ofgem, 2010). As 
Broberg and Persson (2016) observe: “rescheduling energy use is by no means a costless task as 
it may impose significant disutility on households and firms in the form of transaction costs and 
everyday discomfort.” (p.5)  
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2.3.2 Economic and socio-demographic factors 
 
Economic and socio-demographic factors may also influence WTS. Two recent UK studies used 
survey choice experiments to explore UK consumer preferences for DSR programmes and 
investigate the factors that influence WTS (Fell et al, 2015; BEIS, 2016). Fell et al (2015) 
(N=2178) found no relationship between educational qualifications, income, housing tenure, 
gender, age, employment status or social grade and WTS.  
 
By contrast, a 2016 UK government panel study (N=1000) found that certain demographic 
characteristics influenced WTS to DSR programmes including a static ToU tariff, a dynamic 
ToU tariff, a critical peak tariff and a direct load control programme (see Table 2) (BEIS, 2016). 
The authors report that: “There is an obvious split when it comes to smart tariffs whereby 
younger people, those in higher social grades, and those living in larger households are more 
receptive to the idea of switching to one. Older people, those in social grade DE, and those 
living on their own are least receptive to smart tariffs.” (ibid, p.3) 
 
Table 2. Consumers who were found to be most and least likely to switch (Source: BEIS 2016) 
 
 
These divergent findings may be due to sampling differences. While both studies used quota 
sampling to ensure that respondents were broadly representative of the UK population, different 
methods were used to recruit respondents ‒ one factor which explains why panels can 
sometimes produce widely varying results (Ipsos MediaCT, 2010). In the BEIS study, 
respondents were recruited “via a profiling survey covering background information on a range 
of variables including; demographics, characteristics of their property, and their attitudes, 
knowledge and behavior in relation to key BEIS policy areas” (BEIS, 2016, p.1). By contrast, 
respondents in Fell et al (2015a) were recruited by research agency Populus and comprised 
members of a panel assembled through online advertising.   
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A Swedish study which also used a survey choice experiment (N=918) to explore WTS to a 
direct load control programme supports the BEIS (2016) findings that younger respondents and 
those living in households with children may have greater WTS33 (Broberg and Persson, 2016). 
Respondents who were university educated were also found to have greater WTS (ibid).  
 
The same study found that higher-income households and apartment dwellers had lower WTS. 
The authors suggest that the latter may be less likely to own appliances such as dishwashers and 
washing machines, which may have made it more difficult for them to relate to the hypothetical 
contracts;34 and in some cases they may also have limited control over the temperature of their 
homes (ibid). Although the authors do not speculate why higher-income households in their 
study had lower WTS, other scholars have suggested that this may be because the marginal 
utility that such households derive from the limited financial savings offered by DSR 
programmes is lower (Ericson, 2011). 
 
The divergent findings of these studies suggest the value of further research to identify which 
socio-demographic factors influence WTS.  
 
2.4 Increasing WTS to DSR programmes 
 
2.4.1 Understanding the rationale for DSR 
 
Residential consumers have a limited understanding of the environmental and societal benefits 
of participating in DSR programmes (Dütschke and Paetz, 2013; Hall et al, 2016; Kim and 
Shcherbakova, 2011; Ofgem, 2010), as such programmes primarily rely on financial incentives 
to promote uptake. Helping consumers to understand the attendant benefits – for themselves, the 
energy system and the environment – is thus regarded as an important step in fostering 
acceptance of such programmes (Buryk et al, 2015; Darby and Pisica, 2013; Faruqui et al, 
2010b; Lewis et al, 2012; Salies, 2013).35 As Lewis et al (2012) explain, consumers need to 
understand why suppliers are “embarking on this action, why the customer should be interested 
and why the community should be working together”. (p.1) 
 
                                                
 
 
33 In this study, children under the age of 12. 
34 Not having these appliances may also have influenced WTS because they can provide opportunities for 
consumers to respond by rescheduling use. 
35 As has been done by the California Public Utilities Commission (Salies, 2013). 
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The premise that leveraging consumers’ environmental and pro-social motivations in this way 
can increase WTS is supported by research showing that consumers place a high value on many 
of the potential benefits of DSR for the energy system and the environment. Exploring 
consumer attitudes through deliberative workshops in England, Scotland and Wales, and 
through a nationally representative survey (N=2441), Parkhill et al (2013) found that energy 
efficiency is almost universally regarded as important ‒ as is protecting the environment and 
moving from a predominantly fossil fuel-based system to one based on renewable energy.  
 
Kowalska-Pyzalska et al (2014) used agent-based modelling to study consumer switching to 
DSR tariffs and likewise found that reducing consumer “indifference” towards DSR increases 
WTS. The authors recommend that government, suppliers and environmental organisations 
cooperate to “communicate to consumers the potential benefits of adoption at social and 
personal levels [and] provide clear and full information to consumers – to reduce confusion and 
to increase the interest in dynamic pricing” (ibid, p.173). 
 
Similarly, in a representative survey (N=2,441) conducted by Spence et al (2015), respondents 
who expressed greater concern about climate change were more accepting of a range of 
demand-side management measures, including external control of their water heating, fridge-
freezers, washing machines and other appliances which switched themselves off if left on 
standby. The authors suggest that this finding implies that “environmental reasons for deploying 
demand side management should be considered when engaging members of the public” (ibid, 
p.553).  
 
Further evidence that tapping non-financial motivations can increase WTS comes from the Low 
Carbon London (LCL) dynamic ToU trial. While trial participants received no explanation of 
why rates on the tariff were higher at certain times than at others, 60% of those interviewed once 
the trial had concluded indicated that highlighting the link between dynamic ToU tariffs and 
renewables would increase their WTS, with 70% stating that they would be interested in 
“helping society to use energy more efficiently” by switching (Carmichael et al, 2014). The 
authors concluded: “A strong piece of learning from the LCL dynamic ToU trial is that 
consumers are likely to engage more with dynamic ToU if the reasons or rationale for the tariff 
design, rate change events etc are explained clearly.” (p.8) 
 
That this approach can translate into higher uptake of DSR programmes is borne out by a 
successful initiative rolled out by the Pacific Gas and Electric Company in the United States. 
The utility successfully enrolled around 75,000 customers on a smart air-conditioning cycling 
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programme based on a one-off payment of $25 and an appeal that participation would help to 
prevent power cuts and protect the environment (Faruqui et al, 2010).  
 
When it comes to communicating the rationale for DSR to consumers, many studies emphasise 
the need for clarity and simplicity (Citizens Advice Bureau, 2014; Faruqui et al, 2010; 
Kowalska-Pyzalska et al, 2014; Ofgem, 2010). Hobman et al (2016) draw on concepts from 
psychology and behavioural economics to “identify how cost reflective pricing can be designed, 
depicted and delivered to enhance customer uptake and optimal usage” (p.455). The authors 
emphasise the importance of “keeping things simple”, as when people are overwhelmed by the 
amount or complexity of information presented, they tend to ‘satisfice’ ‒ that is, they process 
only enough information to reach a satisfactory rather than optimal decision (Simon, 1955), 
stick with the status quo (Kahneman et al, 1991; Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988), choose 
default options (Johnson and Goldstein, 2003) or avoid making a decision altogether (Anderson, 
2003).  
 
The way in which such information is presented can also influence WTS. Fell et al (2015b) 
conducted a representative survey of UK consumers (N=2178) to examine whether WTS could 
be increased by highlighting that participation in DSR benefits the environment and can help to 
prevent electricity blackouts. But although UK consumers often express strong preferences for a 
secure, environmentally sustainable electricity system (Parkhill et al, 2013; Ipsos Mori, 2012), 
this framing failed to increase WTS in Fell et al’s study. The authors thus argue that: “British 
consumers are unlikely to prioritise the environment and energy security when deciding whether 
to switch to a time-of-use tariff and that we need to find other ways of appealing to consumers.” 
(Fell et al, 2015b, p.7) 
 
However, one possible reason for the lacklustre response is that this information was presented 
in digital leaflets designed to resemble suppliers’ promotional materials, and may thus have 
been ignored or mistrusted by the recipients. This hypothesis is lent credence by findings that 
consumers tend to be more sceptical of information provided by commercial companies than 
that provided by public bodies (Devine-Wright and Devine-Wright, 2005). UK consumers 
appear to be especially sceptical of information provided by suppliers: an Accenture study 
revealed that although globally 28% of consumers would trust their electricity suppliers to 
provide them with information to help them to manage their energy consumption, this figure 
drops to 16% in the UK (Accenture, 2011).  
 
By contrast, in Buryk et al’s (2015) web-based choice experiment - which emphasised the 
environmental and system benefits of switching to DSR tariffs, but did not present tariff options 
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as marketing from suppliers - participants required lower discounts in order to switch, 
demanding a 9.8% lower discount to switch to a static ToU tariff and a 12.8% lower discount to 
switch to a critical peak pricing tariff. The authors thus conclude that “customers may be more 
receptive to dynamic tariffs if the environmental and system benefits of these tariffs are 
highlighted” (ibid, p.194). 
 
These findings suggest that the impact of highlighting environmental and system benefits of 
DSR on WTS may be affected by the way in which this information is presented. Since 
consumers are often sceptical of suppliers’ profit motivations (Navigator, 2012; Simcock et al, 
2013), it would be preferable if trusted independent organisations were to communicate the 
environmental and electricity system benefits of DSR to the wider public (ibid; Breukers and 
Mourik; Hobman et al, 2016). As Simcock et al (2013) observe:  
 
expecting energy companies to provide advice when the information they give may be 
considered suspect seems counter-productive… there is a need for government policies 
to encourage and nurture, in part through financial support, sources of impartial 
information that do not have, and are not perceived by the public to have, a financial or 
other vested interest in providing advice. (p.463) 
 
To this end, Smart Grid GB has recommended that a “collaborative cross-value chain group” be 
established to promote consumer education and awareness of DSR and other smart grid benefits 
(Smart Grid GB, 2013). 
 
2.4.2 Previous experience of ToU tariffs 
 
Studies suggest that consumers who already have experience of ToU tariffs may have greater 
WTS. In a study which used focus groups to investigate consumer preferences for ToU tariffs, 
all participants with previous experience of a three-band ToU tariff (n=8) indicated that they 
would be interested in switching to static ToU tariffs once these became available (Darby and 
Pisica, 2013). While the small sample size of this study precludes generalisation (N=42), in 
another large-scale survey respondents on legacy ToU tariffs such as Economy 7 and Economy 
10 were also found to have greater WTS to new DSR programmes (N=2178) (Fell et al, 2015a). 
That previous experience of ToU tariffs might translate into greater WTS is further supported by 
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Opower’s findings (2013) that participation in one energy efficiency programme drives 
increased participation in subsequent programmes.36 
 
Consumers with prior experience of more complex dynamic DSR tariffs also appear to be more 
accepting of these arrangements. While in theory, as discussed, consumers usually express 
greater WTS to static ToU tariffs than to dynamic tariffs (Buryk et al, 2015; Dütschke and 
Paetz, 2013; Hall et al, 2016), evidence suggests that in practice, consumers “find dynamic time 
of use tariffs better to live with than they might expect” (Fell et al, 2015, p. 9). In other studies, 
participants even indicated a reluctance to return to fixed-rate tariffs: 77% of those surveyed 
who took part in the LCL dynamic ToU trial (N=708) indicated that they would have liked to 
remain on the tariff after the trial concluded (Carmichael et al, 2014), while customers 
participating in the ComEd CAP real-time pricing programme indicated greater satisfaction with 
their tariff and supplier than customers on other tariffs (Parrish et al, 2015). 
 
2.4.3 Guarantees and tariff opt-out arrangements 
 
One major concern for consumers that may negatively affect WTS is the risk that their 
electricity bills may increase on ToU tariffs (Neuberg, 2013). Risk-averse consumers are thus 
considered less likely to switch to DSR programmes (Faruqui et al, 2010b). To address these 
concerns, participants on the UK Customer Led Network Revolution (CLNR) and LCL ToU 
trials were guaranteed that they would not be charged more than they would have paid on a 
standard fixed-rate tariff (Bulkeley et al, 2014; Schofield et al, 2014).  
 
Given that consumers with experience of ToU tariffs are often willing to continue on these 
tariffs or try new ToU tariffs, guarantees that consumers will not pay more on such tariffs for an 
introductory period might represent one way to increase WTS and maximise uptake of DSR 
programmes. Time-limited guarantees of this nature have previously been offered by electricity 
suppliers in the United States (US Department of Energy, 2013). 
 
Guarantees will likely become even more important to encourage switching to dynamic ToU 
tariffs once these are rolled out. In Darby et al’s study (2013), many focus group members 
indicated that they would not consider switching to real-time pricing in the absence of such 
guarantees. Further, while in future new technologies might help consumers to estimate the 
savings they could make from switching to static ToU tariffs (Erikson, 2011; Fischer et al, 
                                                
 
 
36 This finding was based on analysis of Opower deployments by 11 US utilities (Opower, 2013). 
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2013), it may prove impossible to predict potential savings for dynamic tariffs, as the timing of 
price periods will fluctuate from day to day depending on available generation (Faruqui, 2010; 
Neuberg, 2013). Auer et al (1997) discuss a dynamic ToU study in Finland which guaranteed 
participants that their annual electricity bill under the trial tariff would not exceed the amount 
they would have paid under their previous tariff. At the end of the pilot, 75% of participants 
indicated that they would be prepared to switch permanently to the tariff ‒ a result which 
suggests that price guarantees might encourage a larger number of consumers to switch to 
dynamic DSR programmes. As Lewis et al (2012) argue:  
 
If customers are to willingly involve themselves in a relationship step change, such as 
adopting dynamic tariffs, something that demands trust in the provider of those tariffs, it 
can be beneficial to provide promises and guarantees, at least initially, until the 
customer’s perception of risk of change is overcome or sufficiently reduced. (p.42)  
 
Similarly, if consumers are locked into ToU tariffs – for example, by penalties for switching 
back if the tariffs prove unsuitable – this may also reduce WTS. Some have thus argued that 
consumers should be given the chance to try DSR programmes with the possibility to opt out 
penalty free if they find that these do not suit their needs (Citizens Advice Bureau, 2014; 
Kowalska-Pyzalska et al, 2014; Lewis et al, 2012; Neuberg, 2013).  
 
2.4.4 Potential risks of financial incentives  
 
The importance of harnessing non-economic motivations to promote WTS is further 
underpinned by studies which have shown that in certain circumstances, financial incentives can 
actually discourage the desired behaviour.  
 
Deci (1971) explains that an individual is “said to be intrinsically motivated to perform an 
activity when he receives no apparent rewards except the activity itself” (p.105). However, 
when people are offered extrinsic incentives such as financial rewards, this can ‘crowd out’ 
intrinsic motivation, reducing overall motivation to engage in behaviour (Deci, 1971; Gneezy et 
al, 2011; Pritchard et al, 1977). Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997) present an example in the 
energy context: when residents of a Swiss town were asked whether they would accept the 
construction of a nuclear waste facility in their community, over 50% agreed. However, when 
the residents were each offered compensation of between $2,175 and $6,525, acceptance for the 
facility dropped to around 25%. The authors argue that: “The use of price incentives need to be 
reconsidered in all areas where intrinsic motivation can empirically be shown to be important. 
We speculate that this may be the case in work relationships characterized by incomplete 
contracts as well as in environmental policy.” (p.754) 
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Sütterlin et al (2011) likewise contend that financial incentives per se can discourage 
environmentally conscious consumers from conserving electricity by crowding out intrinsic 
motivation. To avoid this, they recommend that financial incentives be presented as supporting 
other reasons for conserving energy, rather than as an end in themselves (ibid). In the context of 
WTS, an MTurk survey (N=1406) found that emphasising the monetary benefits of participation 
in a peak load shifting programme reduced WTS, compared to when the environmental benefits 
alone were highlighted (Schwartz et al, 2015).  
 
Studies have further shown that modest financial rewards can have a particularly detrimental 
effect on intrinsic motivation. Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) discuss two examples. In the first, 
students who were offered a small reward (equivalent to $0.03) for each IQ test question 
answered correctly gave fewer correct answers (23) than a control group offered no reward (28); 
two further groups which were offered either $0.30 or $1 for each question answered correctly 
gave a higher number of correct answers (34 or more). In the second, students who collected 
charitable donations invested more effort when not financially incentivised than when a small 
incentive was offered – although larger incentives led to increased effort. Taken together, these 
studies suggest that if financial incentives are used to incentivise behaviour, it is best “to pay 
enough, or don’t pay at all” (ibid, p.1). 
 
This is particularly relevant in the case of residential DSR since, as previously discussed, the 
savings that are likely to be passed on to consumers in exchange for participation are likely to be 
modest. This limited financial incentive may thus undermine some consumers’ environmental 
and pro-social motivations for participating in DSR and thereby reduce WTS. 
 
2.5 Response on DSR programmes 
 
2.5.1 Response on DSR tariffs  
 
There is abundant evidence that ToU tariffs can successfully promote load shifting to off-peak 
periods (Chan et al, 2014; DECC, 2012; Faruqui and Sergici, 2009; Parrish et al, 2015; 
Stromback et al, 2011). Frontier Economics and Sustainability First reviewed 15 residential 
ToU tariff trials that took place between 2000 and 2010 and found that financial incentives 
normally resulted in load shifting, but that the average reduction in peak demand varied 
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considerably between trials (between 0% and 22%) (DECC, 2012).37 The Carbon Trust’s 
analysis of trials in the US, the UK and Ireland likewise revealed that residential ToU tariffs 
usually resulted in load shifting; peak demand reductions ranged from 0% to 11.6%, with an 
unweighted average of 7% (Carbon Trust, 2012). 
 
Stromback et al (2011) reported the findings from a systematic international review of around 
100 DSR pilots involving over 450,000 consumers. On average, critical peak pricing yielded the 
largest reductions in demand (16%), followed by critical peak rebates and real-time pricing 
(both 12%) and static ToU tariffs (5%). Parrish et al (2015) found similar levels of response to 
static ToU tariffs (6%), critical peak rebates (12%-13%) and real-time pricing (16%), but a 
greater response to critical peak pricing (24%).  
 
The LCL dynamic ToU trial in the UK explored whether consumers could be financially 
incentivised to vary their electricity consumption depending on available wind generation 
(Schofield et al, 2014). As discussed in Chapter 1, dynamic ToU tariffs are especially beneficial 
where a significant proportion of electricity is generated from intermittent renewable resources: 
if consumers can adjust their consumption according to availability, these resources can be more 
efficiently integrated into the energy mix.  
 
The reported response on the LCL dynamic ToU trial was an average increase in demand of 
0.05 kWh per household during high price periods, which occurred at any time of day, and an 
average decrease of 0.05 kWh per household during weekday morning and evening peaks 
(Schofield et al, 2014).38 Perhaps unsurprisingly, when participants were called on to increase 
demand at night, response was significantly lower – even those households which responded the 
most were unable to increase demand by more than 0.05 kW/hour. In the authors’ view, this 
suggests that consumers’ capacity to assist in balancing supply and demand is currently limited 
to waking hours; but that in future, “a more consistent response may be possible using 
autonomously responding appliances” (ibid, p.9). The potential for such appliances to facilitate 
response is discussed further in Section 2.6.4. 
 
 
 
                                                
 
 
37 The tariffs reviewed offered peak to off-peak price differentials ranging from 140% to 408% (DECC, 2012). 
38 Based on average annual household consumption estimates from Intertek (2012) of 3567 kWh, this change is 
equal to a 24% reduction or increase in demand at these times. 
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2.5.2 Response on information-only programmes 
 
As part of the literature review, seven information-only residential DSR trials which took place 
between 2006 and 2012 were compared. The response reported for each of these trials is 
presented in Figure 6.39 
 
Figure 6. Reported reduction of peak load for information-only DSR programmes (Source: adapted from 
Parrish et al, 2015) 
The reported average peak reduction on these trials varied from 0% in the case of the California 
SPP trial to -13% in the case of EnergyAustralia’s summer Strategic Pricing Trial.40 However, 
although some of the trials resulted in peak load reductions, the efficacy of information-only 
DSR programmes remains uncertain. The California SPP trial reported no clear response 
(Parrish et al, 2015); while the -2.1% response on Green Mountain Power’s eEnergyVermont 
trial was not statistically significant (Blumstack and Hines, 2013).  
 
                                                
 
 
39 Figure 6 is based on information-only programmes reviewed in Parrish et al, 2015, Onzo, 2011 and 
Strengers, 2010. 
40 One possible explanation for the greater response seen on EnergyAustralia’s Strategic Pricing trial than the 
other information-only programmes is the relative infrequency of events: a maximum of 12 events were held 
per year for each year of the trial (Miller, 2007). This contrasts with some of the other programmes such as 
Onzo’s Smart Energy Kit trial, which required the kind of frequent response that would be sought from 
consumers on ToU programmes. 
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In the UK context, evidence of the efficacy of information-only DSR programmes is also scarce, 
with Onzo’s Smart Energy Kit trial the only known example. In this trial – which took place 
between October 2010 and June 2011 – Scottish and Southern Electricity issued 25,000 of its 
customers with in-home displays that provided notifications of peak demand between 4:00pm 
and 7:00pm each day. Customers responded by reducing demand by an average of 5% at these 
times (Onzo, 2011).  
 
This dearth of evidence has prompted some scholars to suggest that further studies are needed to 
examine how non-financial signals might be used to facilitate response (Hall et al, 2016; Song 
et al, 2014; Strengers, 2010). Strengers (2010), for example, points out that since some 
consumers have non-financial motivations for responding, the “entrenched assumptions 
underpinning variable pricing programs need to be expanded and extended to consider other 
potential theories, methods and motivations for change” (p.7320). Similarly, Hall et al (2016) 
highlight the need for further DSR research which explores “non-economic influences”.  
 
2.6 Increasing response on DSR programmes  
 
2.6.1 Educational measures  
 
In order for consumers on DSR programmes to respond successfully, they need to know the 
timings of peak and off-peak price periods. However, studies have found that they often lack 
this essential information (Consumer Focus, 2012; Heberlein, 1982; Nicholls and Strengers, 
2014). For example, some consumers mistakenly schedule appliance use for peak periods in the 
belief that these are in fact off-peak (Consumer Focus, 2012; Heberlein, 1982; Nicholls and 
Strengers, 2014). As Nicholls and Strengers (2014) observe, this can hinder response: 
“Householder confusion about their electricity tariff undermines opportunities for consumers to 
benefit, or avoid financial penalty, from time-of-use (or other variable pricing) tariffs.” (p.49) 
 
Moreover, some consumers fail to respond entirely. In a study of households on legacy ToU 
tariffs such as Economy 7 and Economy 10, Consumer Focus (2012) found that 38% of the 
survey sample did not have storage heating or use any appliances off-peak. Over half of the 
participants felt that additional information – especially regarding cheaper usage times – would 
have enabled them to make better use of the tariff (ibid). In this regard, a systematic 
international review of DSR pilots by Stromback et al (2011) revealed that when consumers 
were provided with detailed information about their ToU tariff and tips and advice on how to 
conserve energy, this increased response: peak demand reductions on ToU tariffs were on 
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average 6% for those who received such information, compared with 4% for those who did not 
(for consumers on critical peak tariffs, the figures were 16% and 13%, respectively). Owen et al 
(2013) likewise argue that ToU tariffs should be supported with educational measures, and that 
these should go beyond mere explanations of tariffs to include suggestions regarding the use of 
timers, heating systems, digital control devices and appliances.  
 
2.6.2 Multi-modal notifications  
 
While fridge magnets and stickers can prove an effective way to provide consumers on static 
ToU tariffs with information about peak and off-peak periods (Commission for Energy 
Regulation, 2011), it is essential that consumers on dynamic ToU tariffs are notified when price 
periods change, since these periods will vary from day to day. Stromback et al (2011) compared 
peak reduction response on 66 critical peak pricing, critical peak rebate and real-time tariff 
trials, and found that response correlated positively with the number of different channels 
through which participants were notified about changes in price periods. Figure 7 shows the 
average peak reduction response on these trials depending on how participants were notified 
about changes in price periods. 
 
Figure 7. Average peak reduction depending on alert notification (Source: adapted from Stromback et al, 
2011) 
 
 
Interestingly, ambient in-home displays ‒ devices which provide notifications of changes in 
peak periods by changing colour ‒ were found to be particularly effective, even when they were 
the only notification medium used (ibid). An average peak reduction of 19% was reported for 
programmes that notified participants using ambient in-home displays only ‒ the same as for 
programmes that used a combination of email, phone call and text message (ibid). The authors 
suggest that these devices may be particularly effective facilitators of response because their 
attractive design means they are often prominently situated where everyone in the household 
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can see them (ibid); others posit that ambient devices are more intuitive to understand than 
standard in-home displays and may thus promote greater response (Parrish et al, 2015). 
 
2.6.3 Feedback  
 
Consumers on DSR programmes are usually provided with feedback about their electricity 
consumption to encourage response (Parrish et al, 2015).  The rationale for this is based on the 
information deficit model (Hargreaves et al, 2010), which assumes that consumers lack 
awareness of their electricity consumption owing to its “invisibility” (ibid; Fischer, 2007), and 
that feedback will increase energy visibility and give consumers greater insight into their 
consumption patterns (Buchanan et al, 2014). Analysis conducted by Stromback et al (2011) 
confirms that providing consumers with feedback about their electricity use – whether through 
details of the price they are paying for electricity at different times, information on how much 
electricity they are using or more frequent billing – is critical to the success of ToU trials: the 
authors found that peak reductions were 40% greater on trials involving feedback. 
 
2.6.4 Smart appliances 
 
Unsurprisingly, ‘active occupancy’ – defined as when consumers are both at home and awake – 
significantly influences response on DSR programmes (Torriti, 2013). However, appliances 
which can be controlled remotely or which automatically switch on or off can facilitate response 
even when households are not actively occupied (Faruqui et al, 2010b; Harding and Lamarche, 
2016).   
 
In their analysis of 15 pilot ToU programmes in the US, Faruqui et al (2010b) found that critical 
peak programmes supported by ‘enabling technologies’ – such as two-way programmable 
thermostats and gateway systems that allow multiple end uses to be controlled remotely – 
reduced peak usage by an average of 36%, compared to 17% for those without. Similarly, a 
recent randomised controlled trial in the US (N=1011) found that consumers with electric 
central heating systems reduced peak electricity consumption by 48% when provided with smart 
thermostats (Harding and Lamarche, 2016).  
 
Other studies have shown that cold appliances could make a significant impact on peak demand: 
the Household Electricity Study (Intertek, 2012) revealed that if these appliances were fitted 
with controls that enabled them to avoid using electricity during the evening peak (6:00-
7:00pm), up to 10% of peak power could be suspended for half an hour, or up to 70W per 
household (Palmer et al, 2013). However, while considerable benefit might be achieved through 
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such controls, consumers may be reluctant to accept them: in a UK Energy Research Centre 
study (N=1800) which asked respondents whether they would accept three demand-side 
management scenarios,41 external control of cold appliances was viewed least favourably, with 
47% indicating it was unacceptable (Parkhill et al, 2013). 
 
Several other studies have examined consumer attitudes towards smart appliances in EU 
countries (BEIS, 2016; Mert et al, 2008; Ofgem, 2010; Platchkov et al, 2010). In a survey of 
2,900 households in Austria, Germany, Italy, Slovenia and the UK, Mert et al (2008) found that 
respondents were generally receptive to the idea of smart appliances, with 80% indicating that 
they would accept the smart operation of washing machines, tumble dryers, dishwashers, 
electric heating systems and cold appliances. However, the authors acknowledge that their 
findings should be treated cautiously, because participants were overwhelmingly male, 
academically educated and technologically knowledgeable (ibid). A recent UK government 
study (N=1000) likewise found that respondents were receptive to the idea of smart appliances, 
with 51% expressing interest in purchasing at least one form of smart appliance (BEIS, 2016). 
Respondents reported greatest interest in smart washing machines (39%), followed by smart 
dishwashers (37%).  
 
2.6.5 Response constraints  
 
(a) Immediate need and appliance use concerns 
 
Consumers’ willingness to reschedule appliance use in order to respond has previously been 
explored through surveys and focus groups (BEIS, 2016; Mert et al, 2008; Nicholls and 
Strengers, 2014; Ofgem, 2010; Platchkov et al, 2010), as well as through further research with 
DSR trial participants (Bulkeley et al, 2014). For instance, in a BEIS consumer panel study 
(N=1000), respondents reported that they would be most willing to be flexible about when they 
used washing machines (79%), dishwashers (68%), and chargers (68%) in order to respond on 
DSR tariffs (BEIS, 2016). 
 
Wet appliances – washing machines, tumble dryers and dishwashers – are often considered most 
conducive to response in the UK context (Bulkeley et al, 2014). Were the use of washing 
machines, tumble dryers and dishwashers successfully rescheduled off-peak, this would 
                                                
 
 
41 The other two scenarios involved appliances such as digital boxes, televisions and computers that switched 
themselves off if left for an extended period on standby, and showers that turned off after a set period (Parkhill 
et al, 2013). 
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reportedly shift around 8% of residential peak demand (Palmer et al, 2013).42 However, some 
consumers have expressed concerns that noise from these appliances might disturb the sleep of 
household members or neighbours, or that using them unattended might be unsafe (Butler et al, 
2013; Darby, 2013; Mert et al, 2008; Ofgem, 2010). Others have indicated that they would be 
unwilling to leave clothes in washing machines or tumble dryers overnight (Cambridge 
Electricity Policy Research Group Survey, 2010).  
 
A survey conducted by Platchkov et al (2011) explored whether UK consumers would respond 
on a ToU tariff by delaying the use of appliances until after 9:00pm. Respondents were 
relatively amenable to delaying the use of washing machines (65%) and dishwashers (38%), but 
were far less flexible about delaying watching television (17%) or cooking (1%). These findings 
are in line with other studies which confirm that consumers are often willing to reschedule the 
use of wet appliances to respond (Nicholls and Strengers, 2014; Powells et al, 2014), but 
reluctant to reschedule watching television or cooking meals (Ofgem, 2010).  
 
By contrast, evidence from ToU trials in the UK suggests that in practice, some consumers are 
in fact willing to reschedule cooking times (Bulkeley et al, 2015; Carmichael et al, 2014). For 
instance, on the LCL dynamic ToU trial, 35% to 40% of participants who owned an electric hob 
or oven reported that cooking could more than “occasionally” be done flexibly, at times which 
coincided with the low rate. 
 
This finding is significant, as the amount of electricity used for cooking accounts for a sizeable 
proportion of total residential demand - 17.5% in 2014 (DECC, 2015) - with much of this 
arising during the evening peak.  There is thus scope for further studies to investigate “the types 
of lifestyle changes, particularly around cooking appliances (which contribute approximately 
20% of evening peak loads), that UK consumers are willing to adopt under modern ToUT 
interventions” (Chan et al, 2014, p.5). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
 
 
42 This figure is based on analysis carried out on data collected from the Household Electricity Survey (Palmer 
et al, 2013). 
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(b) Less responsive consumer segments  
 
Many studies have found wide variations in individual household response on DSR programmes 
(Bulkeley et al, 2014; Faruqui and Sergici, 2010a; Reise and White, 2005; Schofield, 2014). For 
example, Faruqui and Sergici (2010b) found that 30% of households accounted for 
approximately 80% of the response on a California trial; while Reise and White (2005) found 
that 44% of a sample of 1,300 Californian households failed to respond to ToU pricing at all. 
Certain household demographics have been identified that correlate to reduced response, as 
discussed below. 
Household income: Some scholars contend that where the costs of electricity are marginal for 
households, this may reduce sensitivity to price signals (Gyamfi, 2013; Reisse and White, 2005). 
Evidence from DSR studies is inconclusive in this regard. Some have found that the magnitude 
of DSR, when expressed as a percentage of peak load, is higher for low-income households than 
for high-income households (Thorsnes et al, 2012; Wolak, 2010). Conversely, the CLNR ToU 
trial found that high-income households reduced their evening peak consumption by a higher 
percentage than low-income households (Bulkeley et al, 2014); and in three of the five ToU trials 
in the US discussed in Faruqui et al (2010), high-income households exhibited above-average 
response. 
Given these conflicting findings, it is uncertain how household income affects response. 
However, it seems reasonable to expect that some higher-income households may be less 
responsive because the marginal utility from saving money on their electricity bills is lower. At 
the same time, since household income is positively correlated with the amount of electricity 
that households consume (Bulkeley et al, 2014; Druckman and Jackson, 2008), higher-income 
households have greater potential for responding if they can be persuaded to participate in DSR 
programmes. 
 
This uncertainty strengthens the hypothesis that the prevailing focus on price as the dominant 
motivator for participating in DSR may be misguided. As Gyamfi et al (2013) observe, DSR 
programmes too often rely on price-based mechanisms alone:  
 
From the literature on demand response, the fundamental assumption has been that there 
is no better signal than price and that socially optimum behaviour can be brought about 
with ‘high’ prices. Despite the growing interest in price-response, experience with such 
programs shows mixed results. (p.76) 
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As such, highlighting the non-financial benefits of DSR and providing opportunities for 
consumers to participate in information-only DSR programmes should help to maximise 
response.  
 
Children: Studies have shown that family households on DSR programmes tend to be less 
responsive (Bulkeley et al, 2015; Nicholls and Strengers, 2014). For example, in contrast to 
other households, those with children under the age of five on the CLNR ToU trial did not 
reduce their electricity consumption during the 4:00pm to 8:00pm peak (Bulkeley et al, 2015). 
Nicholls and Strengers (2014) suggest that many family households are unlikely to shift 
household routines in response to ToU tariffs since energy use considerations are normally a 
low priority for them: “[They] may be more likely to deliberately ignore a time-of-use tariff, 
even when the times are known, because it represents an unacceptable trade-off against 
important family priorities and activities considered ‘non-negotiable’ during the family peak 
period.” (Ibid, p.58) 
 
However, although the families which took part in Nicholls and Strengers’ study (2014) were 
mostly unenthusiastic about ToU tariffs, they were more receptive to the idea of receiving 
infrequent ‘peak alerts’. These tended to be perceived as an acceptable disruption, since they 
shifted the emphasis away from financial penalties and towards rewards for “‘do[ing] their bit’ 
for the ongoing security and affordable supply of electricity for all” (ibid, p.59). This suggests 
that even family households may afford some potential for residential DSR if their participation 
is sought in a way that resonates with them and at a frequency that works for them. 
 
2.7 Conclusion and research gaps 
 
This section summarises the findings from the literature review in relation to maximising uptake 
and response, and highlights gaps in the literature which are subsequently explored in this 
thesis. These gaps are discussed further in Chapter 3 within the framework of the FBM.  
 
2.7.1 Increasing WTS 
 
Several recommendations for increasing WTS to DSR programmes can be identified from the 
literature review. The findings suggest that WTS is greater when consumers are informed of the 
environmental and pro-social benefits of DSR, and that this information should ideally be 
disseminated by organisations with no financial interest in such programmes, in order to 
engender trust.  
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The literature review also identified three important knowledge gaps. First, although one survey 
of British consumers found that socioeconomic attributes had no effect on WTS (Fell et al, 
2015a), other studies suggest otherwise, with age, social class and household size all found to 
influence WTS (BEIS, 2016). There is thus scope for further research to examine the influence 
of these variables on WTS. 
 
Second, although the literature suggests that offering time-limited financial guarantees and 
penalty-free opt-outs arrangements might help to increase WTS, no research has explored 
whether these incentives in fact increase WTS.  
 
Finally, while some studies have explored WTS to various DSR programmes and direct load 
control arrangements, none has explored WTS to information-only programmes – in terms of 
both the number of consumers who might be willing to switch and whether any specific factors 
can be identified which influence WTS to such programmes.  
 
2.7.2 Increasing response  
 
The literature review revealed limited empirical evidence of how consumers who do decide to 
switch to information-only DSR programmes actually respond once enrolled; and no known 
studies have examined whether consumers would change consumption patterns on dynamic 
information-only programmes based on available wind generation. To investigate this gap in 
knowledge, a trial was designed and conducted as part of this research (see Chapters 4, 6 and 7).  
 
The literature review revealed several factors which increase response on DSR programmes, 
including educational measures, the provision of feedback and possession of smart appliances. 
Multi-modal notifications were further found to increase response on dynamic DSR 
programmes. 
 
The literature review also revealed that some consumers on DSR programmes changed cooking 
times in order to facilitate response. As this could have a significant impact on demand were it 
to happen at scale, the interviews with participants on the dynamic information-only trial 
conducted for this thesis sought to explore whether interviewees responded by changing their 
kitchen practices. 
 
Finally, studies suggest that family households – and in particular, households with young 
children – find response more difficult. The interviews discussed in Chapter 7 thus aimed to 
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determine whether this was the case for families on the trial and explore whether anything might 
facilitate response for such households on future DSR programmes. 
 
The next chapter discusses the theoretical frameworks that have been used to understand energy 
related behaviours.  It also discusses the rationale for using the FBM as the principal model for 
exploring the DSR behaviours studied in this thesis.  
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3. Theoretical framework 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter analyses the theoretical frameworks that commonly inform energy research and 
interventions to identify the most suitable model for exploring the key behaviours examined in 
this thesis: switching to DSR programmes and response on such programmes. 
  
Section 3.2 discusses the two opposing paradigms that have predominantly informed approaches 
to energy research and interventions. Section 3.3 characterises the DSR behaviours explored in 
this thesis, with the aim of arriving at a suitable framework through which to conceptualise 
them.  Section 3.4 discusses the discipline of captology pioneered by Fogg and Section 3.5 
introduces the FBM: a model rooted in this discipline which is used in this thesis to explore the 
factors which influence uptake and response on residential DSR programmes. Section 3.6 
explains how the FBM is applied in the thesis to this end and Section 3.7 concludes. 
 
3.2 Theoretical conceptualisations of energy behaviours  
 
Eliciting change in energy behaviours requires both a sophisticated understanding of 
behavioural drivers and an appreciation of how these could inform interventions to best effect. 
Over the years, numerous frameworks from across the social sciences have been applied to 
conceptualise energy behaviours, with varying degrees of success.   
 
Wilson and Dowlatabadi (2007) categorise these different frameworks as falling within one of 
two distinct paradigms.  The first – which underpins disciplines as diverse as conventional and 
behavioural economics, technology adoption and planned behaviour theory, and social and 
environmental psychology – is predominantly personal, foregrounding the primacy of the 
individual as a “rational actor”, albeit one whose decisions are informed by a range of 
influences, both conscious and unconscious, internal and external (ibid). The dominant 
paradigm of modern discourse, this has traditionally informed much energy policy and 
interventions. In the UK, for example, Ofgem has used behavioural economics to explore tariff 
switching in the retail electricity market (Ofgem, 2011), highlighting four factors which can 
prevent consumers from switching or lead them to make sub-optimal switching decisions: 
• Status quo bias (Kahneman et al, 1991; Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988) – the 
tendency to stick with one’s current position; 
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• Limited consumer capacity (Ofgem, 2011) – that consumer decision making is limited 
by the time, attention and knowledge available; 
• Loss aversion (Kahneman et al, 1991; Tversky and Kahneman, 1991) – that potential 
losses have a stronger influence on preferences than potential gains; and 
• Time inconsistency (Ainslie and Haendel, 1983; Shui and Ausubel, 2005) – that 
preferences change over time, creating potential inconsistencies. 
 
Hobman et al (2015) have likewise drawn on insights from behavioural economics to explore 
how DSR programmes could be designed to increase uptake and response. The measures they 
propose include: 
 
• designing tariffs where the potential gain to be made (ie, the off-peak reduction in 
price) is greater than the potential loss (ie, the peak increment in price) (to address loss 
aversion); 
• taking advantage of ‘trigger points’ – such as when customers are moving home or their 
contracts are ending – at which they may be more amenable to switching (to address 
status quo bias); 
• presenting information on tariffs and DSR to consumers in a clear, concise and 
understandable format (to address limited consumer capacity); and 
• providing customers with hints and tips, as well as automated technology, to help them 
change their consumption patterns (to address limited consumer capacity).  
 
The second, more contemporary paradigm identified by Wilson and Dowlatabadi (2007) is 
rooted in sociology and challenges the assumption of an autonomous decision maker, positing 
that “decisions are instead ‘constructed’ or determined by social and technological systems” 
(p.186). It is thus contextual, foregrounding the social matrix within which decisions are made 
and the external structures that serve to inform and constrain individual actions. In the energy 
context, this sociotechnical framework was adopted for the research conducted in the CLNR 
ToU trial, which conceptualised energy use as a ‘gear system’ comprising five distinct cogs: 
 
• Conventions – the parameters of what is generally regarded as ‘normal’ energy use;  
• Capacities – the ability of different objects to use energy and provide energy services; 
• Rhythms – the temporal patterns of activity; 
• Economies – the management of social, natural and financial resources; and 
• Structures – the systems and constructs that govern the socio-material world (Bulkeley 
et al, 2014). 
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Wilson and Dowlatabadi (2007) further observe that, regardless of which paradigm is adopted, a 
discrepancy – the ‘energy efficiency gap’ – has traditionally persisted between the technological 
and economic potential afforded by different interventions and actual market behaviour. 
Decision models predicated on the assumption of the autonomous agent seek to resolve this “by 
targeting individuals with universally applicable technologies, practices, and standards” (ibid, 
p.186). By contrast, those premised on social and technical systems view household energy uses 
as “adaptive responses to particular local conditions and norms” which “are highly 
heterogeneous” (ibid, p.186), and seek to close the gap through a greater understanding of this 
social dimension of energy use.  
But ultimately, suggest Wilson and Dowlatabadi (2007), this dichotomy is unhelpful, as neither 
paradigm is in itself sufficient to bound all possible energy behaviours – as the limited impact of 
many interventions bears out. They further posit that any attempt to reconcile these diametric 
positions in a single universally applicable framework may be doomed to failure as “a quixotic 
simplification, idealized and with merit perhaps, but quite mad given its scant chance of 
success” (p.191). Instead, they advocate a collaborative multi-disciplinary approach, with 
decision models matched to the type and context of the specific behaviour targeted on a case-by-
case basis. In selecting the appropriate decision model to achieve a desired outcome, “critical 
questions for intervention designers to ask are where on the individual-to-social, instinctive-to-
deliberative, psychological-to-contextual, and short-to-long-term decision continua their 
interventions are targeted and which of the determinants of decisions they are aiming to 
influence”. (p.192) 
3.3 Characterising DSR behaviours 
 
In applying this approach to arrive at a theoretical framework for this thesis, the starting point 
was thus to characterise the behaviours with which the research is primarily concerned – that is, 
switching to DSR programmes and response on such programmes.  
 
In their study of DSR programme design, Breukers and Mourik (2013) distinguish between 
‘intentional’ and ‘routine’ behaviours. ‘Intentional’ behaviours are performed at a single point in 
time with a greater degree of conscious awareness, such as investing in energy efficiency 
improvements (eg, installing double glazing or purchasing more efficient appliances) or 
changing thermostat settings. By contrast, ‘routine’ behaviours are recurring, habitual activities 
which are performed with less conscious awareness (eg, cooking, washing and cleaning). 
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While switching to a DSR programme is an intentional one-off behaviour, responding requires 
changes to routine behaviours, such as rescheduling appliance use and changing the way in 
which habitual household practices are performed. Before they can be changed, these routine 
behaviours need to be ‘unfrozen’ by introducing a greater degree of conscious awareness in their 
performance (Breukers and Mourik, 2013; Jackson, 2005; Powells et al, 2014). As Jackson 
explains: “A vital ingredient for changing habits is to ‘unfreeze’ existing behaviour – to raise the 
behaviour from the level of practical to discursive consciousness.” (Jackson, 2005, p.xi-xii) 
 
Figure 8 illustrates the continuum on which these behaviours are situated, with intentional 
behaviours towards the left and routine behaviours towards the right.  
 
Figure 8. Behavioural spectrum (Source: Breukers and Mourik, 2013) 
 
The positioning of the two DSR behaviours at opposite ends of this behavioural spectrum 
presented challenges in identifying a framework for this thesis that could successfully 
accommodate both. Each appears firmly rooted within one of Wilson and Dowlatabadi’s 
opposing paradigms: the one a considered, conscious decision of a ‘rational actor’; the other 
often unconscious routine behaviour performed within a specific social and technical context. 
This inherent tension frustrated initial attempts to parse the two behaviours through many 
frameworks that are commonly used to explore energy behaviours. 
 
For instance, the theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen, 1985) - an extension of the theory of 
reasoned action (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975) - has been used to predict and understand behaviour 
in the energy domain (Ago et al, 2017; Chen, 2016; Wang et al, 2014) as well as in pro-
environmental and health contexts (Armitage and Conner, 2001; Kalafatis et al, 1999; Taylor et 
al, 2006). According to this theory, attitudes toward behaviour, subjective norms and perceived 
behavioural control combine to shape both behavioural intentions and actual behaviours (Ajzen, 
1985). Although widely applied, the theory of planned behaviour has been criticised for its 
limited predictive validity: opponents contend that most of the variability in observed behaviour 
cannot be accounted for by the measures of the theory (Sniehotta et al, 2014). Notably, the 
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problem of ‘inclined abstainers’ - individuals who form an intention, but then fail to act on it - 
is a significant limitation that the theory fails to address (Orbell and Sheeran, 1998). 
	
The theory of planned behaviour has also been criticised for focusing exclusively on rational 
reasoning and thus failing to account for unconscious influences on behaviour (Sheeran et al, 
2013). This is a significant shortcoming, since many behaviours are performed without 
deliberative control: as Jackson observes, “we use a variety of mental ‘short-cuts’ – habits, 
routines, cues, heuristics – which reduce the amount of cognitive processing needed to act and 
often bypass cognitive deliberation entirely” (Jackson, 2005, pvii). As this would accurately 
describe many of the behaviours involved in DSR response, the theory of planned behaviour 
was thus rejected as a primary framework for this thesis.  
 
By contrast, social practice theory – which has more recently emerged as a paradigm for 
exploring energy behaviours (Bulkeley et al, 2015; Shove and Walker, 2010; Strengers, 2012) – 
shifts the focus from “individual and autonomous agents, or self-directive and purposive 
technologies, and onto assemblages of common understandings, material infrastructures, 
practical knowledge and rules, which are reproduced through daily routines” (Shove and 
Walker, 2010, p475). Under this theory, it is the social practices themselves – such as cooking, 
washing and cleaning – that become the unit of analysis, rather than the individuals who 
perform them. “Anti- or pro-environmental actions, and more or less sustainable patterns of 
consumption, are not seen as the result of individuals’ attitudes, values and beliefs constrained 
by various contextual ‘barriers’ but as embedded within and occurring as part of social 
practices” (Hargreaves, 2011, p82)  
 
Once again, however, the theory fell short as a primary framework for this thesis as tariff 
switching is effectively an intentional, one-time individual decision and thus does not easily 
lend itself to such analysis. However, as social practice theory does afford a useful lens through 
which to examine complex routine behaviours, some of its principles were applied – as Wilson 
and Dowlatabadi (2007) might advocate – to complement the FBM in specifically exploring 
DSR response (see Chapter 7).  
 
Given the apparently irreconcilable tensions between these two distinct types of behaviour, 
attention turned to context, to investigate whether this might reveal any commonalities between 
them. In this regard, it was observed that both behaviours examined in this thesis are 
contextualised within a highly computerised environment. Consumer interactions with suppliers 
increasingly take place online, with features such as online bill payment facilities, tariff checks 
 55 
(British Gas, 2017) and product guides all common elements of supplier websites. Consumers 
also often consult online comparison sites when making switching decisions and are informed of 
new tariffs through online and email marketing (eg, supplier Green Energy UK is promoting its 
Tide DSR tariff through its website (Green Energy UK, 2017)). Meanwhile, response on DSR 
programmes is sought, effected and measured through a variety of computerised devices, from 
in-home displays to mobile phones, smart appliances and smart meters (Stromback et al, 2011). 
The technological matrix in which these behaviours are embedded thus served as the prime 
determinant in the choice of theoretical framework.  
 
3.4 Captology as a preferred theoretical framework  
 
Scholars are increasingly highlighting the role that human-computer interaction (HCI) can play 
in shaping behaviours in the energy context. For instance, Pierce et al (2010) have examined 
how HCI influences both consumption and sustainability from a sociotechnical perspective; 
although their study focuses on everyday interactions which they suggest are “unconscious, 
habitual, and irrational” (p.1) – an approach that appears less suited to those conscious, 
deliberative actions involved in switching and response which are also explored in this thesis 
(and whose sociotechnical focus  also arguably falls into the trap highlighted by Wilson and 
Dowlatabadi (2007) of attempting to paint a range of different energy behaviours with a single 
paradigmatic brush). Meanwhile, Froehlich (2009) and Kjeldskov et al (2012) have applied 
feedback intervention theory to explore how the wealth of data that can be gathered on 
individual household consumption might be best processed and delivered back to consumers in 
order to effect changes in consumption behaviour. However, while this approach is obviously 
relevant to ongoing behaviours such as response on DSR programmes, it is of less relevance to 
one-time decisions such as switching. Given the broader scope of the DSR behaviours examined 
in this thesis, a similarly broad theoretical framework was thus sought to conceptualise them and 
inform their analysis.  
‘Captology’ – a discipline pioneered by BJ Fogg, director of the Persuasive Tech Lab at 
Stanford University, to explore the power of ‘computers as persuasive technologies’ – presented 
itself as a framework that was well matched to these behaviours, in terms of both type and 
context. Focused on the “design, research, and analysis of interactive computing products 
created for the purpose of changing people’s attitudes or behaviors” (Fogg, 2002, p.5), 
captology could serve equally well as a lens through which to explore switching as response, as 
it can equally accommodate both behaviour types – one-time and ongoing, intentional and 
routine. As a discipline conceived within the computing space, meanwhile, it is also firmly 
rooted in the contextual realities of DSR.  
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Although still primarily applied to the design of websites and other apps (the founder of 
Instagram is perhaps Fogg’s most celebrated student), its principles have also been successfully 
imported into other fields, including moral influence (Berdichevsky and Neuenschwander, 
1999), the promotion of sporting activity (Consolvo et al, 2006) and transportation (Gharibpour 
and Madzinova, 2016). Meanwhile, the ubiquity of computers in modern life – in particular, the 
microcomputer that is today’s smartphone, which Fogg hails as “the next step in human 
evolution” (Fogg, 2010) – suggests that those principles deserve wider application beyond this 
niche space. 
 
In elucidating the power of persuasive technologies, Fogg (2002) highlights several advantages 
that they afford over traditional media or human agents of persuasion:  
• They are more persistent in seeking to elicit a desired response: “They can work around 
the clock in active efforts to persuade, or watch and wait for the right moment to 
intervene” (Fogg, 2002, p.8). 
• They allow for anonymity, which Fogg suggests can help “overcome social forces that 
lock people into ruts and routines” (ibid, p.8). 
• They can store, access and process huge amounts of data, allowing them to “predict 
what a user is likely to buy or do and make recommendations to the user based on that” 
(ibid, p.8). 
• They can leverage multiple modalities – essentially, the different ways through which 
information is presented – to produce the optimum persuasive effect. 
• They can scale easily as demand increases, replicating the same persuasive experience 
for a multiplicity of users. 
• They are ubiquitous – “embedded in everyday objects and environments” in the form of 
mobile phones, smart appliances and networked systems – giving them the power to 
persuade “at precisely the right time and place” (ibid, p.10) 
Fogg identifies seven different types of persuasive activity which can be carried out through 
persuasive technologies: 
• Reduction – simplifying target behaviours to increase the likelihood of performance; 
• Tunnelling – leading users through a step-by-step process; 
• Tailoring – or “persuasion through customization” (ibid, p.37); 
• Suggestion – intervening at precisely the right time to elicit the desired response; 
• Self-monitoring – enabling people to monitor their own behaviour in order to achieve a 
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predetermined goal; 
• Surveillance – or “persuasion through observation” (p.46); and 
• Conditioning – reinforcing target behaviours. 
Implicit in these ideas – in particular, those of reduction and suggestion – is the germ of what 
would eventually become the FBM. 
3.5 The Fogg Behaviour Model 
 
While persuasive technologies are powerful tools, they are only as effective as their application. 
Recognising that designers and researchers often fail to harness their full capabilities, Fogg 
developed the FBM as a behavioural framework to assist in deploying persuasive technologies 
to best effect. 
 
According to the FBM, for someone to perform a target behaviour: 
 
• he or she must be sufficiently motivated; 
• he or she must have the ability to carry out the behaviour; and  
• the behaviour must be ‘triggered’ (Fogg, 2009a).  
 
The three factors must all be present simultaneously; otherwise, the target behaviour will not 
happen. As motivation and ability increase, the target behaviour becomes more likely; once the 
‘behaviour activation threshold’ is reached – that is, where a person has both sufficient 
motivation and ability – the use of a trigger will then prompt the target behaviour (ibid). Figure 
9 shows how these factors combine in the FBM. 
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Figure 9. The Fogg Behaviour Model (Source: adapted from Fogg, 2009a) 
 
 
In incorporating the factors of motivation and ability, the FBM shares similarities with other 
consumer behaviour models which have previously been applied to conceptualise energy 
behaviours, such as the motivation-opportunity-ability (MOA) model proposed by Ölander and 
Thøgerson (1995). It is their combination with the concept of the trigger that distinguishes the 
FBM from its predecessors and makes it so conducive to understanding the DSR behaviours 
explored in this thesis.  
 
There follows a detailed discussion of the three factors of the FBM and how they operate 
together to drive behaviour. 
 
3.5.1 Ability 
 
Under the FBM, an individual’s ability to perform a behaviour significantly influences the 
likelihood of its performance. For Fogg, ‘ability’ equates to simplicity – in other words, the 
behaviour must be easy to do. Fogg identifies six ‘elements of simplicity’ which “relate to each 
other like links in a chain: If any single link breaks, then the chain fails”: 
 
• Time - if there is insufficient time available to perform the behaviour, it is not simple. 
• Money - if there is insufficient money available to perform the behaviour, it is not 
simple. 
• Physical effort - if the behaviour involves too much physical effort, it is not simple. 
• Brain cycles - if the behaviour involves complex thinking, it is not simple. 
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• Social deviance -  if the behaviour involves contravening social norms, it is not simple. 
• Non-routine - if the behaviour involves breaking routines, it is not simple.  
 
These elements of the FBM reflect some key concepts from behavioural economics. For 
instance, under the ‘brain cycles’ element, behaviour is considered not simple if it is cognitively 
challenging. This idea is also central to behavioural economics, which recognises that when the 
volume or complexity of information increases, people have a greater tendency to satisfice by 
processing only enough information to reach a satisfactory rather than optimal decision (Simon, 
1955), sticking with the status quo (Kahneman et al, 1991; Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988), 
choosing default options (Johnson and Goldstein, 2003) or refraining from making decisions 
altogether (Anderson, 2003). 
 
Likewise, the ‘non-routine’ element reflects the fact that people tend to maintain routines even if 
these behaviours take longer or are more expensive than alternatives (Fogg, 2009). As such, it 
acknowledges that habits and heuristics can lock people into existing patterns and prevent them 
from developing new behaviours – another central concept of behavioural economics (Pollitt 
and Shaorshadze, 2011) which is further highlighted in the literature on energy behaviours 
(Huebner et al, 2013; Pierce et al, 2010).  
 
3.5.2 Motivation  
 
The FBM likewise identifies three core motivators, each with two sides, that influence 
behaviour:  
 
• Pleasure/pain – a “primitive” immediate or near-immediate emotional reaction to 
stimuli; 
• Hope/fear – anticipation of a future outcome, good or bad; and 
• Social acceptance/rejection – a social dimension which controls much of our social 
behaviour and which may be “hardwired” into humans and all other creatures that rely 
on communal living for survival. 
 
These motivators are not ranked in order of potency, although Fogg does go so far as to venture 
that hope is perhaps “the most ethical and empowering” of the three.  
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3.5.3 Trigger 
 
Fogg argues that even if both ability and motivation are high, a behaviour will not occur in the 
absence of a successful trigger. Whatever form they take, triggers share three characteristics: 
they are noticed by the recipient, they are associated with a specific behaviour and they then 
serve to prompt that behaviour if the behaviour activation threshold has been reached (ie, if the 
recipient has sufficient ability and motivation to perform the behaviour). Timing is therefore 
crucial - the trigger must be deployed at the appropriate moment to elicit the desired response; 
poorly timed triggers will serve only to annoy and frustrate. Fogg terms this the ‘kairos factor’, 
invoking the ancient Greek rhetorical concept of presenting one’s message at the opportune 
point, and observes that mobile devices are a particularly powerful trigger medium as they can 
exploit this kairos factor to optimum effect, given that they are almost always with us (2002, 
p.187).  
 
The FBM identifies three different types of trigger: 
  
• ‘Facilitator’ triggers aim to increase ability by making the behaviour easier to perform;  
• Spark’ triggers aim to increase motivation by leveraging one of three core motivators 
identified in the FBM; and 
• ‘Signal’ triggers work best when the recipient already has sufficient ability and 
motivation, and serve merely as a reminder to perform the behaviour (ibid). 
 
Arguably, it is Fogg’s positioning of the trigger as an integral driver of behaviour that makes the 
FBM particularly apposite for understanding the DSR behaviours explored in this thesis. 
Switching to DSR programmes is predominantly triggered through websites, advertising and 
promotional materials and other consumer communications and interactions, and each trigger 
delivered through these different touchpoints must be carefully designed to ensure that it can 
function as a spark or facilitator as appropriate and thus increase the likelihood of switching. For 
example, renewable supplier Bulb uses both a ‘spark’ trigger by offering consumers generous 
financial incentives to switch and a ‘facilitator’ trigger by covering any exit fees charged by 
their existing providers to switch (Bulb, 2017). 
 
Meanwhile, consumers on DSR programmes are notified of peak and off-peak periods in a 
variety of ways (eg, through in-house displays, email notifications, text messages and 
voicemails) (Bulkeley et al, 2015; UK Power Networks, 2014; Raw and Ross, 2011), with each 
such notification likewise functioning as a trigger that plays a vital role in eliciting response. 
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Although some consumers on static ToU tariffs may not need regular reminders if they have 
developed new habits and routines which are synchronised with recurring tariff periods 
(Breukers and Mourik, 2013), the variable timings of peak events in a renewables-rich energy 
system will make the design and delivery of these triggers even more important in the case of 
dynamic programmes. This component of the FBM was thus considered valuable for exploring 
response on DSR programmes: triggers serve as potent reminders of when behaviours can or 
should be performed (Fogg, 2009a), and can also help to elevate unconscious energy behaviours 
to the conscious level (see Figure 8).  
 
As Fogg recognises, the deployment of triggers must also be carefully timed: studies have 
shown that response on dynamic DSR programmes is greater when pricing periods are 
announced in a timely fashion (Battle and Rodilla, 2008; Dütschke and Paetz, 2013). Key 
factors which may affect the efficacy of these triggers in facilitating response include the 
following: 
 
• Type of trigger – for example, text message, email or in-home display? 
• Timing – how far in advance should event notifications be sent (eg, 24 hours or one 
hour in advance)?43 
• Multimodal triggers – is response more likely when notifications are sent through 
several different channels? 
• Repetition – should more than one notification be sent per event?  
• Design – what form should trigger notifications take (eg, words, colours, sounds)? 
 
  
                                                
 
 
43 There is a body of research which suggests that the efficacy of notifications varies depending on when they 
are received (The Behavioural Insights Team, 2014). 
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3.6 Practical application of the FBM 
 
While the FBM was conceived within the framework of captology and is thus still primarily 
utilised within this space, Fogg suggests that it has general relevance beyond the field and could 
be used to understand all types of human behaviour. The model has already been successfully 
applied in other spheres: for instance, in a study of how credit card fraud might be detected 
(Haratinik et al, 2012), the FBM was used to create a ‘fraud tendency weighting’ for merchants 
by examining their ability and motivation to commit fraud.  The FBM was also applied in a 
previous DSR study (Sugarman, 2014), which explored the experiences of Canadian consumers 
participating in a critical-peak DSR programme, with the aim of designing a HCI system to 
promote DSR. The FBM was used to identify ways in which the system could be improved to 
encourage response and to inform the design of a smartphone app that sought to reduce 
consumers’ use of air conditioning systems at peak times.  
 
This section explains how the FBM is applied in this thesis to explore switching and response 
on DSR programmes. 
 
3.6.1 Switching to DSR programmes 
 
The preferences of UK consumers for different DSR programme models were examined through 
the online switching survey described in detail in Chapter 5. The survey tested the relationship 
between various factors influencing WTS which can be mapped to the ability, motivation and 
trigger factors of the FBM. These are described below and depicted schematically in Figure 10. 
 
Figure 10. Conceptualising WTS through the FBM 
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(a) Ability 
 
The DSR literature identifies several factors which are likely to increase WTS by simplifying 
the process of switching tariffs. Under the FBM, these would be classified as measures which 
influence ability. They include:  
 
• measures which make it easier to switch, such as ‘one-click’ switching (Fischer et al, 
2013); 
• simplified tariff information (ibid; Hobman et al, 2015; Kowalska-Pyzalska et al, 2014); 
and  
• price comparison tools which facilitate the comparison of expected costs under different 
DSR tariffs (Ericson, 2011; Fischer et al, 2013).  
 
Given the extensive treatment of these measures in the existing literature, this thesis does not re-
examine how they might affect WTS, but rather focuses on how WTS is influenced by 
consumers’ perceived ability to respond successfully on such programmes – that is, whether 
they consider that they have the requisite ability to alter their consumption patterns. The factors 
discussed in Chapter 2 that are linked to this perceived ability and might therefore influence 
WTS include: 
 
• the availability of certain energy-intensive appliances in their homes; 
• the availability of electric central heating systems; and 
• the perception that it would be easy to reschedule appliance use. 
 
Although this is not discussed in the DSR literature, Fogg’s ‘brain cycle’ ability element would 
further suggest that a good understanding of how much electricity different appliances consume 
(hereinafter referred to as ‘appliance consumption knowledge’) would also contribute to 
perceived ability to respond.  As such, this was also investigated in the survey. 
 
These ability factors informed four hypotheses that were tested in the research: 
 
• (H1) Having a larger number of energy-intensive appliances increases WTS.44  
• (H2) Having electric central heating increases WTS. 
                                                
 
 
44 The specific appliances that were explored in the switching survey are discussed in Chapter 5. 
 64 
• (H3) The perception that shifting is easy increases WTS. 
• (H4) Greater perceived appliance consumption knowledge increases WTS. 
 
(b) Motivation 
Two motivational factors were tested: financial and environmental motivation. Financial 
motivation was explored because of the prevailing focus in the DSR literature - and in the 
industry’s approach to DSR to date - on price as the dominant incentive for participation; it 
maps onto the hope/fear motivator of the FBM as leveraging the anticipation of making future 
financial gains. The survey tested two key motivations in this regard. First, the degree to which 
respondents were motivated to save money on their electricity bills was examined by developing 
a composite indicator and testing whether respondents with higher scores on the measure had 
greater WTS. The survey also investigated whether the level of savings on offer influenced 
WTS by manipulating this external variable and analysing how this affected the results. 
 
Meanwhile, environmental motivation was explored to investigate whether the environmental 
benefits to be realised from DSR could serve as an effective alternative incentive for 
participation. This once again maps onto the hope/fear motivator of the FBM by tapping into 
fears about the effects of climate change and hopes that individual response could help to 
mitigate its effects. Its influence was measured by developing a composite indicator of each 
respondent’s attitude towards environmental sustainability and then testing whether respondents 
with higher scores on this measure had greater WTS (how the composite indicator was created 
and its relationship with WTS are discussed further in Chapter 5 and Appendix II). 
 
The motivational influences discussed above led to three hypotheses that were tested by the 
research: 
 
• (H5) Greater motivation to save money on electricity bills increases WTS. 
• (H6) Doubling the potential savings to be made on DSR programmes increases WTS. 
• (H7) Greater commitment to environmental sustainability increases WTS. 
 
(c) Trigger 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, it has been suggested that offering consumers guarantees that they 
will not pay more on DSR tariffs for an introductory period and allowing them to opt out of 
DSR arrangements on a penalty-free basis should the tariff turn out to be unsuitable might both 
increase WTS. 
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A ‘spark trigger’ was therefore included in the survey which guaranteed that consumers would 
not pay more for an introductory period and could opt out of the programme penalty free if they 
found that it did not suit their needs. Whether this trigger would increase WTS was tested by 
offering the guarantee to half of the survey respondents and statistically testing whether they 
had greater WTS than the other half.  
 
This spark trigger was used to test the following hypothesis in the research: 
 
• (H8) A guarantee that consumers will not pay more on DSR tariffs for an introductory 
period, together with penalty free opt-out arrangements over the same period, increases 
WTS. 
 
Table 3 provides details of the hypotheses that were tested in the switching survey and the 
relationship of each to the FBM. 
 
Table 3. Hypotheses tested in the switching survey and relationship to FBM 
Ability factors Hypotheses  Supporting literature 
Perceived ability  Having a larger number of energy-
intensive appliances increases WTS 
(H1) 
Darby and McKenna, 2012; 
Ericson, 2011; Heberlein and 
Warriner, 1983; Reiss and 
White, 2005 
Perceived ability Having electric central heating 
increases WTS (H2) 
Ericson, 2011 
Perceived ability  The perception that shifting is easy 
increases WTS (H3) 
Buryk et al, 2015 
Perceived ability   Greater perceived appliance 
consumption knowledge increases 
WTS (H4) 
N/A 
Motivation factors Hypotheses  Supporting literature  
Financial (internal) Greater motivation to save money on 
electricity bills increases WTS (H5) 
 
Bartusch and Alvehag, 2014; 
Ericson, 2011; Hall et al, 
2016; Lewis et al, 2012  
Financial (external) Doubling the potential savings to be 
made on DSR programmes increases 
WTS (H6) 
Fischer et al, 2013; Heberlein 
and Warriner, 1983; 
Kowalska-Pyzalska et al, 
2014 
Environmental  Greater commitment to environmental 
sustainability increases WTS (H7) 
Buryk et al, 2015; Gyamfi 
and Krumdieck 2011; Spence 
et al, 2015 
Trigger (spark) Hypothesis Supporting literature 
Price guarantees and opt-
outs 
A guarantee that consumers will not 
pay more on DSR tariffs for an 
introductory period, together with 
penalty free opt-out arrangements over 
the same period, increases WTS (H8) 
Citizens Advice Bureau, 
2014; Darby and Pisica, 
2013; Fell et al 2015b; 
Kowalska-Pyzalska et al, 
2014; Lewis et al, 2012 
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3.6.2 Response on DSR programmes  
 
The design of the dynamic information-only DSR trial that was conducted to investigate 
response was informed by the FBM, while the interviews conducted once the trial had ended 
aimed to explore participants’ experiences through this lens and develop practical insights 
which could help to maximise response. 
 
(a) Trial design  
 
Triggers were a crucial feature of the trial design. These took the form of event notifications 
which requested participants to use more or less electricity during specified periods, depending 
on available wind generation. Providing triggers through different channels (text message, email 
or both) made it possible to explore how these resonated with participants and how receipt of 
multiple triggers affected response.  
 
Meanwhile, the motivation factor of the FBM was reflected in the trial design by providing 
participants with regular feedback throughout the trial. This took the form of text messages that 
used positive or negative emoticons (!  or " ) to inform participants of how both their own and 
overall consumption during DSR events compared against normal consumption levels. In this 
way, the feedback sought to leverage the pleasure/pain motivator of the FBM.  
 
(b) Interviews  
 
The FBM likewise informed the selection of questions posed to interviewees once the trial had 
concluded. Specific questions aimed to determine: 
 
• how ability to respond on such a programme might be improved;   
• how motivation to respond on such a programme might be improved; and 
• how the triggers used to elicit response might be rendered more effective.  
 
Below are several examples of questions that participants were asked that were based around the 
different conceptual elements of the FBM: 
 
• Was there anything that would have made you more motivated to respond? (Motivation) 
• Was there anything that would have made it easier for you to respond? (Ability) 
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• Did you find it easier to respond when you were notified through multiple triggers? 
(Ability) 
• How could the in-home displays with which you were provided have been improved to 
make it easier for you to respond? (Ability) 
• Would it have been easier for you to respond if you had been notified of DSR events in 
a different way? (Trigger) 
 
The qualitative data from the interviews was also used to enhance the suitability of the FBM as 
a tool for examining DSR by mapping participants’ experiences to its different components. 
Themes identified in the interview data were also explored, to identify ways to develop the 
FBM as a heuristic model for exploring their influence on DSR. 
 
3.7 Conclusions 
 
This chapter outlines the traditional theoretical approaches to understanding consumer energy 
behaviours and explains why the nascent discipline of captology was selected as the preferred 
framework through which to explore the two behaviours of specific interest in this thesis: 
switching to DSR programmes and response on such programmes. The chapter also describes 
the FBM – a model rooted in this discipline which identifies three crucial factors that combine 
to elicit a target behaviour. These core constructs of ability, motivation and trigger were 
explored through the switching survey and analysis of the qualitative data collected in the post-
trial interviews. 
 
The following chapter describes the mixed methods approach that was used in this thesis and the 
ways in which the primary data was collected. It also discusses the advantages of each data 
collection method and how limitations which were identified in relation to these methods were 
addressed.  
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4. Methods 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The research for this thesis was carried out using a mixed methods approach involving three 
main data collection phases: an online switching survey, a dynamic information-only trial and a 
set of interviews with trial participants (see Figure 11).  
 
Figure 11. Data collection stages 
 
Section 4.2 of this chapter examines the rationale for using mixed methods and explains why the 
research lent itself to this approach. Sections 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5 describe the data collection for the 
switching survey, the DSR trial and the trial participant interviews, respectively. In each case, 
the rationale for the choice of research method is presented, alongside a discussion of the 
strengths and limitations of the approach and the steps taken to address these limitations. 
Section 4.6 concludes. 
 
4.2 Mixed methods approach  
Mixed methods research combines at least one quantitative method and one qualitative method 
in a single study (Greene et al, 1989; Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004). The data collected is 
then analysed through mixed analysis, which involves the use of both quantitative and 
qualitative analytical techniques within the same framework (Onwuegbuzie and Combs, 2011).  
Greene et al (1989) identified five purposes of mixed methods research:  
• Development – to use the results from one method to develop or inform the other. 
• Initiation – to discover paradoxes and contradictions that lead to the reframing of 
research questions.  
• Expansion – to extend the breadth and range of inquiry by using different methods for 
different inquiry components. 
• Triangulation – to seek convergence, corroboration or correspondence of results from 
the differing methods.  
Switching survey 
•Collect quantitative data 
on tariff preferences
DSR trial
•Collect quantitative data 
on household response
Participant interviews
•Collect qualitative data on 
participants’ experiences
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• Complementarity – to seek elaboration, enhancement, illustration and clarification of 
the results from one method with the results from the other.  
 
The primary purposes of adopting a mixed methods approach for the data collection for this 
thesis were expansion and complementarity.  
 
4.2.1 Expansion 
 
The purpose of expansion was central to the choice of the mixed methods approach for this 
research. As Greene et al (1989) observe, this purpose “is commonly illustrated by the use of 
qualitative methods to assess program processes and by quantitative methods to assess program 
outcomes” (p.260). The research follows this model, with the two key research questions of how 
to increase uptake and how to maximise response addressed through quantitative and qualitative 
methods, respectively.  
 
Quantitative data from the switching survey was used to answer the following secondary 
questions to explore how to increase uptake: 
 
• Which types of DSR programme do consumers prefer and how many consumers would 
be likely to switch to DSR programmes once these become widely available? 
• Do price guarantees and fee-free opt-outs increase WTS? 
• Do larger financial incentives for switching increase WTS? 
• Which socio-economic variables influence WTS? 
• Which attitudinal variables influence WTS? 
 
Meanwhile, qualitative data collected through interviews with participants on the DSR trial was 
used to identify enablers and constraints of response from their experiences, and identify 
measures that could help to maximise response on such programmes. 
 
4.2.2 Complementarity 
 
According to Greene et al (1989), complementarity seeks to “measure overlapping but also 
different facets of a phenomenon, yielding an enriched, elaborated understanding of that 
phenomenon” (p.258). This was another key purpose of the mixed methods approach in this 
research. Collecting quantitative consumption data on the DSR trial made it possible to 
determine whether the consumption patterns of participating households during trial events 
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differed from their normal consumption patterns. However, this raw data alone could not 
identify the causes of such changes. For instance, consumption during turn-down events (when 
trial households were asked to use less electricity) could have been lower because household 
members had changed when or how they performed certain activities, or simply because they 
had not been at home. As such, the interviews added depth to the research and made it possible 
to realise one of the key benefits of mixed methods: “rul[ing] out rival explanations of observed 
change and reduc[ing] skepticism of change-related findings” (Hinds, 1989, p.442). 
 
Analysis of the qualitative data also facilitated a deeper understanding of anomalous results 
during the trial, such as when aggregate consumption was lower than usual during turn-up 
events (when trial households were asked to use more electricity) and vice versa.  In these cases, 
qualitative feedback from the interviewees made it possible to explore what might have caused 
these unexpected findings. 
 
As in previous mixed methods studies (Rossman and Wilson, 1985; Fry, Chantavanich and 
Chantavanich, 1981), this approach likewise allowed for additional analysis of exceptional cases 
of individual response: “[This] involves selecting those cases that are the most outstanding 
successes or failures related to some topic of interest. Such extreme successes or failures are 
expected to yield especially valuable information about the topic of interest.” (Teddlie and Yu, 
2007, p.81) 
 
Comparing the baseline consumption of trial households against their consumption during 
events made it possible to identify those lying at either end of the spectrum: extreme cases 
whose response was either exceptionally high or exceptionally low. As the complementary 
qualitative data was collected through semi-structured interviews, it was possible to tailor 
questions to learn more about the contributing factors to these extreme cases. This in turn 
revealed valuable information about specific enablers and constraints of response (see Chapter 
5).  
 
The mixed methods approach also added texture to other findings in this thesis: for example, the 
qualitative interviews complemented the statistical data collected from the switching survey by 
exploring whether interviewees’ experiences on the trial had influenced their preferences for 
different DSR programme models. 
  
 71 
4.3 Switching survey 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the UK government has relied on statistics from DSR programmes in 
other countries to estimate the number of consumers who are likely to switch to ToU tariffs 
once these become widely available (DECC, 2012; DTI, 2005). However, the robustness of this 
approach is questionable, given that results from one region may not readily be replicated in 
others due to differences in market and customer characteristics (Parrish et al, 2015).  
 
Some previous UK studies have explored consumer preferences for DSR using focus groups 
(Darby and Pisica, 2013) and consumer panels (Ofgem Consumer First Panel, 2009). However, 
the small samples on which such studies are based cannot be considered representative of the 
overall population (Teddlie and Yu, 2007; Wunsch, 1986). As such, these methods are not 
suitable for estimating WTS or for using statistical methods to explore the influence of specific 
socio-economic or attitudinal factors on WTS.  
 
By contrast, surveys with larger samples can allow inferences to be drawn about the wider 
population from which the sample is obtained (Fricker, 2008).  Such surveys also make it 
possible to statistically test the correlation between different variables (Oppenheim, 2007). A 
large-scale survey was thus identified as the optimal method to estimate potential uptake of 
residential DSR and test the influence of socio-economic and attitudinal factors on WTS. This 
information could then be used to inform the marketing of DSR programmes. As Cappers et al 
(2013) observe:  
 
If the decision to participate can be associated with observable or measurable customer 
characteristics, the quantification of the relative importance of those factors and how 
they correlate with customer responsiveness will greatly improve the effectiveness of 
recruitment campaigns. (p.4) 
 
The switching survey was conducted online through market research company Bilendi, which 
recruits consumers to participate in online market and social research surveys. Respondents 
receive points for every survey they complete, which can be redeemed for vouchers for various 
rewards. By paying Bilendi for a guaranteed number of responses, it was possible to ensure a 
large sample for the survey (N=1312). 
 
Collecting the data online afforded several advantages. Online surveys are faster to conduct than 
surveys by mail or telephone, and do not require the hiring and training of interview personnel 
(Dillman, 2000). The costs relative to the number of responses collected are also low, and data 
is instantly available for analysis because digital storage and coding occur at the same time as 
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data collection (Potoglou and Kanaroglou, 2007). Online surveys further make it possible to 
present highly customised choice scenarios to respondents (ibid). This latter feature was 
particularly useful for this survey: respondents could be randomly allocated into four treatment 
groups to explore the effects of price guarantees and larger financial savings on WTS (see 
Chapter 5).  
 
On the other hand, online surveys are sometimes criticised for their limited demographic 
coverage and for producing non-random samples (Broberg and Persson, 2015; Potoglou and 
Kanaroglou, 2007). The former issue can be particularly problematic in developing countries, 
where often only higher-income, better-educated segments of the population have internet 
access (Iraguen and Ortuzar, 2004). However, this is unlikely to have significantly biased the 
results of the switching survey, since around 93% of the UK population now have internet 
access (Internet Live Stats, 2016), and the survey was designed so that it could be completed on 
a range of internet-enabled devices.  
 
The issue of non-random sampling was addressed through quota sampling. “A ‘quota’ in this 
context is a cell within an overall sample, designed to have the same sociodemographic 
characteristics as its population” (Oppenheim 2007, p.41). Quota sampling makes it possible to 
match selected socio-demographic characteristics in the sample to the population of interest. As 
such, its use in the switching survey helped to ensure that the preferences expressed would 
likely reflect those of the wider UK population. The socio-demographic characteristics used in 
the quota sampling are outlined in Chapter 5, together with a comparison of the sample against 
the UK population. 
 
Further sources of potential bias must be acknowledged. First, respondents opted to participate 
in the survey in return for a fee and thus may not be representative of the overall population 
(Nicolson et al, 2017). Second, while all respondents were provided with incentives for 
participating in the survey, those who completed the whole survey may have had a greater 
interest in energy issues than the average consumer (Spence et al, 2015). However, both of these 
potential sources of bias are common problems in national panel surveys and were thus 
considered acceptable limitations in the present study.  
 
4.3.1 Hypothetical bias 
 
The switching survey used a stated choice experiment method, presenting a hypothetical choice 
situation with a finite number of alternatives and asking respondents to choose their preferred 
option (Fifer, 2011). While this design is often used to obtain responses to hypothetical 
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questions about future behaviour (Whitehead and Blomquist, 2006), respondents can sometimes 
find it difficult to predict how they might behave in circumstances that they have not previously 
experienced (Fowler, 1995). This can result in hypothetical bias - that is, “The difference 
between results generated via stated preference studies and corresponding evidence stemming 
from real-world data” (Fifer, 2011, p.1). 
 
There is thus a risk that stated preference studies may produce data that does not reflect how 
individuals would behave in real life (ibid). For example, research has shown that such studies 
often overstate consumers’ valuation of goods: a meta-analysis of willingness to pay studies by 
Murphy et al (2005) found a median overstatement of 1.35; while analysis of both willingness 
to accept and willingness to pay studies by List and Gallet (2001) and Little and Berrens (2004) 
found that, on average, individuals overstated their preferences by a factor of three. Hypothetical 
bias can thus diminish the utility of stated preference data: “If the results from stated preference 
studies are to be used in real-life policy decisions, it is important that these results accurately 
reflect or be able to predict what would happen in a real market application” (Fifer, 2011, p.3) 
 
The most common techniques to mitigate hypothetical bias in stated preference studies are 
‘cheap talk’ and certainty correction (Fifer, 2011; Samnaliev et al, 2006). ‘Cheap talk’ is an ex-
ante technique where respondents are shown a text script before they complete the experiment 
which explains hypothetical bias and asks them to adjust for this when answering (Samnaliev et 
al, 2006). Certainty correction (Antil, 1983; Loomis, 2014) is an ex-post technique where 
respondents are asked to indicate how certain they are that they would act in accordance with 
their stated preference - otherwise known as their “intensity of preference” (Whitehead et al, 
2014). Intensity of preference responses are then used to calibrate the stated preferences by 
recoding those below a certain threshold as negative or uncertain. 
 
While opinion is divided on the efficacy of cheap talk as a means of addressing hypothetical 
bias (Aadland et al, 2006; Fifer, 2011; Samnaliev et al, 2006), numerous studies have shown 
that certainty correction can effectively reduce hypothetical bias (Antil, 1983; Champ et al, 
1997; Fifer, 2011; Loomis, 2014; Samnaliev et al, 2006; Whitehead et al, 2014). As such, 
respondents who indicated WTS were asked to rate their intensity of preference on a 10-point 
certainty scale. Previous studies which have recalibrated response data using a numerical 
certainty scale have generally adopted one of two approaches. The first assumes that 
respondents would act in accordance with their stated preferences where they rate their intensity 
of preference as seven or higher out of 10 (eg, Champ and Bishop, 2001); the second assumes 
that this would be the case where the respondent’s intensity of preference equals or exceeds the 
 74 
mean score for all intensity of preference responses provided (Champ et al, 2009). There was no 
need to choose between these approaches in analysing the switching survey data, since the mean 
score for all intensity of preference responses provided by respondents was seven (rounded up 
from 6.7). Thus, after the correction was applied, only those respondents who indicated an 
intensity of preference of seven or higher were classified as WTS to one of the DSR tariffs.  
 
4.4 DSR trial 
 
Analysis of the switching survey data revealed that a sizeable percentage of respondents (8% 
after certainty correction) would be willing to participate in a dynamic information-only DSR 
programme. However, there was obviously no way to predict how consumers who indicate 
willingness to switch to such programmes might behave on such a programme in practice. It 
was thus decided to conduct a dynamic information-only trial to investigate how consumers who 
chose to switch to such a programme might respond once enrolled. 
 
Consumer behaviour studies can be used to explore both whether and how consumers respond 
to inducements to change their consumption patterns (Cappers et al, 2013). To this end, a mixed 
methods approach was adopted for the trial, as the use of quantitative or qualitative methods 
alone would have made it impossible to determine precisely how households had responded to 
the trial events. Although some electricity trials have reported intervention effects based solely 
on self-reported energy-related behaviours, these do not necessarily reflect the changes that 
consumers make to their energy consumption (Abrahamse et al, 2005). Moreover, self-reported 
behaviours can be influenced by social desirability bias (ibid; Fisher, 1993) and recall bias 
(Last, 2000).45 As such, the use of quantitative methods made it possible to explore whether 
households had successfully changed their consumption patterns during trial events. Meanwhile, 
the qualitative data made it possible to gain insight into how observed changes in consumption 
had most likely occurred. 
 
4.4.1 Trial collaboration 
 
The original aim was to conduct the DSR trial in partnership with a supplier or DNO, recruiting 
participants from its existing customer base as would happen on an actual DSR programme. 
                                                
 
 
45 ‘Social desirability’ refers to systematic error in self-report measures which arises from respondents’ desire 
to avoid embarrassment and project a favourable image to others (Fisher, 1993). ‘Recall bias’ refers to 
systematic error which arises due to inaccurate or incomplete recollections of past events or experiences (Last, 
2000). 
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This would have provided greater confidence that the response from the trial group could be 
replicated in a real-world setting (Davis et al, 2013; Faruqui et al, 2009). Further, with 
additional funding from an industry partner, it would have been possible to purchase a larger 
number of in-home displays and thus recruit a larger sample of trial households, thereby 
increasing the statistical power of the tests used to explore trial response (Field, 2009).  
 
Between October 2012 and September 2014, three separate attempts were made to collaborate 
with electricity stakeholders. The first, with British Gas and researchers at Durham University, 
would have recruited participants on the CLNR ToU trial (Bulkeley et al, 2015), to explore 
whether notifying them of different tariff periods using ambient in-home displays (see 
www.ambientdevices.com) would increase DSR. Unfortunately, after several months of 
negotiations, the proposed collaboration failed when British Gas concluded that it was unable to 
make a real-time smart meter data feed available for the trial.46  
 
The second attempt at collaboration was with DNO Electricity North West. The proposal was to 
provide ambient in-home displays to some of the households participating in the Power Saver 
Challenge - a competition to reduce electricity use between 4:00pm and 8:00pm each day 
during Winter 2014/2015 (Electricity North West, 2015). Electricity North West eventually 
withdrew because it was concerned that the ambient in-home displays would give the 
households that received them an unfair advantage in the competition. 
 
The third potential partner was renewable provider Good Energy. In this case, the proposal was 
for a dynamic information-only DSR trial, which would have asked participants to try to use 
more electricity when available wind generation across the UK was high and less electricity 
when available wind generation was low (the same model as was ultimately adopted for the 
trial). Once again, however, this attempt at collaboration eventually foundered, due to concerns 
on the part of Good Energy that the trial might end up creating an unexpected administrative 
burden. 
 
After these attempts at collaboration failed, it was decided to conduct an independent trial, 
recruiting a convenience sample by advertising on the Centre on Innovation and Energy 
Demand website, the Your Energy Sussex Twitter account and the West Sussex County Council 
email bulletin.47 Although this method of recruitment meant that participants may have been 
                                                
 
 
46 This would have been required to measure the effects of the intervention. 
47 The confirmation of ethical approval for the trial is reproduced in Appendix V. 
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more interested in energy issues than the average consumer, this is not unusual in the case of 
DSR trials. Even in trials organised by electricity stakeholders, which can recruit large samples 
from their existing consumer base, participants may also be considered atypical of the wider 
population, as simply by choosing to sign up they demonstrate that they “are, by default, 
interested in the subject matter and interested enough to engage in early adopter projects” 
(Smart Grid GB, 2013, p.23). While this admittedly creates a risk of bias, it also reflects the 
realities of the UK energy market, in which consumers are free to choose between tariffs and 
providers, but only a small proportion are sufficiently interested and engaged to switch: 
according to Ofgem, as of January 2017 some two-thirds of UK households remained on 
standard variable tariffs, which are typically more expensive than other deals available on the 
market; while between July 2016 and June 2017, just 17% of UK consumers switched provider 
(Ofgem, 2017c).  
 
4.4.2 Within-subjects design 
 
Although randomised controlled trials and randomised encouragement designs48 are the 
preferred model for electricity trials (Cappers et al, 2013; Hobman et al, 2016), such methods 
were not viable for this study, because electricity interval data could be gathered only from 
customers who agreed to participate in the trial. Instead, a within-subjects design49 was used, in 
which the measured load of participants during non-event periods was compared with their 
consumption during events (Cappers et al, 2013).  
 
The internal validity of the within-subjects experiment required that two assumptions be met. 
The first was that there be a set of non-event days that was ‘sufficiently’ comparable to the set 
of event days: 
            
so that it is reasonable to assume that the only difference in customer behavior during 
event days and the comparable non-event days is that they experienced the treatment in 
effect during event days (for example, the comparable non-event days have similar 
temperatures and daylight hours to those of the event days). (p.44) 
  
                                                
 
 
48 In randomised encouragement designs, customers are randomly assigned to either a treatment group, which is 
encouraged to sign up for the treatment through an op-in or opt-out method, or a control group, which is not 
notified of the study (Cappers et al, 2013). 
49 Within-subjects designs compare the treatment group during periods when it receives the treatment to times 
when it does not receive the treatment (Cappers et al, 2013). 
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The second was that trial participants were on non-variable tariffs, as in this case “the 
assumption is that customers [will] not alter their non-event behavior very much as a result of 
being on the rate”. (p.44) 
 
In this study, the first assumption was met by conducting the trial in summer (from May to 
September 2015). This meant that the period during which baseline consumption data was 
collected to generate a reference load (May 10 to June 19) was similar in terms of temperature 
and daylight hours to that in which trial events were held (June 20 to September 3). The second 
was met by recruiting consumers who were on non-variable tariff rates (ie, not on Economy 7 or 
Economy 10). Cappers et al (2013) observe that when these conditions are satisfied, “non-
treatment days are an acceptable approximation of what the load would have been if the 
treatment group had never been on the rate” (p.44). 
 
4.4.3 Sample bias  
 
An important consideration when conducting electricity trials is to minimise the risk of bias 
affecting results (Davis et al, 2013). Davis et al (2013) identified six common biases recognised 
in the context of medical trials which might also affect electricity trials. Four of these –  
intervention selection bias, sequence generation bias, allocation concealment bias and blinding 
bias – are relevant only when the trial involves more than one participant group (eg, multiple 
intervention groups or an intervention group and a control group). Since the DSR trial used a 
within-subjects design, these biases could be discounted. A fifth – attrition bias, where 
participants who are not benefiting from the trial are excluded or withdraw from the trial before 
it ends – could be discounted as no participants withdrew or were excluded from the trial. The 
one remaining bias that could affect the findings of the trial was volunteer selection bias,50 
which arises “when the people who choose to participate in a study differ from the study’s 
intended population” (p.402).  
 
The initial attempts to collaborate with either a supplier or a DNO aimed to minimise volunteer 
bias by recruiting a larger sample directly from the customer base of the collaborating 
stakeholder. While – as previously discussed – this would not have eliminated such bias 
altogether, it would have afforded a wider pool from which to recruit and more closely reflected 
the real-world scenario. Ultimately, however, these efforts proved unsuccessful.  
 
                                                
 
 
50 This bias is also commonly referred to as ‘self-selection bias’ (see Aubin et al, 1995 and Ham et al, 1997).  
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Given the greater risk of volunteer bias presented by the smaller convenience sample that was 
eventually recruited, the sample was analysed to test how accurately it reflected the intended 
population: households that would choose to switch to a dynamic information-only DSR 
programme.  
 
The switching survey identified three factors which were positively correlated with WTS to 
such a programme: 
 
• environmental motivation (as measured by the “Commitment to environmental 
sustainability” measure – see Chapter 5); 
• education level; and 
• household income. 
 
Data pertaining to these factors was collected from the volunteer trial participants through an 
enrolment questionnaire – essentially a shorter version of the switching survey which was 
administered before the trial began. The volunteers’ responses on these three measures were 
then compared with those of the survey respondents who had indicated WTS to the dynamic 
information-only DSR programme. The results were closely matched for two of the three 
criteria – education level and environmental motivation (see Chapter 6) – providing greater 
confidence that, notwithstanding the limitations of selection, the trial sample was broadly 
representative of the intended population. 
 
However, this of course could not exclude the risk of volunteer bias altogether.  As Davis 
explains, volunteers and non-volunteers matched on observable characteristics may respond 
differently “if they differ in other relevant ways that are not represented in the available 
measures or if the act of volunteering changes their behaviour” (Davis et al, 2013, p.402).  
 
4.5 Interviews 
The third data collection phase involved a series of semi-structured telephone interviews with 
trial participants. Interviews are a suitable research method for exploring individuals’ views, 
experiences, motivations and beliefs on specific matters (Gill et al, 2008); “In simple terms 
interviewing provides a way of generating empirical data about the social world by asking 
people to talk about their lives.” (Holstein and Gubrium, 2004, p.140) 
Qualitative methods such as interviews can provide deeper individual insights than quantitative 
methods such as questionnaires (Silverman, 2000). As Aberbach and Rockman (2002) observe: 
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“Interviewing is often important if one needs to know what a set of people think, or how they 
interpret an event or series of events, or what they have done or plan to do.” (p.673) 
The interviews were thus intended to complement the quantitative trial data by delving deeper 
into participants’ experiences during the trial. While the quantitative data revealed whether 
consumption patterns during events differed from baseline consumption patterns, the interviews 
made it possible to explore the reasons for these changes. Learning about the experiences of 
individuals in a specific behavioural context can also generate insights which can be used to 
tailor interventions and maximise behavioural response (The Behavioural Insights Team, 2014; 
Fogg, 2009b). As such, this approach made it possible to identify actual (rather than 
hypothetical or assumed) enablers and constraints of response, and make recommendations for 
the design of future programmes informed by first-hand insights. 
Telephone interviews afforded several advantages over face-to-face interviews, including lower 
costs in terms of both travel expenses and travel time, and the speed with which the data could 
be collected (Lavrakas, 1993; Oppenheim, 2007). The use of telephone interviews also made it 
easier for individuals to participate, since they could be interviewed at a time and place that 
suited them best. These advantages were reflected in the size of the interview sample: all 46 
households which took part in the trial were invited to participate in this stage of the research 
and interviews were ultimately conducted with more than half of them (N=24). 
The interviews were semi-structured to afford some flexibility in responses, while still allowing 
comparisons to be made between them (May, 2001). The semi-structured format also made it 
possible to tailor some of the questions depending on interviewees’ previous responses in the 
enrolment questionnaire, and further allowed for “the discovery or elaboration of information 
that [was] important to participants but may not have previously been thought of as pertinent by 
the research team” (Gill et al 2008, p.291). 
4.5.1 Limitations 
A key objective of the interviews was to identify findings that could inform future DSR 
strategies with a view to maximising response. However, the qualitative nature of the interview 
data made it difficult to draw definitive conclusions in this regard. Therefore, where the 
interview data suggested possible measures for maximising response, the potential efficacy of 
these measures was explored further through a review of the DSR literature. 
As the interview sample was once again a convenience sample, it is possible that outlying 
households – those that responded to the greatest or least extent – may not have volunteered to 
 80 
be interviewed. There was therefore a risk that particularly potent enablers and constraints of 
DSR may have been missing from the interview data. To address this issue, households in the 
top and bottom 10% in terms of response were specifically targeted with follow-up interview 
requests; interviews were ultimately conducted with six out of eight such households (ie, 75% of 
the households that fell within this response spectrum).  
 
4.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter presented the methodological approach adopted to data collection and analysis in 
this thesis. It explored the advantages and limitations of the various data collection methods, and 
outlined the steps which were taken to address those limitations.  
 
The following chapter describes the switching survey, which examined UK consumer 
preferences for different DSR programme models. It explains how the survey was designed and 
conducted to collect switching preference data and identify the socio-demographic and 
economic variables that influence WTS. It also reveals DSR programme preferences both before 
and after certainty correction was applied to the survey results, and uses statistical models to 
explore the relationship between several independent variables and WTS to the different 
programme models.  
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5. Switching survey 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter discusses the online survey that was conducted to explore UK consumer 
preferences for DSR programmes. The survey aimed to estimate potential uptake of several 
different programme models and identify specific consumer characteristics that might influence 
WTS to such programmes.  These insights should prove valuable in marketing residential DSR 
programmes: correlating different customer characteristics with WTS and quantifying their 
relative importance should translate into more effective recruitment campaigns (Cappers et al, 
2013).  
 
Although previous studies have investigated consumer preferences for DSR in the UK context 
(see BEIS, 2016; Fell et al, 2015a; Nicolson et al, 2016), questions that remain unresolved 
include the following: 
 
• Is there a relationship between consumers’ perceived ability to respond on DSR 
programmes and WTS? 
• Does stronger financial or environmental motivation increase WTS and, if so, which has 
the greater influence on WTS? 
• Can WTS be increased by offering price guarantees? 
• What is the predicted uptake of information-only DSR programmes? 
 
By exploring these questions, the survey aimed to identify various measures to assist electricity 
stakeholders in maximising uptake of DSR programmes.  
 
Section 5.2 of this chapter explains how quota sampling was used to obtain a representative 
sample of households and provides details of the survey sample. Section 5.3 describes the 
questionnaire design and the rationale behind specific questions. Section 5.4 presents the main 
results from the survey data analysis, including details of respondents’ switching preferences 
and the factors that were correlated with WTS in the statistical modelling. Section 5.5 discusses 
the results of the various hypotheses regarding WTS that were tested, which were structured 
around the FBM elements of ability, motivation and trigger. Section 5.6 concludes and explains 
how the findings in this chapter informed the design of the dynamic information-only trial 
described in Chapters 6 and 7.  
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5.2 Survey sample 
 
As in previous studies exploring consumer preferences for DSR among representative samples 
of the UK population (BEIS, 2016; Fell et al, 2015a; Nicolson et al, 2017), respondents were 
recruited from an online panel of consumers. In this case, market research company Bilendi was 
commissioned to provide a sample from its 450,000 UK panellists, who complete online surveys 
in return for points which can be exchanged for various rewards (Bilendi, 2015).  
 
To be eligible to complete the survey, respondents had to be over 18 years old, live in the UK 
and be solely or jointly responsible for choosing their electricity supplier. This ensured that 
respondents were representative of those UK consumers who would be involved in the decision 
to switch to DSR programmes in a real-world context. Bilendi ensured that the first and second 
criteria were met when recruiting panellists; while the first survey item ensured that only 
respondents who identified themselves as solely or jointly responsible for choosing their 
household’s electricity supplier could continue with the survey. 
 
Socio-demographic quotas were applied to ensure that the sample was broadly representative of 
the UK population. These related to age, country of residence, number of household members, 
household income and ownership status, and were established using data from the 2011 UK 
Census and the 2014 Family Resources Survey (FRS) (Census, 2011; Department for Work and 
Pensions, 2014). Table 4 illustrates how the survey sample compared with this data. 
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Table 4. Survey sample compared to 2011 UK Census and 2014 Family Resources Survey data  
  Respondents 
(%) 
Census and FRS 
data (%) 
Country of residence 
 
England 84.4 83.9 
Scotland 8.4 8.4 
Wales 4.6 4.9 
Northern Ireland 2.6 2.8 
Household  
 
Owner 72.0 64.0 
Renter 28.0 36.0 
Age  
 
18-64 79.0 79.1 
65+ 21.0 20.9 
Gender Male 56.9 49.0 
Female 43.1 51.0 
Household members 
 
1 23.6 31 
2 40.2 34.0 
3 16.2 15.0 
4 13.8 13.0 
5+ 6.2 7.0 
Gross household  
income per week 
£0 - £199 8.2  9.0 
£200 - £399 21.1  25.0 
£400 - £599 18.2  20.0 
£600 - £799 12.6  14.0 
£800 - £999 8.9  10.0 
£1000+ 17.7  22.0 
Don’t know/prefer 
not to say 
13.3  
 
Although quota sampling made it possible to closely match the sample with the 2011 Census 
and the 2014 Family Resources Survey data for most of the socio-demographic and economic 
characteristics in Table 4, home owners and males were over-represented, while multiple 
occupancy households were under-represented.52 As such, a weighting parameter based on 
gender, household ownership and household size was used in the analysis (see Table 5). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
 
 
52 Except for households with five or more occupants, which were slightly underrepresented in the sample. 
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Table 5. Weighting parameters  
 1-person 
households 
2-person 
households 
3-person 
households 
4-person 
households 
5-person+ 
households 
Female renter  2.05 1.32 1.44 1.47 1.76 
Female owner 1.37 0.88 0.96 0.98 1.17 
Male renter  1.49 0.96 1.05 1.07 1.28 
Male owner 0.99 0.64 0.70 0.71 0.85 
 
5.3. Survey design and research hypotheses  
 
A 56-item survey54 containing a mix of closed and open-ended questions was designed with the 
aims of:  
 
• collecting socio-demographic and household data from respondents;  
• obtaining data for creating various measures of perceived ability to respond on DSR 
programmes and financial and environmental motivation to switch to such programmes;  
• describing three different models for DSR programmes and determining respondents’ 
WTS to each; and  
• exploring the influence of various factors on respondents’ stated preference to switch to 
one of the DSR programmes or remain on their current tariff. 
 
5.3.1 Perceived ability to respond  
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, consumers with greater perceived ability to respond on DSR 
programmes may have greater WTS to such programmes. To explore whether this is the case, 
four measures of perceived ability were created, as follows. 
 
(a) Ability to use energy-intensive appliances to respond 
 
In the UK, washing machines, dishwashers and tumble dryers can facilitate response on DSR 
programmes because these appliances are energy intensive and can often be operated flexibly 
(Bartusch et al, 2011; Ofgem, 2010). As Owen and Ward (2010) explain:  
 
                                                
 
 
54 The full survey is reproduced in Appendix II. 
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As of today, the main appliances where households could benefit from off-peak tariffs 
are wet appliances such as washing machines, dishwashers and tumble dryers. 
Households can vary the times at which they use these and they are large enough 
electrical loads to make it worth changing behaviour. (p.28) 
 
To test whether consumers with more of these appliances have greater WTS (H1), respondents 
were asked to indicate which of these appliances they had in their households. Responses were 
then used to create the measure “Household appliances” by awarding one point for each 
appliance they possessed (range 0 to 3).55 
 
(b) Ability to use electric central heating systems to respond 
 
Due to thermal inertia, households remain warm for a period even when heating systems are 
turned off. Consequently, one way in which consumers with electric central heating systems56 
might respond on DSR programmes is by varying their heating demands at certain times 
(Ericson, 2011; Mountain and Lawson, 1995). As such, it was hypothesised that consumers 
living in households with electric central heating systems might have greater WTS (H2). To test 
this, the “Household heating” measure was created by asking respondents to indicate how their 
households were heated from one of four categories:  
 
• electric central heating; 
• storage heating; 
• gas central heating; and  
• other types of heating, such as wood or coal burners. 
 
(c) Potential to change appliance use times 
 
To test the hypothesis that consumers who believe it would be easy to reschedule appliance use 
might have greater WTS (H3), respondents were asked to indicate how easy it would be to 
reschedule the use of each energy-intensive appliance that was present in their households 
(Question 17). The responses provided were used to create the measure “Ability to change 
appliance use times” (range 1 to 5).57 
                                                
 
 
55 Households with combined washer dryers were awarded two points on this measure, since both the washing 
and drying functions of this appliance could be used to respond. 
56 Excluding those consumers with storage heating systems, as the times at which these switch on and off are 
dictated by suppliers (usually overnight) and cannot be manually overridden. 
57 Respondents were asked to indicate how easy it would be change when each of these appliances were used, 
from response options of “Very difficult”, “Difficult”, “Neither easy nor difficult”, “Easy” and “Very easy”. 
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(d) Appliance consumption knowledge  
 
Consumers who believe they have a good understanding of appliance energy consumption may 
have greater WTS (H4), as this knowledge should assist them in responding. To explore this 
hypothesis, the measure “Perceived appliance consumption knowledge” was created by asking 
respondents to indicate how much they thought they knew about the amount of electricity used 
by different household appliances (range 0 to 4).  
 
5.3.2 Financial and environmental motivations for switching  
 
Two measures were used to explore the influence of financial and environmental motivations on 
WTS. The first, “Commitment to environmental sustainability”, was based on a measure of the 
same name developed using archive data from the British Household Survey and originally 
discussed in Alcock (2012). The seven attitudinal questions used to create this measure in the 
Alcock study (2012) were adapted for the survey, with the changes made to these questions 
discussed in Appendix III.58  
 
Three questions were used to construct the second measure: “Motivation to save money by 
switching electricity tariffs”. The design of these questions was informed by the survey pre-test, 
together with input from energy demand experts.59  
 
Principal component analysis is a statistical technique that can be applied to a set of variables to 
identify those which form coherent sub-sets that are relatively independent of one another 
(Tabachnick, 2001). Following the survey pilot (N=90), principal component analysis was 
performed on the response data collected for these 10 attitudinal questions (shown in Table 6): 
the seven adapted from Alcock (2012) and the three used to produce the “Motivation to save 
money by switching” measure. In this case, principal component analysis was used to explore 
the relationship between the 10 attitudinal questions and the two constructs - “Commitment to 
environmental sustainability” and “Motivation to save money by switching tariffs” - that these 
questions were being used to measure. 
                                                
 
 
The measure was created by converting each of these responses into a score (range 1-5), summing these scores 
and then dividing this by the number of these appliances they possessed. 
58 Appendix III also discusses the steps taken in designing the survey to reduce the incidence of bias. 
59 Appendix III includes further discussion of the pre-testing and pilot phases used to refine the attitudinal 
questions in the survey.   
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The outputs of principal component analysis include Bartlett’s test of sphericity and Kaiser-
Meyer-Olson’s measure of sampling adequacy tests, which test whether the data is suitable for 
the analysis (Field, 2009). Bartlett’s test of sphericity was statistically significant (P=.00), 
indicating that relationships existed between the data – the responses to the attitudinal questions 
collected from the survey pilot – that was being compared (ibid). Furthermore, the Kaiser-
Meyer-Olson value was 0.7, which is considered a good score for this test and further confirmed 
that the data was suitable for principal component analysis (Hutcheson and Sofroniou, 1999). 
After orthogonal rotation using Varimax60, each of the questions loaded onto one of three 
components61 and the component loading values ranged from 0.54 to 0.86, indicating that each 
of the variables was contributing to its component in a meaningful way62 (Field, 2009) (see 
Table 6). The three components were interpreted as:  
 
• personal commitment to environmental protection (Component 1);  
• the need for lifestyle changes to protect the environment and limit climate change 
(Component 2); and 
• motivation to save money by switching tariffs (Component 3). 
                                                
 
 
60 This method is considered easier to interpret, describe and report than oblique rotation methods, since it 
simplifies components by maximising the variance of the loadings within components, across variables 
(Tabachnick, 2001). 
61 Components are thought to reflect the underlying processes that have created the correlations among the 
variables being examined (Tabachnick, 2005). 
62 Typically, loadings greater than 0.3 are considered to be important (Field, 2009). 
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Table 6. Attitudinal survey questions 
 
As in Alcock (2012), the scored responses to the questions that loaded onto Components 1 and 2 
were combined to produce the measure “Commitment to environmental sustainability” (range 0 
to 29). This measure was used to explore whether consumers who are more environmentally 
motivated have greater WTS (H7). Scores for Component 3 questions were combined to create 
the measure “Motivation to save money by switching tariff” (range 0 to 12), to test whether 
consumers who are more motivated to save money by switching tariffs have greater WTS 
(H5).63 
 
Two further independent variables were included in the models. The first was a categorical 
variable which captured respondents’ educational qualifications.64 Respondents were divided 
into three categories: 
 
                                                
 
 
63 Questions for both measures were coded so that higher scores corresponded with greater motivation. 
64 This data was obtained using the same question used to record educational qualifications in the 2011 Census 
(Census, 2011).  
Component 1: Personal commitment to environmental protection 
 
It takes too much time and effort to do things that are environmentally friendly. 
The environment is a low priority for me compared with a lot of other things in my life. 
I am environmentally friendly in most things that I do. 
The need to reduce carbon emissions frequently influences what I do - for example, by choosing to drive 
less or to turn lights off when I can. 
Component 2: The need for lifestyle changes to protect the environment and limit climate change 
 
Most people will have to make big changes to their way of life to help to solve climate change. 
Most people need to change their way of life so that future generations can enjoy a good quality of life and 
environment. 
I need to change my way of life so that future generations can enjoy a good quality of life and 
environment. 
Component 3. Motivation to save money by switching tariffs 
 
When choosing your electricity tariff, how important is it that you get the cheapest deal available? 
How much effort would you be willing to put into comparing electricity tariffs to get the cheapest deal? 
How worried are you about the cost of electricity rising in the future? 
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• those with no qualifications;  
• those with qualifications below degree level; and  
• those with degree-level or higher qualifications.  
 
The second variable was household income. Respondents were asked to indicate their 
household’s weekly income from a set of income bands ranging from <£100 to £2,000+. So that 
this data could be treated as continuous, households were accorded the midpoint value for their 
income band and those indicating incomes of £2,000+ were treated as having incomes of 
£2,500. The data was then recoded into £100 units.65 For example, if a respondent indicated that 
household weekly income was between £300 and £400, this was recoded to 3.5. Since the 
income data was not normally distributed, it was converted into logarithmic form before being 
applied in the models.66  
 
5.3.3 DSR programme models and randomisation of respondents into groups  
 
Two of the three DSR programme models presented in the survey were based on tariffs that are 
well suited to the prevailing UK electricity system and have already been the subject of large-
scale trials. The first ‒ the daily ToU tariff ‒ was a static ToU tariff that charged higher prices 
for electricity between 4:00pm and 8:00pm on weekdays. This was based on the tariff tested in 
the CLNR ToU trial (Bulkeley et al, 2014). The second ‒ the day-ahead alert tariff ‒ was based 
on the dynamic ToU tariff tested in the LCL trial (Carmichael et al, 2014). Households on this 
tariff would be notified daily of how much their electricity would cost at specific times the 
following day. 
 
The third model ‒ the environmental alert ‒ was a dynamic information-only programme. Under 
this model, respondents would be sent notifications asking them to increase or reduce their 
electricity consumption at certain times the following day, depending on predicted wind 
generation. Respondents were informed that such programmes will help to increase the share of 
                                                
 
 
65 The data was recoded into £100 units to facilitate interpretation of the influence of this variable on WTS. 
Without this adjustment, the odds ratios produced by the models for household income would have indicated 
how the odds of choosing the DSR programmes changed for each £1 increase in household income. 
66 As respondents were offered the option to answer “Don’t know/prefer not to say” when asked about their 
household income, this led to missing values in the models (12.5% of cases). However, a comparison of the 
model with and without missing values for income revealed no substantive differences in model results. It was 
therefore decided to use a complete case analysis rather than to undertake a multiple imputation for missing 
values.  
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renewable energy in the UK electricity system by reducing demand when wind generation is 
low and preventing electricity from being wasted when wind generation is high.  
 
This model was included in the survey because, while studies have found that some consumers 
would be willing to participate in information-only DSR programmes which ask them to adjust 
their consumption based on available wind generation (Mert, 2008), no research as yet has 
explored how popular such programmes would be among UK consumers. 
 
As well as exploring consumer preferences for these programme models and whether financial 
or environmental motivations increase WTS, the survey was designed to answer two further 
questions: 
 
• Does increasing the savings that consumers can make by switching to DSR tariffs 
increase WTS (H6)?  
• Do price guarantees which allow consumers to try DSR tariffs without the risk of 
paying more increase WTS (H8)? 
 
To this end, respondents were randomly assigned to four groups that were presented with 
different descriptions of the DSR tariffs:67  
 
• Base case (Group 1) – informed that, on average, households would save 2% on the 
daily ToU tariff and 4% on the day-ahead alert tariff. 
• x2 savings (Group 2) – informed that, on average, households would save 4% on the 
daily ToU tariff and 8% on the day-ahead alert tariff.  
• Guarantee (Group 3) – informed that, on average, households would save the same as 
Group 1, but would pay no more for their electricity on a per unit basis for the first three 
months and could opt out with no penalty if they wished. 
• x2 savings plus guarantee (Group 4) – informed that households would receive both the 
x2 savings and the guarantee.  
 
Figure 12 shows how respondents were recruited, from the initial emails inviting them to 
complete the survey to their assignment to one of the four groups.  
 
                                                
 
 
67 The environmental alert programme was described in identical terms to respondents in all groups.  
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Figure 12. Recruitment and randomisation of respondents into groups  
 
 
Although respondents were randomly assigned to one of the four treatment groups, the groups 
might still have differed in terms of the independent variables (Table 7). As this might have 
biased the comparison of WTS between the groups, one-way analysis of variance and chi-square 
tests were used to check for any statistically significant differences in terms of these 
independent variables across the four groups. These tests revealed no differences between 
groups (all P values <0.05). 
 
5.4 Switching survey results  
 
After the three DSR programme models were described to respondents, they were asked to 
specify their switching preferences as follows:  
 
• Switch to one of the DSR programmes; 
• Remain on their current tariff; or  
• Don’t know.68 
 
Overall, 69% of respondents indicated that they would choose to switch to one of the three DSR 
programmes. The daily ToU tariff was the most popular, with over half of the switchers 
indicating that they would choose this tariff. The remaining switchers were almost evenly split 
between the day-ahead alert tariff and the environmental alert programme. This preference for 
the daily ToU tariff over the day-ahead alert tariff is in keeping with previous studies which 
have found that consumers tend to prefer simpler DSR tariffs with fixed pricing that does not 
                                                
 
 
68 The full survey is reproduced in Appendix II. 
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vary from day to day (Darby and Pisica, 2013; Ericson, 2011; Fell et al, 2015a). Figure 13 
shows the distribution of responses. 
 
Figure 13. Stated willingness to switch (N=1312) 
 
 
5.4.1 Certainty correction 
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, hypothetical bias can influence respondents’ choices in stated 
preference research (Fifer, 2011; Whitehead et al, 2014). In the context of this survey, this could 
have resulted in more respondents indicating WTS than would switch in a real-world setting. 
Consequently, and to provide a more conservative estimate of WTS, responses were certainty 
corrected through a follow-up question which asked respondents to rate how certain they were 
about their decision to switch, on a scale from 1 to 10. It was then assumed that only those with 
a certainty of seven or higher would actually switch. Figure 14 illustrates the percentage of 
respondents who indicated WTS before and after certainty correction. 
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Figure 14. Stated willingness to switch before and after certainty correction (N=1312) 
 
 
After certainty correction, the percentage of respondents who indicated that they would switch 
to one of the DSR programmes dropped to 40% (previously 69%). However, even after 
certainty correction, the percentage who indicated that they would switch to the daily ToU tariff 
(23%) was in line with UK government estimates that 20% of residential consumers will switch 
to a static ToU tariff by 2030 (DECC, 2012).69 In this regard, it is notable that respondents were 
asked whether they would switch to the DSR programmes now, whereas the UK government 
estimates are for 2030. This suggests that the government estimates might be conservative and 
that a larger number of consumers may choose to switch to these tariffs once they become 
widely available. 
 
Although the certainty correction is an approximation, and it cannot be assumed that the 
certainty corrected data would necessarily reflect the number of actual switchers in a real-world 
setting, it nonetheless provided a useful adjustment to the hypothetical switching data for the 
purposes of this study. 
                                                
 
 
69 This is in addition to consumers who are already on Economy 7 and Economy 10 tariffs (DECC, 2012). 
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5.4.2 Factors that influence WTS   
 
Statistical analysis was carried out to examine which socio-demographic, economic, household 
and attitudinal variables were correlated with WTS. The multinomial logistic regression model 
that was used for this purpose is an extension of the binomial logistic regression model, and is 
normally applied when the dependent variable can take three or more values and there is no 
obvious order to the alternatives (Friedman, 2010; Wooldridge, 2010). As in binomial logistic 
regression, multinomial logistic regression uses maximum likelihood estimation to evaluate the 
probability of categorical membership and is often considered an attractive method because it 
does not assume normality, linearity or homoscedasticity (Starkweather and Moske, 2015). 
Sample size guidelines indicate that there should be a minimum of 10 cases per independent 
variable (Schwab, 2002). These guidelines were satisfied since the sample consisted of 1,312 
participants and 10 variables were included in the final model.  
 
However, as in many statistical procedures, high levels of collinearity between independent 
variables can be problematic because they increase the standard errors of the coefficient 
estimates and can make it harder to attribute effects to specific variables (Field, 2009). 
Accordingly, correlation matrices were produced for all the interval and ratio independent 
variables that were included (see Table 7). The correlations between these variables were all less 
than 0.2, suggesting acceptable collinearity (ibid). Additional tests for collinearity were 
performed by carrying out linear regressions between these variables. Variation inflation factor 
values for all the variables were less than 1.6 and the average of all the variation inflation factors 
was less than 1. This provided further evidence that collinearity was within acceptable bounds 
(Bowerman and O’Connell, 1990; Myers, 1990). 
 
Table 7. Independent variables included in the model 
Variable Type Range 
Country of residence  Nominal NA 
Gender Nominal NA 
Qualifications Ordinal NA 
Household income (log) Interval 3.9 – 7.8 
Household heating  Nominal NA 
Household appliances  Ratio 0 - 3 
Perceived appliance consumption knowledge Interval 0 - 4 
Perceived ability to change appliance use times Interval 1 - 5 
Motivation to save money  Interval 0 - 12 
Commitment to environmental sustainability Interval 0 - 29 
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In this application of the multinomial logistic model, the dependent variable could take on one 
of four values: one of the three DSR programmes or ‘non-switcher’.70 ‘Non-switcher’ was used 
as the reference case, so that the statistically significant predictors of switching could be 
identified. Table 8 summarises the results of the multinomial logistic regression used to explore 
the relationship between the various individual and household variables in Table 7 and stated 
WTS to the three DSR programmes.71 
 
 
 
                                                
 
 
70 Respondents who indicated “Don’t know” were classed as non-switchers. 
71 In addition, the final three rows of Table 8 report results for Groups 2, 3 and 4 (see Section 3.3). 
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Table 8. Switching model    
Test variable  Daily time of use Day-ahead alert Environmental alert 
  95% confidence interval for 
odds ratio (OR) 
 95% confidence interval for 
odds ratio (OR) 
 95% confidence interval for 
odds ratio (OR) 
 B (Std. Error) Lower OR Upper B (Std. Error) Lower OR Upper B (Std. Error) Lower OR Upper 
Resident of Scotland -.29 (.28)  .43 .75 1.29 .00 (.34) .51 1.00 1.95 .61 (.32) .98 1.84 3.45 
Resident of Wales .34 (.41) .63 1.41 3.13 .44 (.51) .56 1.55 4.23 .96 (.47) * 1.05 2.62 6.54 
Resident of Northern Ireland .01 (.57) .33 1.02 3.14 -.21 (.76) .18 .80 3.55 1.44 (.59)* 1.32 4.23 13.54 
             
Gender (female) .32 (.15)* 1.02 1.38 1.86 -.02 (.19) .67 .98 1.44 .50 (.20)* 1.10 1.65 2.45 
Degree+ qualifications 1.18 (.36)** 1.62 3.26 6.58 .81 (.46) .90 2.25 5.60 1.04 (.46)* 1.14 2.82 6.98 
Below degree qualifications .83 (.35)* 1.16 2.30 4.57 .23 (.46) .51 1.26 3.11 .62 (.46) .76 1.86 4.56 
Income (log) .09 (.10) .89 1.09 1.34 .47 (.14)** 1.22 1.60 2.10 .32 (.14)* 1.04 1.37 1.81 
             
Electric central heating .84 (.31)** 1.25 2.31 4.25 .26 (.42) .56 1.29 2.97 1.00 (.37)** 1.32 2.73 5.65 
Storage heating -.46 (.36) .31 .63 1.28 -.89 (.56) .14 .41 1.22 -.92 (.55) .13 .40 1.18 
Other heating -.52 (.31) .32 .59 1.09 -.42 (.39) .30 .65 1.42 -.68 (.41) .22 .50 1.14 
             
Household appliances .16 (.09) .97 1.17 1.41 .06 (.12) .84 1.06 1.35 .14 (.12) .90 1.15 1.47 
Perceived appliance consumption knowledge .16 (.08)* 1.00 1.17 1.37 .11 (.10) .91 1.11 1.36 .19 (.11) .98 1.21 1.50 
Perceived ability to change appliance use times .18 (.08)* 1.02 1.20 1.41 .36 (.11)** 1.15 1.43 1.76 .14 (.11) .93 1.15 1.42 
             
Motivation to save money .05 (.02) .99 1.05 1.12 .03 (.04)  .95 1.03 1.11 -.00 (.04) .91 .99 1.08 
Commitment to environmental sustainability .05 (.02)** 1.02 1.05 1.08 .06 (.02)** 1.02 1.06 1.11 .17 (.02)** 1.13 1.19 1.24 
             
x2 savings -.30 (.21) .49 .74 1.11 .31 (.26) .82 1.36 2.28 -.12 (.26) .53 .88 1.49 
Guarantee -.05 (.21) .62 .95 1.45 -.11 (.29) .51 .89 1.60 -.14 (.28) .50 .87 1.49 
x2 savings and guarantee .23 (.21) .83 1.26 1.91 .20 (.28) 1.23 .71 2.12 -.33 (.29) .41 .72 1.28 
N=1312, P <.05* P<.01** 
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5.4.3 Odds ratios 
 
Odds ratios (ORs) are commonly used to report effect sizes in logistic models (see the boxout 
below for an explanation of how ORs are calculated). In the case of the ratio and interval 
variables included in the model - household income (log), household appliances, perceived 
appliance consumption knowledge, perceived ability to change appliance use times, motivation 
to save money and commitment to environmental sustainability - the ORs indicate the 
difference between the odds that respondents would choose a particular DSR programme and 
the odds that the respondent would choose not to switch for each one-unit increase in the 
variable. ORs greater than (less than) one indicate that as the variable increases, the odds of 
switching to the DSR programme increase (decrease).  
 
In the case of the categorical variables included in the model – household heating, country of 
residence, gender, educational qualifications – the ORs indicate the difference between the odds 
of switching to the DSR programmes for each category of the variable and the odds of switching 
in the reference case. For instance, as the reference case used for household heating was gas, the 
ORs reported for the other heating categories – electric central heating, storage heating and 
other – indicate the difference between the odds that households with these heating systems 
would switch to the DSR programmes and the odds that households with gas central heating 
would switch to the DSR programmes.  
 
Odds ratios (adapted from Liberman, 2005) 
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5.4.4 Hypothesis tests of ability, motivation and trigger 
 
This section provides the results of the hypothesis testing based on the coefficients and 
significance values from the estimated model (see the summary in Table 9). As discussed in 
Chapter 4, each hypothesis related to the ability, motivation or trigger component of the FBM. 
Hypotheses 1 to 4 relate to ability factors; Hypotheses 5 to 7 to motivation factors; and 
Hypothesis 8 to the trigger (the price guarantee). Hypotheses were accepted in cases where they 
were found to be significantly correlated with at least two of the three DSR programmes.72 
 
Table 9. Summary of switching hypotheses results 
                     Hypothesis Variable 
range 
ToU DAA EA Hypothesis 
accepted or 
rejected  
 OR OR  OR  
H1 More washing machines, tumble 
dryers and dishwashers increases 
WTS 
0-3 1.17 1.06 1.15 Rejected 
H2 Electric central heating increases 
WTS 
 
NA 2.31** 1.29 2.73** Accepted 
H3 Greater perceived ability to 
change appliance use times 
increases WTS 
1-5 1.20* 1.43** 1.15 Accepted 
H4 Greater perceived appliance 
consumption knowledge increases 
WTS 
0-4 1.17* 1.11 1.21 Accepted 
H5 Greater motivation to save money 
by switching tariffs increases 
WTS 
0-12 1.05 1.03 0.99 Rejected 
H6 Doubling the financial savings to 
be made on the DSR tariffs 
increases WTS 
NA 0.74 1.36 NA Rejected 
H7 Greater commitment to 
environmental sustainability 
increases WTS 
0-29 1.05** 1.06** 1.19** Accepted 
H8 Offering consumers price 
guarantees increases WTS 
NA 0.95 0.89 NA Rejected 
N=1312, P<.05* P<.01** 
 
                                                
 
 
72 H4 was an exception in this regard. This hypothesis was accepted even though it was significantly correlated 
with only the daily ToU tariff in the base model (P<.05). The justification in this case was that although greater 
perceived appliance consumption knowledge was correlated with greater WTS to the environmental alert 
programme at only the 10% confidence in the base model this increased to the 5% level when the analysis was 
carried out using the certainty corrected data (see Section 5.4.5). 
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Hypothesis 1 – Having a larger number of washing machines, tumble dryers and dishwashers 
increases WTS (ability) 
 
Although it was hypothesised that having more washing machines, tumble dryers and 
dishwashers would increase WTS, this was not supported by the results. The relationship 
between the number of these appliances found in respondents’ homes and the likelihood of 
choosing to switch to any of the programmes was not statistically significant for any of the DSR 
programmes (P>0.05 in each case).  
 
Hypothesis 2 – Having electric central heating increases WTS (ability)  
 
This hypothesis was strongly supported: the odds of respondents with electric central heating 
(n=93) choosing the daily ToU tariff were 2.3 times as large as the odds of respondents with gas 
central heating (n=929) choosing this programme. Similarly, the odds of respondents with 
electric heating choosing the environmental alert programme were 2.7 times as large as the odds 
of respondents with gas central heating doing so. 
 
Hypothesis 3 – Having greater perceived ability to change appliance use times increases WTS 
(ability) 
 
The results supported the hypothesis that consumers who believe it would be easier to 
reschedule appliance use have greater WTS. For each one-unit increase in this five-point 
measure, respondents were 43% more likely to choose the day-ahead alert tariff and 20% more 
likely to choose the daily ToU tariff. That this measure was most strongly correlated with WTS 
to the day-ahead alert tariff is unsurprising: consumers on this tariff – who would know only 
one day in advance of the electricity prices that would apply on the following day ‒ would need 
to be more flexible about when appliances were used than those who switched to the daily ToU 
tariff. 
 
Hypothesis 4 – Having greater perceived appliance consumption knowledge increases WTS 
(ability)  
 
The hypothesis that respondents with greater perceived appliance energy consumption 
knowledge would have greater WTS was supported: for each one-unit increase in this measure, 
respondents were 17% more likely to choose to switch to the daily ToU tariff. For each one-unit 
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increase in this measure, respondents were 22% more likely to choose the environmental alert 
programme; however, this was only significant at the 10% level (P=0.07).  
 
Hypothesis 5 – Having greater motivation to save money by switching tariffs increases WTS 
(motivation) 
 
As consumer interest in saving money on electricity bills is often cited as a motivation for 
switching to DSR programmes (Dütschke and Paetz, 2013; Namerikawae et al, 2015), it was 
hypothesised that consumers who are more motivated to save money by switching would have 
greater WTS. However, this hypothesis was not supported. The ORs for this measure for all 
three programmes were close to one (+/- 0.05 in each case) and the measure did not have a 
statistically significant relationship with WTS (P>0.05 for all three programmes). 
 
Hypothesis 6 - Doubling the financial savings to be made on the DSR tariffs increases WTS 
(motivation) 
 
The hypothesis that WTS would be increased by doubling the financial savings that consumers 
expect to receive was not supported. Although the tariffs presented to Group 2 respondents 
offered savings that were twice as high as those offered to Group 1 respondents, there was no 
statistically significant difference in the likelihood that respondents in these groups would 
switch (P=0.15 for the daily ToU tariff and P=0.23 for the day-ahead alert tariff).  
 
Hypothesis 7 – Having greater commitment to environmental sustainability increases WTS 
(motivation) 
 
As discussed in Section 3.2, a measure of each respondent’s “Commitment to environmental 
sustainability” was created to explore whether consumers who are more motivated by 
environmental concerns have greater WTS. The model showed that respondents with higher 
scores on this measure were more likely to choose to switch to all three DSR programmes, with 
higher scores increasing the likelihood that respondents would choose the environmental alert 
programme the most. For each one-unit increase in scores on this measure, respondents were 
19% more likely to switch to this programme (OR=1.19, P=0.00), 5% more likely to switch to 
the daily ToU tariff (OR=1.05, P=0.00) and 6% more likely to switch to the day-ahead alert 
tariff (OR=1.06, P=0.00).  
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Hypothesis 8 - Offering consumers price guarantees increases WTS (trigger) 
 
Contrary to expectations, the results did not support the hypothesis that offering price 
guarantees would increase WTS. The ORs for the guarantee group (Group 3) were less than one 
for both the daily ToU tariff and the day-ahead alert tariff, indicating that respondents in this 
group were less likely to choose these tariffs than respondents in the group not offered the 
guarantee.73  
 
5.4.5 Socio-demographic and economic variables and WTS  
 
Respondents from higher-income households were more likely to choose both the day-ahead 
alert tariff and the environmental alert programme. For each one-unit increase in the logarithmic 
income measure, respondents were 60% more likely to choose the day-ahead alert tariff and 
37% more likely to choose the environmental alert programme (OR=1.60, P=0.00 and OR=1.37, 
P=0.02 respectively). The day-ahead alert tariff was particularly popular with very high-income 
households (£2,000+ per week), with 33% of respondents in this income category choosing this 
tariff, compared with 16% who chose it across all income groups.74 
 
The relationship between equivalised household income and WTS was also explored (see 
OECD, 2013). For each one-unit increase in the logarithmic equivalised income measure, 
respondents were 68% more likely to choose to switch to the day-ahead alert tariff and 27% 
more likely to choose to switch to the environmental alert programme (OR=1.68 and OR=1.27 
respectively). However, as no data was collected about which households contained children 
between the ages of 15 and 17, the equivalised income measure was unable to accurately weight 
all households. Consequently, income before equivalisation was used in the final models. 
 
As the highest income band that respondents could select was open-ended (£2,000+ per week), 
sensitivity analysis was carried out on the income results. The model was estimated with an 
assumed income for these households of £2,000, £2,250, £2,500 and £2,750 per week. For all 
values, the relationship between household income and WTS to the day-ahead alert tariff and 
environmental alert programme remained unchanged (OR=1.60, P=0.00 for the day-ahead alert 
tariff and OR=1.37, P=0.02 for the environmental alert programme).  
                                                
 
 
73 The difference was also not statistically significant for either tariff. 
74 The percentages reported are before certainty correction. After certainty correction, 18% of respondents from 
households with incomes of £2,000+ indicated that they would switch to the day-ahead alert tariff, compared 
with 9% of respondents who chose this tariff across all income groups. 
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Respondents with educational qualifications were more likely to choose both the daily ToU 
tariff and the environmental alert programme. The odds that respondents with a degree 
qualification or higher would choose the daily ToU tariff were 3.3 times as large as the odds of 
those without qualifications and 2.8 times as large as the odds of those without qualifications to 
choose the environmental alert programme (OR=3.26, P=0.00 and OR=2.82, P=0.02 
respectively).  
 
The odds that respondents with qualifications below degree level would choose the daily ToU 
tariff were also 2.3 times as large as those without qualifications (OR=2.30, P=0.02).75 There 
was no statistically significant difference in the likelihood that respondents with qualifications 
would switch to the day-ahead alert tariff compared to those without qualifications (P>0.05 for 
all qualification categories). 
 
Females were 38% more likely to choose the daily ToU tariff than males (OR=1.38, P=0.04), 
and 65% more likely to choose the environmental alert programme than males (OR=1.65, 
P=0.01). Consumers living in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales were much more likely to 
choose the environmental alert programme than those living in England. The odds that 
respondents in Northern Ireland would choose this programme were 4.2 as large as those in 
England; the odds of those in Scotland were 1.84 times as large; and the odds of those in Wales 
were 2.6 times as large (OR=4.23, 1.84 and 2.62 respectively).76 
 
Several other variables were initially included in the model because previous studies have found 
that they influence WTS. These included variables pertaining to household size (BEIS, 2016; 
Ericson, 2011), whether households contained white goods with timers (Fell et al, 2015b) and 
whether households were on an Economy 7 or 10 tariff (Fell et al, 2015b; Nicolson et al, 2016). 
However, these variables were omitted from the final model because they did not show a 
statistically significant relationship with WTS to any of the programmes.  
 
                                                
 
 
75 The model was also estimated using respondents with qualifications below degree-level as the reference case. 
This made it possible to examine whether WTS differed between respondents with degree+ qualifications and 
respondents with below degree-level qualifications. Respondents with degree+ qualifications were 42% more 
likely to choose the daily ToU tariff and 79% more likely to choose the day-ahead alert tariff than those with 
below degree-level qualifications (OR=1.42, P=0.03 and OR=1.79, P=0.00). Respondents with degree+ 
qualifications were also 51% more likely to choose to switch to the environmental alert programme than those 
with below degree-level qualifications, although this difference was not statistically significant (P=0.06). 
76 This relationship was statistically significant for respondents from Northern Ireland and Wales (P=0.01 and 
P=0.04 respectively), but not for respondents from Scotland (P=0.06). 
 103 
5.4.6 Certainty corrected switching model  
 
An additional model was estimated using the certainty corrected data (the ‘certainty corrected 
switching (CCS) model’). This included an additional category for ‘uncertain switchers’ ‒ 
respondents who had indicated that they would switch, but who then provided a certainty 
response below seven. This model was used to explore whether respondent certainty influenced 
the relationship between the independent variables and WTS.  
 
The results of the CCS model provide further evidence that individuals with greater perceived 
appliance consumption knowledge have greater WTS (H4). In contrast to the base model ‒ 
which only showed a statistically significant relationship between perceived appliance 
consumption knowledge and choosing the daily ToU tariff ‒ the CCS model also showed a 
statistically significant relationship between perceived appliance knowledge and choosing the 
environmental alert programme (P=0.02).77 For each one-unit increase in this measure, 
respondents were 36% more likely to choose this programme (OR=1.36). 
 
The results of this model also supported the hypothesis that consumers who think it would be 
easier to change the times at which appliances are used have greater WTS (H3). Respondents 
were 30% more likely to choose the daily ToU tariff for each one-unit increase in perceived 
ability to change appliance use times, compared to 20% for the base model. Similarly, they were 
53% more likely to switch to the day-ahead alert tariff for each one-unit increase in this measure 
(compared to 43% for the base model), and 28% more likely to choose the environmental alert 
programme. However, the latter was just outside the threshold for statistical significance 
(OR=1.28, P=0.06). 
 
That respondents with higher commitment to environmental sustainability scores had greater 
WTS was also found in the CCS model (H7).  In fact, this was the only variable which was 
positively correlated with switching to all three programmes in both models. This strongly 
supports the hypothesis that individuals who are more environmentally motivated have greater 
WTS.  
 
                                                
 
 
77 In the base model, this measure was not statistically significant for the environmental alert programme 
(P=0.07). 
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Figure 15 shows the factors that were found to have a positive and statistically significant 
correlation with WTS to each programme.78  
 
Figure 15. Factors correlated with WTS to each DSR programme 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
 
 
78 In addition to being significantly correlated with WTS to the daily ToU tariff in both models, perceived 
appliance consumption knowledge was significantly correlated with switching to the environmental alert 
programme in the CCS model and is therefore marked with an asterisk in Figure 15. 
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5.4.7 Factors influencing the decision to switch or remain 
 
Respondents were asked to indicate the relative importance of several factors in their decision 
either to switch to one of the DSR programmes or to remain on their existing tariff, as 
appropriate. In each case, the factors were chosen because the DSR and wider energy literature 
suggest that they might influence WTS (see the discussion of the various factors in Appendix 
IV).  
 
Figure 16 shows the percentage of respondents who indicated that each factor was not at all, 
slightly, moderately, very or extremely important in the decision to switch to their chosen DSR 
programme. The scores in parentheses on the right-hand side of the tables indicate the overall 
importance attributed to each factor by respondents who chose the programme. Scores were 
calculated by awarding one point for each 1% of respondents who indicated that the factor was 
not at all important, two points for each 1% of respondents who indicated that the factor was 
slightly important and so on (overall importance scores had a possible range of 50 to 500). 
 
Figure 16. Reasons for switching  
 
 
 
 106 
 
 
 
 
 
Respondents who chose the daily ToU and day-ahead alert tariffs indicated that the opportunity 
to save money by switching to these programmes had the greatest influence on their decision to 
switch. “Save money” received the largest number of “Extremely important” responses from 
respondents who chose to switch to these tariffs by a considerable margin, as well as the highest 
number of “Moderately important”, “Very important” and “Extremely important” responses 
combined. This is in line with previous research on consumer preferences for DSR: most of the 
consumers in studies by Darby and Pisica (2013) and Hall et al (2016) indicated that the 
opportunity to save money was the main reason they would consider switching. 
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Respondents who chose all three of the DSR programmes reported that the ability to be flexible 
about the times at which appliances were used was the second most important factor in their 
decision to switch. This supports the results of the switching models, which showed that 
consumers who thought it would be easier to reschedule appliance use had greater WTS to the 
daily ToU and day-ahead alert tariffs (H3).  
 
Respondents who chose the two DSR tariffs indicated that improving the efficiency of the 
electricity system was the third most important factor and rated this above protecting the 
environment, preventing power cuts and promoting renewables. This suggests that efficiency 
considerations resonate strongly with many consumers and that electricity stakeholders may 
help to encourage switching to DSR tariffs if they highlight concomitant efficiency benefits. 
 
Respondents who chose the environmental alert programme indicated that the most important 
reason for doing so was that it would help to protect the environment. These respondents were 
also asked to rate the importance of fixed pricing on this programme, with 87% indicating that 
this was either moderately, very or extremely important in their switching decision. This 
suggests that information-only programmes could play an important role in maximising 
participation in DSR: these programmes may attract environmentally motivated consumers who 
might otherwise be dissuaded from switching to DSR tariffs by the inherent price uncertainty 
involved. 
 
5.4.8 Factors influencing the decision not to switch 
  
Respondents who chose not to switch were also asked to rate the importance of different factors 
in their decision. The responses to this question are shown in Figure 17. 
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Figure 17. Reasons for not switching 
 
 
Overall, respondents indicated that concerns about paying more primarily influenced their 
decision not to switch: 87% indicated that this was either “Moderately important”, “Very 
important” or “Extremely important”. This accords with previous research which has found that 
“scepticism and uncertainty” regarding the potential impact on energy costs is the main barrier 
to uptake of DSR tariffs (BEIS, 2016), and that most UK electricity consumers are loss averse 
(Nicolson et al, 2016).  
 
Respondents cited lack of trust in energy suppliers as the second most important reason for 
choosing not to switch. This is in line with the DSR literature, which identifies mistrust in 
energy suppliers as a further barrier to uptake of DSR programmes (Ofgem, 2013; Smart Grid 
GB, 2013; see also Chapter 2), and suggests that electricity stakeholders may need to take steps 
to engender consumer trust in order to address this. As Ofgem explains: “improving the base 
level of consumer trust and engagement is an important pre-condition for [DSR] developments.” 
(Ofgem, 2013, p.10) 
 
Appliance safety was cited as the fourth most important reason for choosing not to switch, 
suggesting that such concerns may reduce WTS. To explore this issue further, respondents were 
also asked to indicate whether they would be prepared to use appliances such as washing 
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machines, dishwashers and tumble dryers when household members were asleep or no one was 
at home. Many indicated that they would be unprepared to use one or more of these appliances 
at these times, with the most common reason for such reluctance being that unattended 
operation posed a fire risk.  
 
In this section of the survey, respondents were also presented with an open-ended question 
asking them to indicate the single most important reason for having chosen not to switch. Two 
hundred and fifteen respondents completed this question, with responses provided in Figure 18. 
 
Figure 18. Most important reason for not switching79 (open-ended question) 
 
 
Most of the considerations that respondents expressed in their answers to the open-ended 
question reflected the range of options presented in the previous closed-ended question. 
However, the fact that several individuals indicated that they would not switch to the DSR 
programmes because they already had solar panels is notable. These consumers indicated a 
reluctance to switch because the fact that they were generating their own electricity meant that 
they were already motivated to use electricity at certain times, and the timing of this usage 
might have conflicted with the requirements of the DSR programmes. Specific DSR tariffs 
                                                
 
 
79 The numbers in parenthesis next to the reasons presented in the key indicate the number of respondents 
providing this response. 
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which are tailored so that such households can still realise the benefits from their investment in 
solar may thus be needed to secure buy-in from this cohort (eg, Green Energy UK has partnered 
with energy storage developer Powervault to offer solar households a 20% discount on the price 
of a home battery which can be charged during cheap off-peak periods and then used at peak 
times (Green Energy UK, 2017)). 
 
5.5 Discussion 
 
This section discusses what was learned about the factors that increase WTS through the 
hypotheses that were tested in the survey, which were based on the FBM elements of ability, 
motivation and trigger. It also explores the implications of the survey results for maximising 
uptake of DSR programmes.  
 
5.5.1 Perceived ability 
 
Three of the four measures of perceived ability to respond that were explored (H2-H4) were 
correlated with greater WTS to one or more of the DSR programmes.  
 
The second hypothesis relating to perceived ability - that having electric central heating 
increases WTS (H2)  - was supported by the results of the switching survey. Respondents with 
these heating systems had greater WTS to both the daily ToU tariff and the environmental alert 
programme than respondents from households with gas central heating. As increased 
electrification of heating is expected to place a significant burden on the UK electricity system 
in the future (Ofgem, 2010; Strbac et al, 2016), electrically heated households represent an 
important target market for residential DSR, since some of the electrical load associated with 
heating these households will need to be shifted to avoid large spikes in demand at certain times 
of day and could also potentially be shifted to match supply output (ibid). As Darby explains, as 
“the future of heating will strongly influence the scale and shape of electricity demand in 
regions with cold winters”, one way of responding is “to ‘smarten’ electrical heating, enabling it 
to respond to network conditions by storing energy at times of plentiful supply, releasing it in 
response to customer demands and offering rapid-response ancillary services to the grid” 
(Darby, 2017, p.1).  
 
In this context, the fact that consumers with electric central heating systems had greater WTS is 
an important finding, suggesting that suppliers could maximise uptake of DSR programmes 
through targeted marketing directed at these households. At the same time, recruiting these 
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households could help to reduce the burden that they might otherwise place on the electricity 
system in the form of increased peak demand.80 
 
However, any such approach by suppliers may need to be accompanied by changes in housing 
policy. Households with poor thermal performance have less scope for thermal load shifting 
(Hong et al, 2012), and such loads could be shifted by at most two hours in households which 
are insulated to current standards before space temperatures dropped below widely accepted 
lower limits for thermal comfort (Kelly et al, 2012).81 As such, tighter regulation of the thermal 
standards of new houses, along with increased retrofitting of existing houses to improve 
insulation standards, may be required to facilitate greater use of electric heating systems to 
respond on DSR programmes. This could represent a win-win from a policy perspective, since it 
would help to unlock DSR potential in electrically heated homes while simultaneously helping 
consumers to save money through household energy efficiency improvements.82 
 
The third hypothesis relating to perceived ability to respond – that having greater perceived 
ability to change appliance use times increases WTS (H3) – was also supported by the results of 
the switching survey. Consumers who thought that it would be easier to reschedule appliance 
use times had greater WTS to both of the DSR tariffs. This finding is in line with findings by 
Buryk et al (2015), who found that consumers who thought that it would be easier to reschedule 
appliance use had greater WTS to a dynamic DSR tariff. Thus, measures which facilitate 
rescheduling - by promoting greater market penetration of smart appliances that can be 
controlled remotely by their owners or third parties - may help to increase uptake of DSR 
programmes. 
 
The fourth hypothesis relating to perceived ability to respond – that having greater perceived 
appliance consumption knowledge increases WTS (H4) – was partially supported by the results 
of the switching survey. Greater perceived appliance consumption knowledge was positively 
correlated with WTS to the daily ToU tariff in the base model, and with WTS to both the daily 
                                                
 
 
80 This approach may also represent a win-win for operators if these households can then shift a larger 
proportion of their demand through by rescheduling use of their heating systems, as seen in other studies 
(Mountain and Lawson, 1995).  
81 Which is usually regarded as the lower limit for acceptable thermal comfort (Fanger, 1970).   
82 In this regard, a recent study by UK Energy Research Centre and the Centre for Innovation and Energy 
Demand found that measures, including a combination of energy efficiency improvements, heat pumps and 
heat networks that would be cost effective from now until 2035 could reduce household consumption by 25% 
by 2035 (UK Energy Research Centre and Centre for Innovation and Energy Demand, 2017). At current energy 
prices this would equate to energy cost savings of £270 per household per year (ibid). 
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ToU tariff and the environmental alert programme in the CCS model (H4). This suggests that 
educational measures which help consumers to learn more about the amount of energy 
consumed by different household appliances might also help to maximise uptake of DSR 
programmes. As measures of this kind could also play a role in increasing response on such 
programmes, they are discussed further in Chapter 7. 
 
One of the measures of perceived ability – that having a larger number of washing machines, 
tumble dryers and dishwashers increases WTS (H1) – was not supported by the model results. 
Although it was hypothesised that having a greater number of energy-intensive appliances, 
which are commonly used to respond (Bulkeley et al, 2014; Schofield et al, 2014), would 
increase WTS (H1), respondents with more of these appliances in fact proved no more likely to 
switch.  
 
5.5.2 Motivation 
 
The switching survey explored the influence of internal and external financial motivations on 
WTS. The former – specifically, respondents’ motivation to save money by switching ‒ was 
explored using the measure “Motivation to save on electricity bills”. As discussed, there was no 
statistically significant difference in WTS between respondents with different scores on this 
measure. This is perhaps unsurprising: while the prospect of saving may have increased WTS 
for some, the risk of potentially paying more on a new tariff may have been a countervailing 
factor which reduced WTS for others. This explanation seems even more likely given that most 
electricity consumers in the UK are loss averse (Nicholson et al, 2016), and may thus be 
discouraged from switching to DSR programmes if there is a risk that they might end up paying 
more. 
 
External financial motivation was explored by varying the level of financial incentives offered. 
Half of the survey respondents were presented with the opportunity to save 2% on their 
electricity bills if they switched to the daily ToU tariff and 4% if they switched to the day-ahead 
alert tariff; while these savings were doubled to 4% and 8% respectively for the other half. The 
results were somewhat counterintuitive: while it was expected that WTS would be greater 
among those respondents offered the higher savings, this was not in fact the case.83  One 
possible explanation is that the savings were presented as a percentage saving on electricity 
                                                
 
 
83 In fact, the ORs for these respondents were lower than 1 indicating that they were less likely to have chosen 
to switch than those offered the base case savings of 2% on the daily ToU tariff and 4% on the day-ahead alert 
tariff. 
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bills, and thus may not have resonated as strongly as they might have had they been presented in 
pounds and pence.  
 
The result may also reflect the relative price insensitivity which residential consumers have 
displayed in other DSR contexts. Studies measuring response on DSR programmes have found 
that the relationship between consumer price response and peak and off-peak rates is not linear, 
and that consumers often appear to respond more to the existence of price signals than to the 
differential between peak and off-peak prices (Neuberg, 2014; Stromback et al, 2011). 
Similarly, respondents’ switching decisions may have been influenced more by the fact that 
savings could be made on such tariffs than by the magnitude of those savings.  
 
In contrast to the financial motivations explored, environmental motivation was positively 
correlated with WTS. The fact that respondents who were more environmentally motivated had 
greater WTS to all three DSR programmes has important implications for maximising uptake. 
While Buryk et al (2015) found that environmentally motivated respondents had greater WTS 
when the environmental and system benefits of participating in DSR programmes were 
highlighted, sampling issues with that study precluded generalisation of these results.84 By 
contrast, the sample for the switching survey was broadly representative of the UK population. 
Consequently, the finding that, when presented with information about the environmental 
benefits of DSR programmes, consumers who are more environmentally motivated have greater 
WTS can be generalised to the UK context, and suggests that highlighting the attendant 
environmental benefits of DSR programmes is likely to be an effective way of increasing 
uptake. 
 
Several factors which served as barriers to switching were also identified through the survey. 
These can be summarised as follows:  
 
• fears about the safety of using appliances unattended in order to respond;  
• fears that using appliances to respond at certain times would be too noisy;  
• fears over paying more; 
• fears over associated inconvenience; and 
• fears that responding would make it more difficult to benefit from existing solar panels.  
 
                                                
 
 
84 The sample consisted of 160 consumers, a mix of US and EU citizens (Buryk et al, 2015). 
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These considerations were sometimes the most important reasons that respondents gave for 
deciding not to switch (see Figure 18). The fact that all related to fears about the potential 
implications of switching indicates that they map onto the hope/fear motivator of the FBM – 
although in this case, instead of acting as motivations to perform a certain behaviour as under 
the FBM, they acted as ‘counter-motivations’ that prevented its performance.  
 
As these counter-motivations all reduced WTS, it may thus be argued that if ways can be found 
to mitigate their influence, this should correspondingly help to increase WTS. For example, to 
mitigate concerns about the incompatibility between personal solar generation and DSR, 
programmes could be designed which do not penalise such consumers for using electricity at 
times when their solar panels are likely to be generating. Similarly, regulations could be 
introduced to ensure that appliances are quieter and safer to operate.85  
 
Figure 19 presents a modified version of the FBM which incorporates the additional concept of 
‘counter-motivation’ described above. The dotted arrow running downwards shows how these 
serve to counter motivations for switching and reduce the likelihood that consumers will switch 
to DSR programmes. 
 
Figure 19. Modified FBM  
 
                                                
 
 
85 See Electrical Safety First (2014) for a detailed discussion of measures which could be implemented to make 
it safer to use household appliances.   
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5.5.3 Trigger 
 
The switching survey also explored whether a specific ‘spark trigger’ ‒ a guarantee that 
consumers would not pay more under the DSR tariffs for the first three months ‒ would 
influence WTS (H8). While this was expected to increase WTS (see Chapter 3), the results did 
not bear this out. The guarantee may possibly have had the opposite effect to that intended: 
instead of mitigating concerns about the risk of paying more during the initial three-month 
period, it may instead have highlighted the risk that bills might increase once the guarantee was 
withdrawn. Similarly, offering a penalty-free opt-out with the guarantee may have attracted 
respondents’ attention to the fact that they might need to switch tariff once again if they found 
that the DSR tariff was ultimately unsuitable for their needs; the associated inconvenience in 
turn may have dissuaded some respondents from switching. Regardless of the reasons, the 
results suggest that offering price guarantees is unlikely to be an effective way of maximising 
uptake of DSR programmes. 
 
5.5.4 Income and WTS and consumer interest in information-only programmes  
 
The finding that higher-income households had greater WTS is significant. Higher-income 
households are a key target segment for residential DSR, since they are normally higher 
electricity users and consume a greater proportion of their electricity during peak periods 
(Bulkeley et al, 2015; Druckman and Jackson, 2008). At the same time, they often have greater 
capacity to respond on DSR programmes than lower-income households: for example, those on 
the CLNR ToU trial shifted a greater proportion of their electricity use outside the 4:00pm to 
8:00pm peak period and were often “socio-technically equipped to incorporate the tariff into 
their active rhythms of household management” (Bulkeley et al, 2015, p.6). The fact that these 
households had greater WTS to the day-ahead alert tariff and the environmental alert 
programme thus suggests that targeted marketing of certain DSR programmes towards these 
households could provide a win-win by helping to maximise both uptake and response. 
 
Meanwhile, the fact that 20% of the respondents who indicated WTS to one of the DSR 
programmes chose the environmental alert programme, even though it provided no financial 
incentives, suggests that a significant residential DSR resource exists in the UK that might be 
tapped through similar information-only programmes. This resource is at least partially distinct 
from that which is captured by financial programmes: the variable pricing inherent in DSR 
tariffs was found to have dissuaded many respondents from switching, and most of those who 
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chose the information-only programme indicated that the associated fixed pricing had 
significantly influenced their decision. 
 
The popularity of the environmental alert programme among respondents from Northern 
Ireland, Scotland and Wales is also noteworthy, and suggests that electricity stakeholders in 
these countries may find it easier than their counterparts in England to recruit consumers to 
similar programmes. While the survey data does not reveal why respondents from these 
countries had greater WTS to this programme than their English counterparts, this may be 
because the wind industry in these countries was more mature than that in England when the 
survey took place. In 2015, wind capacity accounted for just 0.11 kilowatts per capita in 
England, compared to 1.03 kilowatts per capita in Scotland, 0.43 kilowatts per capita in Wales 
and 0.39 kilowatts per capita in Northern Ireland (Special feature – UK renewable electricity, 
2016) 
 
To the author’s knowledge, the approach taken in this study to cross-check the 
results – comparing a model produced with the stated preference data before certainty correction 
with a second model produced after certainty correction – is not commonly undertaken in 
statistical analysis. The cross-check made it possible to collect additional evidence regarding the 
influence of the various independent variables included in the model on WTS, providing further 
support in this regard. This could thus represent a promising methodological approach for 
generating further insights when using statistical methods to analyse data from stated choice 
experiments.     
 
5.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter explored consumer preferences for a range of DSR programmes that are likely to 
be suited to the UK electricity system context either now or in the future. The results of the 
stated choice experiment presented in the switching survey suggest that UK consumers have a 
considerable appetite for DSR programmes. Even the more conservative estimate, using the 
certainty corrected data, that 23% of consumers would switch to the static ToU tariff is 
comparable to UK government switching estimates for 2030 (DECC, 2012). Meanwhile, the 
fact that 9% of respondents indicated they would be willing to switch to the day-ahead alert 
tariff suggests that there is a market for dynamic DSR tariffs, which may become an 
increasingly attractive way for suppliers to manage the greater share of variable generation in 
the future UK electricity system (Deasley et al, 2014). 
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While previous research has estimated the number of UK consumers who might be willing to 
switch to DSR tariffs and direct load control arrangements (BEIS, 2016; Fell et al, 2015a; 
Nicolson et al, 2017), this study is the first to explore consumer interest in information-only 
programmes. In this regard, even after certainty correction, 8% of respondents indicated WTS to 
the environmental alert programme (20% of all respondents who indicated that they would 
switch to one of the DSR programmes). This suggests that such programmes could serve as a 
complementary offering to financially incentivised programmes, helping to expand the resource 
represented by residential DSR.  
 
However, by its nature, the switching survey cannot provide any evidence as to whether the 
consumers who might be willing to switch to information-only DSR programmes might in fact 
respond once enrolled. To explore this further, a DSR trial was designed and conducted, using 
the environmental alert programme as the blueprint. The trial ‒ described in detail in Chapters 6 
and 7 ‒ aimed to determine whether households on information-only DSR programmes would 
be willing and able to respond, and whether the theoretical resource revealed through the 
switching survey could be harnessed to help optimise the impact of residential DSR in practice.  
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6. The dynamic information-only trial 
 
6.1 Introduction  
 
The switching survey discussed in Chapter 5 included a discrete choice experiment which 
presented respondents with the hypothetical opportunity to switch to one of three DSR 
programmes: a static TOU tariff, a dynamic TOU tariff or a dynamic information-only 
programme. The static and dynamic TOU tariffs were based on price-based programmes that are 
well suited either to existing electricity system conditions or to those expected to prevail from 
2020 onwards (see Chapter 2 and also Element Energy and Redpoint, 2012; Darby and 
McKenna, 2012). Under the third - the environmental alert programme - customers would be 
sent advance notifications requesting them to reduce or increase their electricity consumption 
depending on available wind generation, although prices would remain the same at all times.  
 
While large-scale trials have been conducted in the UK to explore how consumers respond to 
tariffs that resemble the static and dynamic ToU tariffs presented in the switching survey 
(Bulkeley et al 2014; Schofield et al, 2014), none thus far have focused on dynamic 
information-only DSR programmes. Research in this area would be especially welcome for two 
reasons. First, as renewable generation increases, dynamic DSR programmes could help 
suppliers to match supply with demand, thus reducing the price they pay for electricity in the 
wholesale markets (Hesmondhalgh et al, 2014). Second, the switching survey revealed that 
some consumers may prefer the fixed pricing that is a feature of dynamic information-only 
programmes. Such programmes could therefore represent an additional demand-side resource 
for electricity system stakeholders if consumers on these programmes can successfully respond 
once enrolled. 
 
To this end, a dynamic information-only DSR trial was carried out as part of the research for 
this thesis. It aimed to determine whether residential consumers could adjust their consumption 
patterns in response to day-ahead notifications based on forecast available generation from wind 
farms across the country. The trial focused specifically on wind generation because this is 
already the most abundant renewable electricity source in the UK (DUKES, 2016) and has 
strong potential for further growth, given that the UK is among the windiest countries in Europe 
(Ask For Evidence, 2017). 
 
Section 6.2 of this chapter explains how participants were recruited to the trial, provides socio-
demographic information about the sample and discusses self-selection issues. Section 6.3 
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describes the experimental design, including how electricity consumption data was collected 
from trial households and how changes in consumption during trial events were estimated. 
Section 6.4 presents the results, including estimations of response during trial events and the 
tests used to determine whether changes in consumption were statistically significant. Section 
6.5 discusses the implications of these results for the use of information-only DSR programmes 
as an additional demand-side resource, and the potential benefits of implementing such 
programmes for electricity stakeholders. Section 6.6 sets out conclusions and discusses some 
limitations of the trial.  
 
6.2 Trial recruitment, sample socio-demographics and participant self-
selection  
 
An invitation to participate in the trial was circulated through the Centre on Innovation and 
Energy Demand website, the Your Energy Sussex Twitter account and the West Sussex County 
Council email bulletin. The call for participation explained that as electricity cannot be easily 
stored, information-only DSR programmes can help to ensure that generation from wind is not 
wasted (see Appendix VI). 
 
Forty-six individuals from households across Southeast England volunteered to participate in 
the trial (henceforth referred to as the ‘lead participants’).86 These individuals then completed an 
online enrolment questionnaire - essentially, a shorter version of the switching survey - the 
results of which are summarised in Table 10. 
 
Compared to UK statistics, most of the lead participants were from households with higher than 
average incomes and were also more likely to own their homes (Office for National Statistics, 
2012). The sample also included a greater than normal proportion of four-person and five-
person-plus households (ibid). However, the sample was intended to be representative not of the 
average UK household, but rather of those that would be most likely to sign up to similar 
information-only DSR programmes if they were made available in the future.  
 
In this regard, studies suggest that individuals who self-select to participate in residential energy 
trials are often highly environmentally aware and inherently motivated to engage in energy 
                                                
 
 
86 The consent form for participation in the trial is reproduced in Appendix VII; the information form which 
participants were sent prior to commencement of the trial is reproduced in Appendix VIII. 
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saving (Ek and Söderholm, 2010). The fact that the trial sample was likely to include many such 
individuals was considered advantageous, given that the switching survey revealed that more 
environmentally motivated individuals – as tested through the “Commitment to environmental 
sustainability” measure – were more likely to choose to sign up to an equivalent information-
only programme (see Chapter 5). 
 
Table 10. Trial sample 
Household location East Sussex 20 
 West Sussex 12 
 London 8 
 Other87 6 
Household ownership Owner 35 
 Renter 11 
Gender of lead participant Male 25 
 Female 21 
Household members 1 4 
 2 15 
 3 7 
 4 16 
 5+ 4 
Household income per week £100 - £399 4 
 £400 - £699 4 
 £700 - £999 14 
 £1,000 - £1,499 13 
 £1,500+ 2 
 Don’t know/prefer not 
to say 
9 
 
The switching survey further revealed that individuals with degree-level educational 
qualifications or higher and those from higher-income households were more likely to choose to 
sign up to the environmental alert programme. The mean “Commitment to environmental 
sustainability” scores, mean household incomes and mean educational qualification levels88 of 
                                                
 
 
87 These households were located in the West Midlands, Cornwall, the Southeast, Norfolk, Portsmouth and 
Cambridge. 
88 This four-point educational qualification measure was the same as that used in the Census 2011 (Office for 
National Statistics, 2012):  
• Level 1 qualifications – one to four GCSEs or equivalent qualifications;  
• Level 2 qualifications – five GCSEs or equivalent qualifications;  
 121 
the lead participants were thus compared with those of the switching survey respondents who 
chose the environmental alert programme, to test whether they were representative of the cohort 
that would be most likely to participate in similar information-only programmes.89 The results 
are set out in Table 11 which also includes this data for survey respondents who chose not to 
switch to any of the DSR programmes, for comparison. 
 
Table 11. Comparison of trial sample and survey respondents 
 Trial sample 
(N=46) 
Environmental 
alert (n=194)  
Non-switchers 
(n=412) 
Commitment to environmental 
sustainability score (0-29) 
 
20.9 
 
20.2 
 
16.5 
 
Educational level (1-4) 
 
3.5 
 
3.3 
 
2.8 
 
Weekly household income90 
 
£995 
 
£748 
 
£585 
 
As Table 11 illustrates, while lead participants tended to come from higher-income households 
than respondents who chose the environmental alert programme in the switching survey, the two 
cohorts were closely matched in terms of mean educational qualification levels and commitment 
to environmental sustainability scores.  This afforded greater confidence that the response from 
households on the trial could be representative of that which might be expected on a real-world 
information-only DSR programme.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
 
 
• Level 3 qualifications – two or more A Levels or equivalent qualifications; and  
• Level 4 qualifications – bachelor’s degree or equivalent and higher qualifications. 
89 At least in terms of these characteristics. It was not possible to know for certain whether other consumer or 
household characteristics which were not measured had influenced respondents’ decisions to choose the 
equivalent programme in the switching survey. 
90 Survey respondents and lead participants in the DSR trial who answered “Don’t know/prefer not to say” to 
the income question were not included in this comparison.   
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6.3 Experimental design  
 
In order to track response on the trial, participating households were provided with: 
 
• a current transformer clip, which was attached to each household’s electricity meter to 
record electricity consumption;  
• a Geo Solo in-home display; and  
• an internet bridge.  
 
The in-home display presented participants with real-time information on their electricity 
consumption, in either kilowatt-hours (kWh), pence per hour or carbon dioxide emissions per 
hour. By default, it showed consumption in pence per hour, as illustrated in Figure 20. 
 
Figure 20. Geo Solo II in-home display 
 
 
 
The internet bridge, which was connected to each household’s broadband router, allowed more 
detailed consumption data to be accessed online. Household members – and the author – could 
log onto the Energynote website (Energynote, 2014) to access historical consumption data 
presented in daily, weekly or monthly graphs. Crucially, 15-minute interval consumption data 
could also be downloaded from the site to determine whether each household’s consumption 
patterns during trial events differed from its typical consumption patterns (described further 
below).  
 
Many of the lead participants (n=24) were also interviewed at the end of the trial, to learn more 
about their experiences and explore how future DSR programmes could be designed to 
maximise response. The qualitative data from these interviews is discussed in detail in Chapter 
7. However, when analysed alongside participants’ consumption data, this often yielded further 
insights regarding household electricity use; in such cases, qualitative data from the interviews 
is also presented in this chapter to contextualise electricity use in the households.  
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6.3.1 Trial events 
 
Lead participants registered the mobile phone numbers of one or more household members to 
receive event notifications by text and could also choose to receive additional notifications via 
email. Two notifications of each trial event were sent: the first 24 hours in advance of the event 
and the second one hour before it was due to start. The first notification aimed to give 
participants sufficient time to consider how they might respond during the event, while the 
second served as a reminder that the event was about to begin.  
 
Twenty-four ‘turn-up’ events (where participants were asked to increase consumption) and 16 
‘turn-down’ events (where participants were asked to reduce consumption) were held between 
June 23 2015 and September 5 2015. Five events took place in June, 19 in July, 14 in August 
and two in September. Each event lasted for between two and 18 hours. Figure 21 shows an 
example of a ‘turn-up’ notification. 
 
Figure 21. Turn-up notification 
 
 
6.3.2 Timing of events 
 
The events were timed based on data from National Grid’s wind forecasting tool, which is 
published on the Balancing Mechanism Reporting System website (BM Reports, 2014). The 
tool predicts total electricity generation for the next 72 hours from wind farms which are 
monitored by National Grid.  
 
This data was analysed daily throughout the trial to determine the timing and duration of events. 
Turn-down events were scheduled when total predicted output from all wind farms was under 
850 MW, representing under 10% of installed wind capacity. Turn-up events were scheduled 
when total predicted output from all wind farms was over 3,000 MW, representing more than 
33% of installed wind capacity.  
 
Figure 22 shows an example of forecast data for the period between midnight on July 1 2015 
(the first ‘1’ on the X axis) and 10:00pm on July 3 2015 (the last ‘45’ on the X axis). Minimum 
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generation was predicted to take place between 7:00am and 11:00am on July 3 (15-23 on the X 
axis). As generation was forecast to be under 850 MW over this period, a turn-down event was 
scheduled (Event 7). 
 
Figure 22. Forecast of generation from wind farms monitored by National Grid 
 
 
Using wind generation forecasts to schedule events afforded greater realism to the trial, 
increasing the likelihood that events would occur at a similar frequency and last for a similar 
duration as would be expected on an equivalent real-world programme. This also made it less 
likely that participants would experience a disconnect between the timing of events and 
prevailing weather conditions in their local area, which might have led to disengagement from 
the trial and biased event response. 
 
The timing of the events is shown in Table 12 and Table 13. The green events in Table 12 were 
turn-up events (n=24) and the red events in Table 13 were turn-down events (n=16). 
 
6.3.3 Trial design 
 
The trial design was informed by recommendations for consumer electricity behaviour studies 
made by Cappers et al (2013), who identified six design stages. One of these - estimating 
demand models - involves calculating price elasticities and was thus irrelevant for present 
purposes, as information-only DSR programmes do not provide financial incentives.  
 
The remaining five stages are as follows:  
 
• Identify the specific questions that the analysis seeks to answer. 
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• Select the optimal reference load model given the data available. 
• Validate the reference load model. 
• Estimate load impacts by measuring effects based on reference load and actual usage 
data. 
• Report the results. 
 
Stage 1 - Identify specific questions 
 
The first stage involved identifying the questions that the trial was seeking to answer. In the case 
of the quantitative data analysis presented in this chapter, these were as follows: 
 
• Did electricity consumption in each household during trial events differ from typical 
consumption? 
• To what extent did response vary between households? 
• Was response greatest for turn-up events or for turn-down events?  
 
Stage 2 - Select reference load model  
 
Although treatment control methods – such as randomised controlled trials and randomised 
encouragement designs91 – are often preferred for electricity trials (Cappers et al, 2013; Hobman 
et al, 2016), these methods could not be used for this study because electricity interval data was 
available for participating households only. Instead, a within-subjects design was used, so that a 
reference load model could be produced and treatment effects estimated by comparing measured 
consumption during non-event periods against consumption during trial events (Cappers et al, 
2013).  
                                                
 
 
91 In randomised encouragement designs, customers are randomised into a control or treatment group before 
they are contacted or encouraged to participate in a study (Cappers et al, 2013). 
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Table 12. Turn-up events 
 Event 
 3 4 6 8 10 11 13 14 15 17 19 21 22 23 25 27 29 32 33 34 35 36 39 40 
12am                         
1am                         
2am                         
3am                         
4am                         
5am                         
6am                         
7am                         
8am                         
9am                         
10am                         
11am                         
12pm                         
1pm                         
2pm                         
3pm                         
4pm                         
5pm                         
6pm                         
7pm                         
8pm                         
9pm                         
10pm                         
11pm                         
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Table 13. Turn-down events 
 Event 
 1 2 5 7 9 12 16 18 20 24 26 28 30 31 37 38 
12am                 
1am                 
2am                 
3am                 
4am                 
5am                 
6am                 
7am                 
8am                 
9am                 
10am                 
11am                 
12pm                 
1pm                 
2pm                 
3pm                 
4pm                 
5pm                 
6pm                 
7pm                 
8pm                 
9pm                 
10pm                 
11pm                 
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The validity of this within-subjects design rested on two assumptions (ibid). First, electricity 
consumption had to be measured on a set of non-event days with similar characteristics to event 
days (eg, days with similar daylight hours and temperatures).  Second, participants had to be on 
non-variable tariffs, so that it could be assumed that they were not altering their consumption 
patterns in response to other influences outside the trial. 
 
The former assumption was met by conducting the trial from May to early September, so that 
the temperatures and daylight conditions when reference loads were produced (May 10 to June 
19) were similar to those when events were held (June 20 to September 3). The latter assumption 
was met by ensuring that participating households were not on legacy time-varying electricity 
tariffs such as Economy 7 or Economy 10, which might have biased their response. 
 
Reference consumption (RChk) values were calculated for each household (h) for each event 
period (k), where the latter is defined as the day of the week and the time of day of the 
corresponding event. This involved measuring electricity consumption in each household during 
each period during the monitoring stage that corresponded with the events (i=1,…Nhk), and 
taking the mean:  
 !"#$ = 	 '()* !"#$++,',()*   (1)   
The resulting RChk values provided estimates of the counterfactual: in other words, what 
electricity consumption in each household would have been during the events had it not been 
exposed to the treatment.  
 
As household routines which influence electricity consumption are more likely to recur at 
similar times (Cetin et al, 2014; Powells et al, 2014), RChk values were calculated using 
consumption data collected over the same hours and on the same days of the week as the events 
themselves. This increased the likelihood that the values would reflect the typical electricity 
consumption of the households for these periods.  
 
Stage 3 – Validate reference load model  
 
Before within-subjects designs are used to estimate changes in electricity consumption, it is 
helpful to assess the accuracy of the load model in predicting actual loads (Cappers et al, 2013). 
In this case, four tests were performed to examine how accurately the model predicted the total 
electricity consumption of all households during different periods on different days of the week. 
To this end, reference consumption values for each household were created for each test period. 
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The reference consumption values for all households were then combined and compared with 
the actual consumption of all households during the test periods.  
 
For example, for Test 1, the total electricity consumed by all households between 4:00pm and 
8:00pm on May 13, May 20, May 27, June 3 and June 10 was calculated and then divided by 
five (the number of reference periods for which consumption data was collected). This resulted 
in a predicted total consumption on Wednesdays between 4:00pm and 8:00pm of 78.58 kWh. 
This was then compared with the actual consumption of the households between 4:00pm and 
8:00pm during the test period on June 17 (77.49 kWh). The results of the four tests are reported 
in Table 14. 
 
Table 14. Model load prediction tests 
 Date Day Time Predicted 
consumption 
(kWh) 
Actual 
consumption 
(kWh) 
Load 
difference 
(kWh) 
Percentage 
difference 
1 17.06.15  Wednesday 4:00pm-
8:00pm 
78.58 77.49 -1.09 -1.39% 
2 19.06.25  Friday 8:00pm-
12:00am 
74.61 74.26 -0.35 -0.47% 
3 20.06.15 Saturday 12:00pm-
2:00pm 
32.60 34.01 1.41  4.33% 
4 22.06.15 Monday 7:00am-
10:00am 
53.78 56.03 2.25 4.18% 
 
As expected, there was some variance between the model’s predictions and actual consumption 
during the test periods: sometimes the model overestimated consumption (Tests 1 and 2), and 
sometimes it underestimated consumption (Tests 3 and 4). Across the four tests, the model 
predicted electricity consumption with an average deviation of 2.6% from actual consumption 
during the test periods.  
 
Paired sample t-tests were carried out on predicted and actual consumption values for each test. 
The null hypothesis in each case was that there was no difference between predicted and actual 
consumption during the test period. As none of the tests was statistically significant, the null 
hypothesis was accepted, providing additional confidence that the model would produce viable 
reference loads. 
 
The combined electricity consumption of all households was also compared on two Saturdays 
and two Thursdays while reference consumption data was being collected. This made it possible 
to explore whether consumption followed a similar pattern on the same days of the week (see 
Figure 23 and Figure 24). 
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As can be seen from Figure 23 and Figure 24, electricity consumption in all households 
followed a similar pattern on the same days of the week. For instance, on both Thursdays 
depicted in Figure 24, combined consumption was less than 3.5kWh between 12:00am and 
6:30am, before increasing to a morning peak of between 5.5kWh and 6.2 kWh at 7:30am. 
Electricity consumption also peaked at 6.2kWh and 6.5kWh on both Thursdays at 7:30pm. 
  
Figure 23. Total electricity consumption for all households on Saturday June 13 and 20 
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Figure 24. Total electricity consumption for all households on Thursday June 11 and 18 
 
 
Stage 4 – Estimate load impacts  
 
To examine whether electricity consumption during events in each household differed from 
typical consumption, the difference in consumption for each household during event periods 
(EChk) and corresponding reference consumption periods (RChk) was calculated. This was 
expressed in absolute terms (Dhk) and as a percentage (Phk) of the reference consumption: 
 
hkhkhk RCEC -=D   (2) 
 
100*)(
hk
hkhk
hk RC
RCECP -=
 (3) 
To examine whether the total electricity consumption of all households during events differed 
from typical consumption, two further values were calculated. The first was the total combined 
electricity consumption of the households for each event: 
 
å=
h
hkk ECEC   (4)  
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The second was the corresponding combined total reference electricity consumption of the 
households for each event: 
 
å=
h
hkk RCRC    (5) 
The percentage change in consumption between ECk and RCk for each event was then calculated: 
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6.4 Event response  
 
In line with recommended practice for evaluating and reporting the results of electricity trials 
(Cappers et al, 2013), and to facilitate comparison of the response recorded in this trial with 
other DSR studies, two measurements of response are reported: 
 
• Average kWh change per event hour – the mean household response per hour during 
turn-up events was +18W and the mean household response per hour during turn-down 
events was -44W. The mean household response per hour considering both turn-up and 
turn-down events was +/-30W. 
• Average percentage change in energy use per event hour – this was an average increase 
in electricity usage of 4.4% for turn-up events and an average decrease in electricity 
usage of 9.9% per hour for turn-down events. The mean household percentage change 
in consumption per event hour considering both turn-up and turn-down events was 
6.8%. 
 
During 14 out of 16 turn-down events, the total electricity consumption of the households (ECk) 
was lower than their total reference consumption (RCk); while during 19 out of 24 turn-up 
events, ECk was higher than RCk.  
 
Figure 25 shows the percentage difference between the total electricity consumption during each 
event and the corresponding total reference load (Equation 6). Turn-down events are shown in 
red and turn-up events are shown in green. 
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Figure 25. Percentage difference between electricity consumption during events and reference load (all 
households) 
 
 
The greatest response occurred during Event 10 (a turn-up event from 1:00pm to 4:00pm on 
Monday July 6): households used 29% more electricity than during the corresponding reference 
period (13.4 kWh more electricity). The lowest response occurred during Event 34 (a turn-up 
event from 10:00am to 9:00pm on Sunday August 23): households used 17% less electricity 
(44.5 kWh), despite having been asked to try to use more. 
 
In the case of Event 34 and four other anomalous turn-up events (Events 15, 21, 25 and 40), 
complementarity (cf Greene et al, 1989 and Chapter 4) - achieved by analysing household 
electricity consumption data alongside the interview data - made it possible to explore why ECk 
was lower than RCk, even though the events had called for increased consumption. The analysis 
revealed that certain larger households that usually consumed more electricity than average for 
the trial group had been empty during these events. To explore whether this had caused the 
anomalous results, ECk and RCk values were recalculated after removing the RChk and EChk 
values of these households; the results are shown in Table 15. 
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Table 15. Anomalous turn-up events before and after adjusting for households identified as empty 
Event RCk 
KwH 
ECk 
KwH 
% change in 
consumption 
Empty 
households92 
Adjusted 
RCk 
KwH 
Adjusted  
ECk  
% change in 
consumption 
15  111.9 99.6 -11.05 1 108.6 98.2 -9.58 
21  125.4 117.2 -6.53 3 109.9 110.9 +0.91 
25  105.6 93.3 -11.65 4 91.9 90.0 -2.07 
34  268.7 224.1 -16.59 4 231.1 214.8 -7.05 
40  89.5 86.7 -3.08 3 84.8 85.7 +1.06 
 
After these adjustments, two of the turn-up events showed a positive overall response (Events 
21 and 40), and the difference between ECk and RCk values for the other events was 
considerably lower (Events 15, 21 and 34). It was thus confirmed that the larger households 
identified as unoccupied during the events had contributed significantly to the anomalous 
results: in the case of at least two of the events, the reduced consumption in these households 
had more than offset any increase in consumption in the other households, leading to an overall 
anomalous result.  
 
Further analysis of the events - including comparisons between ECk and RCk for each event and 
the results of the statistical tests used to explore the differences between these values - are 
provided in Table 16 (turn-down events) and Table 17 (turn-up events).  
 
6.4.1 Individual household response 
 
As has been seen in other UK residential DSR trials (Bulkeley et al, 2014; Schofield et al, 
2014), response varied considerably between households: the average percentage change in 
consumption across all events ranged from -16% for the least responsive household to +52% for 
the most responsive household.93  
 
Figure 26 shows the average percentage change in electricity consumption in each household 
across all events (relative to reference consumption).94 In cases where households show a 
                                                
 
 
92 This was the number of households identified as having been empty through the interviews and analysis of 
electricity consumption data. The actual number of empty households during these events may have exceeded 
this number. 
93 Household response was also analysed in terms of load shifted (in kWh/event hour). This likewise revealed 
considerable variation in response: the response from the top 25% of households was three times greater 
(approximately +\-100W) than the average response. 
94 The data has been converted so that response to both turn-up and turn-down events can be shown 
simultaneously. To do this, in cases where households consumed less electricity during turn-down events, this 
was counted as a positive response. 
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negative consumption change - those shown below the 0 in Figure 26 - this was because the 
household consumed more electricity than its reference consumption during turn-down events 
and/or less electricity than its reference consumption during turn-up events. 
 
Figure 26. Average percentage change in electricity consumption by household 
 
 
Once again, complementarity - achieved through analysing the electricity consumption data 
alongside the interview data - made it possible to explore why some households had 
consistently failed to respond. Lead participants from two of these households – represented by 
data points 3 and 5 in Figure 26 - explained that their households had given up attempting to 
respond very early in the trial because they found this too difficult with children (discussed 
further in Chapter 7). 
 
Another lead participant, from the second least responsive household - represented by data 
point 2 in Figure 26 - explained that for much of the trial she had moved out of her household to 
care for her partner, who was unwell, making it impossible to respond during turn-up events. 
 
The average +\-30W response per hour during events equates to approximately 3.5% of the 
average winter peak household load (Carmichael et al, 2014). This was lower than the average 
response of 0.05 KW per hour achieved by households on the LCL dynamic ToU trial (ibid). 
While the financial incentives in the latter trial may well have encouraged greater response, 
other contextual differences between the two may also have contributed. 
 
First, the frequency of events on the information-only trial was greater – at around four per 
week – than the maximum three events per week permitted on the LCL trial (ibid); a lower 
response might be expected when participants are asked to respond more frequently. This 
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supposition was also supported by the interview comments of one lead participant: “There was a 
phase when you were sending a lot of alerts very frequently one after another, and after that 
when you slowed it down again I was fatigued –  I mean, still fatigued even though you had 
slowed it down again.”  
 
Second, on the LCL trial event notifications were sent through participants’ in-home displays as 
well as by text message, which may have increased their immediacy, making it more likely that 
household members would respond. This supposition is supported by previous dynamic DSR 
studies which found that response is usually greater when participants are notified of events via 
in-home displays (Stromback et al, 2011). 
 
6.4.2 Statistical analysis of event response  
 
Paired samples t-tests were carried out using ECk and RCk for each event to determine whether 
the changes in electricity demand during the events were statistically significant. For events 
which asked participating households to reduce consumption, the hypothesis tested was that 
households had reduced consumption during the events relative to their corresponding reference 
consumption value and vice versa.  
 
The tests were statistically significant at the 5% confidence level (P<0.05) for six of the turn-
down events (38%) and for four of the turn-up events (17%). A further four turn-down events 
(25%) and three turn-up events (13%) were significant at the 10% confidence level (P<0.1). The 
difference between ECk and RCk is reported for all events in Table 16 and Table 17, along with 
95% confidence intervals and significance values. Events during which consumption differed 
significantly from reference consumption at the 5% confidence level are indicated with ** in the 
final column, while events during which consumption differed significantly from reference 
consumption at the 10% confidence level are indicated with * in the final column. 
 
As the difference between event and reference consumption was not statistically significant for 
all events, an additional paired samples t-test was conducted, using ECk and RCk data for all 
events. The null hypothesis for the test was that the total electricity consumption of all 
households during the events was no different from the total reference consumption of all 
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households for the events. Before proceeding with the test, the data was transformed so that all 
turn-up and turn-down events could be tested simultaneously.95  
 
The test revealed that RCk was 102.75 kWh and ECk was 110.13 kWh. The difference between 
RCk and ECk was 7.38 kWh, with a 95% confidence interval between 2.33 kWh and 12.43 kWh; 
the t-test statistic was 2.957, with 39 degrees of freedom, and was statistically significant 
(P=0.00). As such, the null hypothesis was strongly rejected: the combined electricity 
consumption of the trial households during events was statistically different from their 
consumption during the reference periods. 
                                                
 
 
95 The transformation treated reduced demand during turn-down events in the households as a positive 
response. 
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Table 16. Turn-down events 
Event Date Day Event time Hrs RCk 
(kWh) 
ECk 
(kWh) 
Difference 
(kWh) 
% 
change 
Mean 
difference/ 
household 
(kWh) 
95% confidence interval 
of the difference 
Sig.  
(1-tailed) 
Lower Upper 
1 23.6.15 Tue 5pm-10pm 5 118.01 98.19 -19.82 -16.79 -.48 -.87 -.12  .005** 
2 25.6.15 Thu  7am-10am 3 57.54 52.32 -5.22 -9.07 -.12 -.25 .01  .032** 
5 29.6.15 Mon  6am-9am 3 50.46 41.44 -9.02 -17.87 -.21 -.36 -.07   .002** 
7 3.7.15 Fri  7am-11am 4 75.65 59.63 -16.02 -21.18 -.37 -.58 -.17   .000** 
9 5.7.15 Sun 6am–9am 3 42.98 39.57 -3.41 -7.93 -.08 -.17 .02   .050* 
12 9.7.15 Thu 4pm-10pm 6 121.03 120.41 -0.51 -0.62 -.01 -.36 .33  .466 
16 19.7.15 Sun 9pm-12am 3 54.44 48.96 -5.48 -10.07 -.13 -.30 .03  .050* 
18 22.7.15 Wed 8am-10am 2 34.82 32.09 -2.73 -7.84 -.07 -.28 .14  .258 
20 24.7.15 Fri 7am-2pm 7 122.60 133.22 +10.62 +8.66 .26 -.24 .77   .853 
24 31.7.15 Fri 1am-8am 7 76.79 63.84 -12.95 -16.86 -.32 -.52 -.12 .001** 
26 7.8.15 Fri 6am-12am 18 324.69 260.34 -64.35 -19.82 -1.61 -2.47 -.74   .000** 
28 11.8.15 Tue  4pm-10pm 6 146.04 125.5 -20.54 -14.06 -.47 -1.06 .12  .061* 
30 15.8.15 Sat  4pm-12am 8 165.50 153.07 -12.43 -7.51 -.29 -.80 .22  .131 
31 17.8.15 Mon 6am-12am 18 341.64 308.67 -32.97 -9.65 -.77 -1.70 .16   .052* 
37 28.8.15 Fri 6am-10am 4 72.40 65.97 -6.43 -8.88 -.15 -.40 .10 .121 
38 29.8.15 Sat 7pm-12am 5 102.08 113.76 +11.68 +11.44 .26 -.14 .67   .905 
*Significant at the 10% confidence level ** Significant at the 5% confidence level 
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Table 17. Turn-up events 
Event Date Day Event time Hrs RCk 
(kWh) 
ECk 
(kWh) 
Difference 
(kWh) 
% 
change 
Mean 
difference/ 
household 
(kWh) 
95% confidence 
interval of the difference 
Sig 
(1-tailed) 
Lower Upper 
3 26.6.15 Fri 8pm-10pm 2 47.58 58.53 +10.95 +23.01 .26 -.03 .55 .038** 
4 28.6.15 Sun 7am-12pm 5 89.09 104.63 +15.54 +17.46 .38 -.23 .99 .107 
6 1.7.15 Wed  10am-3pm 5 74.97 85.28 +10.31 +13.75 .24 -.11 .59 .085* 
8 4.7.15 Sat 1am-7am 6 59.67 67.03 +7.36 +12.33 .17 -.09 .44  .094* 
10 6.7.17 Mon 1pm-4pm 3 46.83 60.25 +13.42 +28.66 .31 .00 .62 .025** 
11 7.7.15 Tue 8pm-12am 4 80.68 89.52 +8.84 +10.96 .21 -.09 .51 .081* 
13 11.7.15 Sat 6pm-11pm 5 105.49 108.69 +3.2 +3.03 .08 -.39 .54 .372 
14 16.7.15 Thu 8pm-12am 4 74.87 84.80 +9.93 +13.26 .24 -.02 .51 .035** 
15 17.7.15 Fri 9am-4pm 7 111.92 99.55 -12.37 -11.05 -.31 -.65 .03 .963 
17 21.7.15 Tue 10am-3pm 5 81.93 94.30 +12.37 +15.10 .30 -.29 .89 .155 
19 23.7.15 Thu 9am-4pm 7 104.43 115.18 +10.75 +10.29 .27 -.21 .75 .134 
21 25.7.15 Sat 7am-2pm 7 125.37 117.18 -8.19 -6.53 -.21 -.66 .23 .834 
22 27.7.15 Mon  9am-3pm 6 94.27 101.66 +7.39 +7.84 .19 -.27 .66 .200 
23 29.7.15 Wed 10am-3pm 5 71.58 78.72 +7.14 +9.97 .18 -.22 .59 .184 
25 4.8.15 Tue 3pm-8pm 5 105.58 93.28 -12.3 -11.65 -.31 -.74 .12   .921 
27 8.8.15 Sat 4pm-12am 8 156.16 161.72 +5.56 +3.56 .14 -.77 1.05 .379 
29 13.8.15 Thu 8pm-12am 4 78.83 85.9 +7.07 +8.97 .16 -.14 .46  .146 
32 19.8.15 Wed 7pm-12am 5 102.76 106.97 +4.21 +4.10 .10 -.45 .66 .356 
33 20.8.15 Thu 8pm-4am 8 113.85 119.33 +5.48 +4.81 .13 -.23 .49 .237 
34 23.8.15 Sun 10am-9pm 11 268.65 224.08 -44.57 -16.59 -1.01 -1.91 -.11 .986 
35 26.8.15 Wed 9am-4pm 7 107.82 138.56 +30.74 +28.50 .71 -.00 1.43 .025** 
36 27.8.15 Thu 9am-4pm 7 108.32 115.93 +7.61 +7.02 .18 - .20 .56 .178 
39 3.9.15 Thu 10am-4pm 6 93.09 100.97 +7.88 +8.46 .17 -.36 .71 .256 
40 5.9.15 Sat 9am-1pm 4 89.44 86.68 -2.76 -3.08 -.06 -.40  .28 .641 
*Significant at the 10% confidence level ** Significant at the 5% confidence level 
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6.5 Discussion  
 
6.5.1 Potential benefits of dynamic information-only DSR programmes  
 
Overall, most households successfully changed their consumption patterns in response to the 
event notifications, consuming 9.9% less electricity on average during turn-down events and 
4.4% more electricity on average during turn-up events.  
 
This finding is especially noteworthy when considered alongside the results of the switching 
survey, which revealed that approximately 8% of respondents would be willing to participate in 
dynamic information-only DSR programmes based on available wind generation. Taken 
together, the results of the trial and the switching survey suggest that such programmes could 
provide a valuable but overlooked resource for suppliers, helping them to balance supply and 
demand in a future system in which a greater share of electricity comes from renewables. 
 
However, some consumers may be reluctant to participate in information-only DSR 
programmes because, while their efforts may result in reduced costs for suppliers, they 
themselves will not benefit financially from responding. This point was expressed in the 
interviews: one lead participant suggested that because of this inequity, he would be unwilling 
to sign up to such programmes. His comments echo those of residential consumers in the DSR 
study conducted by Buchanan et al (2016), who expected to be compensated financially for their 
efforts: “Given that their actions were providing a financial benefit to suppliers, they expected a 
fair exchange for their part in the transaction (i.e., retribution in the same metric-financial” (ibid, 
p.93). 
 
Within this context, it is helpful to consider whether other electricity stakeholders than suppliers 
might benefit from implementing dynamic information-only DSR programmes. DNOs, for 
example, might be able to leverage such programmes to reduce network constraints, thus 
deferring costly network upgrades and increasing asset utilisation. A similar programme - albeit 
using a dynamic ToU tariff - was explored by the LCL trial (Schofield et al, 2014), although the 
study concluded that the tariff could not serve as a cost-competitive alternative to traditional 
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network reinforcement.96 However, an information-only programme might be more viable, as it 
would avoid some of the costs of price-based DSR programmes, such as those associated with 
providing financial incentives and changing customer billing arrangements.97  
 
Perhaps aware of these advantages, DNO Electricity North West pioneered a similar programme 
- the Power Saver Challenge - in Heaton Moor and Heaton Norris, Stockport, in Winter 
2014/15. Residents successfully reduced their electricity consumption at times of peak load, 
deferring the need to build a costly new substation to cope with growing demand (Power Saver 
Challenge, 2015).  
 
Dynamic information-only DSR programmes could also help to balance electricity flows in 
network areas with high levels of local generation. As highlighted by Work Stream Six98 (2014), 
community schemes could be developed to encourage electricity use at certain times close to 
sources of generation, thereby avoiding thermal or voltage issues.  Work Stream Six also 
suggested that instead of rewarding individual customers financially for responding, benefits 
could “be directed towards sources of value to the whole community affected by the network 
constraint and prepared to provide an appropriate response” (ibid, p.18) 
 
The scepticism expressed towards suppliers further suggests that certain non-conventional 
players, which operate what Ofgem refers to as ‘non-traditional business models’ (Ofgem, 
2015), may be well placed to implement dynamic information-only DSR programmes. 
Examples include Bristol Energy and Robin Hood Energy, the not-for-profit energy supply 
companies established by Bristol and Nottingham Councils, respectively. Given their not-for-
profit status, some consumers might be more willing to participate on programmes offered by 
such bodies. 
 
6.5.2 Potential alternative models for information-only programmes 
 
Although the trial event notifications were based on prevailing wind generation, other factors 
might also prove effective in eliciting response. For instance, the signal for consumers to 
                                                
 
 
96 EDF Energy, which administered the LCL dynamic ToU trial, incurred costs which were estimated at £350 
per customer, with around one-third of these costs expected to apply on an annual basis (Schofield et al, 2014). 
97 The principal costs on an information-only DSR programme would arise from recruiting consumers to 
participate and providing event notifications. 
98 Work Stream Six was a working group of the Smart Grid Forum tasked with investigating the commercial 
and regulatory challenges of implementing the smart grid in Great Britain. It was chaired by Ofgem and 
included representatives from DNOs, electricity suppliers, consumer groups and other industry stakeholders 
(Ofgem, 2017b). 
 142 
respond could be based on threats to electricity supply arising from spikes in demand (Gyamfi 
and Krumdieck, 2011). Alternatively, DSR programmes could be designed to reduce carbon 
emissions, using the carbon intensity of electricity generation at different times of day as the 
basis for event notifications (see GridCarbon’s carbon dioxide tracking website - GridCarbon, 
2017).  
 
The burgeoning applications for information-only DSR were highlighted by one of the 
programme managers working on the CITYOPT information-only DSR programme, part of an 
EU project to promote efficient planning, design and operation of energy systems in urban areas 
(Power Technology, 2017): 
 
I can see that, in the future, these kinds of applications could be a reality in many 
initiatives. You are getting the information about the community’s level of electricity 
use and then the electricity companies can communicate with the end users. They can 
give them the indication that they may have a problem with peak demand in the next 
couple of hours, so please do your best to take part in helping the community cope with 
the situation. 
 
6.6 Conclusions and limitations  
 
This chapter describes one of the few dynamic information-only DSR trials and – to the author’s 
knowledge - the first to explore how such programmes could help to balance residential demand 
with fluctuating supply from wind generation.  
 
As these programmes circumvent a key barrier to uptake of traditional ToU tariffs – financial 
loss aversion (Bradley et al, 2016; Nicolson et al, 2016 and Chapter 2) – they may attract 
consumers who might otherwise be unwilling to participate and thus help to optimise the impact 
of residential DSR. 
 
In combination, the electricity consumption data and qualitative interview data revealed that 
most participating households successfully rescheduled their electricity use in response to 
notifications (see also Chapter 8). However, overall response was not as high as that on the LCL 
dynamic ToU trial, which - while similar in many respects - was financially incentivised 
(Schofield et al, 2014). This suggests that alternative incentives may need to be leveraged to 
elicit comparable response on information-only programmes. The interviews discussed in the 
following chapter aimed to explore further the question of how response on residential DSR 
programmes - in particular, information-only programmes - might be maximised. 
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Certain limitations of the trial must be acknowledged. The first relates to the small sample size 
(N=46): it has been argued that when small-scale studies are scaled up, the response per 
household may be smaller (Pollitt and Shaorshadze, 2011). This is also supported by a meta-
analysis of DSR programmes conducted by Stromback et al (2011), which found that response 
on a per-household basis on non-automated DSR programmes is usually lower when these 
involve larger numbers of participants.  
 
The second relates to the short duration of the trial, which ran for four months only. This raises 
two questions. First, although many households successfully responded by changing their 
consumption patterns, it is unknown whether response would have become weaker or stronger 
over time. Had the trial lasted longer, ‘response fatigue’ (Kim and Shcherbakova, 2013) might 
have led some participants to respond less often or cease responding altogether. On the other 
hand, response might actually have increased: some energy scholars suggest that response 
increases over time as new ways of responding become embedded in everyday routines 
(Breukers and Mourik, 2013; Filippini, 2011; Sexton et al, 1987; Thorsnes, 2012).  
 
Second, patterns of electricity demand vary throughout the year, and a trial conducted in 
summer reveals nothing about whether response at other times of year – for example, in winter – 
might be higher or lower (Hu et al, 2015). In this regard, however, evidence from other DSR 
studies suggests that the response might have been greater had the trial taken place in winter: a 
meta-analysis of DSR programmes in Stromback et al (2011) and the results of the LCL 
dynamic ToU trial (Schofield et al, 2014) both indicate that response on non-automated 
dynamic DSR programmes is greater in winter than at other times of the year.   
 
Finally, it is possible that response might have been biased because participants were aware that 
they were taking part in an experiment – sometimes referred to as the ‘Hawthorne effect’ 
(Benson, 2000). This could have influenced response and is often more pronounced in shorter 
experiments such as that described here, as participants have less time to grow accustomed to 
the intervention (Darby, 2011). 
 
These considerations suggest it may be imprudent to assume that the response recorded on this 
trial would necessarily be replicated in a real-world context. As such, further studies exploring 
consumer response to dynamic information-only DSR programmes would be valuable. Ideally, 
these should involve larger samples and be conducted over longer timeframes, making it 
possible to determine whether the response recorded in this trial could be replicated across a 
larger cohort of households and whether response would be sustained over time.  
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7. Trial interviews 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
Once the dynamic information-only trial had ended, participants were invited to be interviewed 
to explore their experiences and develop insights that might inform future residential DSR 
strategies – particularly in relation to how response on such programmes might be maximised. 
Specifically, the interviews aimed to:  
 
• identify factors that affected interviewees’ ability to respond; 
• identify factors that affected their motivation to respond; 
• determine how feedback affected their motivation to respond; 
• determine how and why response varied between different households; and 
• develop practical recommendations for the design of future DSR programmes. 
 
Section 7.2 of this chapter describes how interviewees were recruited, the socio-demographic 
characteristics of the sample and the structure of the interviews. Section 7.3 identifies the 
appliances that participants used to respond on the trial. Section 7.4 highlights the themes that 
were identified through analysis of the interview data, while Section 7.5 explores interviewees’ 
experiences through the prism of the FBM. Section 7.6 draws on this analysis to provide 
suggestions for how these findings might inform future DSR strategies, and Section 7.7 presents 
conclusions.  
 
7.2 Interview methodology 
 
At the end of the trial, the 46 lead participants were invited to discuss their experiences in 
interviews with the author; 24 of them agreed to do so. Although these individuals self-selected 
for interview, the socio-economic range was nonetheless diverse, including single occupancy 
households, multiple occupancy households, households containing children under the age of 
five, households containing students and households containing retirees. Further details of the 
interview sample are provided in Table 18. 
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Table 18. Socio-demographic details of interview sample 
 
Characteristics 
 
Number of 
interviewees 
Age 
 
25-34 8 
35-44  10 
45-54 2 
55-64 3 
 65+ 1 
Gender Male  9 
 Female 15 
Household ownership 
 
Owner 18 
Renter 6 
Household size 
 
1 3 
2 10 
3 2 
4 8 
5+ 1 
Weekly household 
income  
£200-£299 1 
£300-£399 1 
£500-£599 1 
£700-£799 1 
£800-£899 3 
£900-£999 2 
£1,000+ 10 
 Don’t know/prefer not 
to say 
5 
 
Interviewing individuals with first-hand experience of a DSR programme –  rather than, for 
instance, DSR experts or DSR programme managers – allowed for factors that influenced their 
ability and motivation to respond to be identified. Exploring these enablers and constraints 
alongside the triggers used to prompt response – the event notifications – made it possible to 
identify measures which could help to maximise response. As Grünewald (2015) explains: 
“Greater emphasis in research on the dynamics that enable and inhibit flexibility, grounded in a 
more activity centred perspective, rather than focusing on the responses observed in load 
profiles alone, may therefore yield valuable insights into the potential for demand side 
flexibility.” (p.16) 
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The interviews were conducted by telephone between September 2015 and October 2015. Each 
lasted approximately 45 minutes and followed a semi-structured format, allowing initial 
questions to be prepared in advance and points of interest that emerged during the interviews to 
be explored in greater depth. The interviews included questions on: 
 
• the appliances that participants used to respond; 
• the factors that influenced their motivation or ability to respond; 
• the effectiveness of the event notifications in triggering response; and 
• the feedback that interviewees received about their response. 
 
The interviews were recorded and subsequently transcribed. Transcription is conducive to an 
interpretative qualitative methodology, as it helps to facilitate “the close attention and the 
interpretive thinking that is needed to make sense of the data” (Lapadat and Lindsay, 1999, 
p.82). Transcribed scripts were imported into qualitative analysis software (NVivo) and coded 
using thematic analysis using the five-stage process described by Braun and Clarke (2006), in 
which analysts: 
 
• familiarise themselves with the data;  
• code the data;  
• identify initial themes; 
• review the themes; and 
• define and name the themes. 
 
Themes that provided insight into the enablers and constraints of response were identified where 
they were mentioned in at least three interviews. These themes were then mapped to the FBM to 
conceptualise them through this framework.  At the same time, the interview data was used to 
refine and develop the FBM as a framework for understanding response. 
 
7.3 Response during trial events 
 
While previous DSR studies have examined whether consumers on DSR programmes 
successfully change consumption patterns, they often fail to address the question of how this is 
achieved (Breukers and Mourik, 2013). To arrive at a more nuanced understanding of how 
consumers respond on DSR programmes, it is important to identify both the appliances that are 
most commonly used to respond and the different behaviours involved in responding.  
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To this end, the eight DSR mechanisms identified by Grünewald (2015) were used to categorise 
response from interviewees, as follows: 
 
• Reduce load – reducing load by using more efficient appliances or smart automated 
features. 
• Substitute energy vector or location – switching to an alternative form of energy or 
relocating the use of energy (eg, using a gas hob to boil water rather than an electric 
kettle). 
• Shift load forward in time – delaying the use of an appliance (eg, by using a timer to 
start a wash cycle at a future point in time). 
• Shift load backward in time – shifting the energy use of an appliance to an earlier point 
in time (eg, by heating water with an immersion heater in advance of when it is needed). 
• Shift a practice in time – performing an activity (eg, watching television, cooking or 
using a computer) at a different time. 
• Substitute the practice – using a different practice to achieve a similar outcome (eg, 
preparing a cold meal instead of a hot one). 
• Substitute service provision to metabolic energy – carrying out a practice manually 
rather than using an appliance (eg, washing clothes by hand or mixing ingredients with 
a hand beater rather than an electric mixer). 
• Change the practitioner – carrying out the practice outside of the consumer’s household 
(eg, going out to eat instead of cooking at home or going to the cinema instead of 
watching television). 
 
Interviewees used washing machines and dishwashers most frequently to respond - either by 
delaying the use of these appliances so that they were not used during turn-down events 
(shifting forward) or by advancing their use to take advantage of a turn-up event (shifting 
backward). The various appliances used to respond are shown in Table 19. 
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Table 19. Appliances that interviewees used to respond 
 Washing 
machine 
Dishwasher Oven Hob Vacuum Laptop Immersion 
heater 
Shower Tumble  
dryer 
Other 
P1 1 1 1     1 1  
P2 1 1         
P3 1         1* 
P4 1 1 1 1  1  1   
P5           
P6   1 1  1  1   
P7 1          
P8 1          
P9   1        
P10 1 1        1** 
P11 1      1    
P12 1 1     1    
P13 1 1         
P14 1 1   1     1*** 
P15 1 1         
P16 1   1 1      
P17 1 1    1    1**** 
P18 1 1       1  
P19   1        
P20 1  1 1   1    
P21 1  1 1       
P22           
P23 1  1        
P24 1  1  1      
Total 19 10 9 5 3 3 3 3 2 4 
*Kettle   **Dehumidifier   ***Hairdryer  ****Mobile phone charger 
 
Although some interviewees (n=5) explained that their households had not changed how food 
was prepared or consumed in order to respond – normally because mealtimes were governed by 
routines dictated by school or work – somewhat surprisingly, nearly half of the interviewees 
(n=11) reported that their households had in fact done so, including by: 
 
• preparing food during turn-up events for consumption later (shifting the practice in 
time); 
• waiting until a turn-down event had finished before preparing hot food or drinks 
(shifting the practice in time); 
• using a microwave rather than an electric hob or oven to reheat food during turn-down 
events (reducing load); 
• not using appliances to cook or reheat food during turn-down events (eg, by preparing 
cold meals instead of hot meals) (substituting the practice); and 
• using gas rather than electricity during turn-down events (eg, boiling water using a gas 
hob rather than a kettle) (substituting energy vector). 
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That so many interviewees demonstrated flexibility in the preparation and consumption of food 
is a significant finding, as although some studies have found a degree of response in the form of 
rescheduled cooking times (Bulkeley et al, 2015; Carmichael et al, 2014) kitchen practices are 
not generally considered to offer much promise for DSR (Bird, 2015; Darby and McKenna, 
2012; Parrish et al, 2015).  
 
Meanwhile, all interviewees who owned immersion heaters (n=3) indicated that they had used 
these appliances to respond on the trial, either by refraining from using them during turn-down 
events (shifting load forward in time) (P11, P20), or by switching them on manually or setting 
timers to coincide with turn-up events (shifting load backward in time) (P12).   
 
The significance of the flexibility shown in relation to kitchen practices and the use of 
immersion heaters is discussed in Section 7.6.  
 
7.4 Themes 
 
Twelve themes were identified from the thematic coding of the interview transcripts:  
 
• Themes 1 to 7 relate to ability to respond; 
• Themes 7 to 10 relate to motivations for responding; and  
• Themes 11 and 12 relate to the triggers used to prompt response. 
 
7.4.1 Ability themes 
 
Theme 1 – A greater understanding of appliance consumption and functionality would facilitate 
response 
 
Before the trial began, lead participants’ understanding of appliance consumption was tested by 
analysing their responses to a question in the enrolment questionnaire which asked them to rank 
six common household activities in order of energy intensiveness (see Appendix II, Question 
16). Table 20 shows the percentage of participants who incorrectly ranked each activity. 
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Table 20. Percentage of lead participants who incorrectly ranked each household activity  
Activity Percentage of 
participants who 
incorrectly ranked the 
activity (N=46) 
Washing a laundry load at 40 degrees Celsius  70% 
Running a dishwasher at 65 degrees Celsius  59% 
Ironing for 20 minutes 56% 
Fully charging a laptop 22% 
Fully charging a smartphone 15% 
Using a tumble dryer for 60 minutes (on high heat) 13% 
 
Overall, only 15% of participants ranked all activities correctly, with 41% ranking two activities 
incorrectly and 44% ranking three or more activities incorrectly. 
 
Although all trial interviewees were aware that washing machines, dishwashers and tumble 
dryers are energy intensive, some were uncertain as to how much electricity is needed to run 
other appliances (P2, P4, P22), making it more difficult for them to prioritise which appliances 
to use to respond. As P4 explained: “I think there’s a lack of information – or at least, I lack 
general information – about how much products consume... In order to use other appliances to 
respond, I would need to know how much energy they take up.”  
 
P2 likewise suggested that tables and graphs illustrating the typical consumption of common 
appliances would have helped him to “focus more on, ‘Okay, now is a high power usage time - 
let’s use that,’ or, ‘It’s going to be a low power usage time - let’s make sure that’s not 
running’”. 
 
Other interviewees remarked that it would have facilitated response if their in-home displays 
showed real-time information about how much electricity different appliances were using (P7, 
P12). As P12 commented: “If you knew what different appliances were using more precisely, 
then that would have made it easier.”99 
 
The interviews further revealed that sometimes participants lacked other knowledge that would 
have facilitated response. For example, P9 and P23 had timers on certain appliances, but did not 
                                                
 
 
99 The interest that these interviewees expressed in receiving appliance specific consumption information 
echoes similar comments made by focus group participants in “Consumer views of smart metering” (Ofgem, 
2010). 
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know how to use them, which prevented them from programming the appliances to start during 
turn-up events. P23 explained: “I was considering learning how to use the timer on my washing 
machine, because it would have been fun to turn it on at work with some of the alerts that you 
sent. However, there’s no manual with it and I haven’t found the manual online, so I don’t know 
how to set it.” Similarly, P9 only discovered towards the end of the trial that her dishwasher had 
a delay cycle: “Had I known that and known how to use it, I might have had that set up so that if 
we were going out and were asked to use more, then that could have been something that we 
could have done.”  
 
Some interviewees believed that had they purchased smart plugs100 and connected these to 
specific appliances – in P11’s case, a hot water tank; in P17’s, a dishwasher – they would have 
been able to respond when they were not at home. However, P11’s hot water tank was 
hardwired into the wall, so could not have easily been fitted with a smart plug; while P17 was 
unaware that remotely switching on an electrical socket would not initiate a wash cycle. In each 
case, specialist expertise or appliances would have been required to achieve the desired goal. 
 
Theme 2 – Inflexible routines can prevent response  
 
Many interviewees reported that they had found it difficult to respond because the times at 
which appliances were used were governed by fixed routines.101 For instance, P13 - a retiree - 
explained that dinner in his household always took place at a specific time: “It was difficult if 
you wanted us to use electricity between 8:00pm and midnight to say, ‘Well, we’ll have our 
dinner at 8 o’clock’ - two hours later than we normally have it. These were difficult things.”  
 
Similarly, P24 found that her partner’s routines sometimes prevented their household from 
responding: “If you said, ‘Use less at the weekend,’ it would be difficult because the tumble 
dryer and the ironing tend to happen together. He just likes to do it all in one block; he doesn’t 
like to spread it out over the weekend. He’ll have the TV on and be doing the ironing and 
running the tumble dryer all at the same time.”  
 
The lives of some families in particular were often structured around routines that occurred at 
specific times - such as before and after school, and at bath time and mealtimes - making 
                                                
 
 
100 Smart plugs connect home appliances and other electronic devices to WiFi networks, enabling them to be 
switched on or off remotely (Elzabadini et al, 2005). 
101 That household routines can make it more difficult for consumers to respond has also been found in other 
DSR studies (Nicholls and Strengers, 2015; Pollitt and Shaorshadze, 2011; Powells et al, 2014).  
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response especially difficult (P5, P7, P19). As P5 explained: “When you’ve got children who 
need clothes for school and a husband who needs shirts for work, things have to be done by a 
certain time and they aren’t that moveable.” Similarly, P19 admitted: “It was hard because it 
didn’t really fit around my lifestyle - that’s the truth of it. You know, family… It’s quite 
rigorous timings, and it just wasn’t very easy to start changing things at the last minute or even 
with preparation the day before. There’s just certain things that happen at certain times.” 
Interviewees from these households explained that they had quickly disengaged from the trial 
altogether, as they realised that their day-to-day routines made it too difficult to respond.102 
 
Other residential DSR studies have likewise found that family households often find response 
especially challenging (Bulkeley et al, 2015; Nicholls and Strengers, 2015). On the CLNR ToU 
trial, households with children under the age of five were less responsive to peak prices than 
other households; the qualitative data revealed that this was often due to daily cooking and 
bathing routines (Bulkeley et al, 2015). Similarly, from their study of Australian family 
households, Nicholls and Strengers (2015) concluded that “the family peak is tightly 
coordinated and routinised…. [and] TOU tariffs are unlikely to effectively reduce peak period 
electricity consumption in households with children” (p.1). 
 
Although many interviewees reported that their routines had made response more difficult, for 
some the events came to supplant previous routines and instead determine the timing of 
household practices (P6, P11, P16, P20, P23, P24). P11 explained that the events had “governed 
when I would put the washing on”; while P6 found that once the notifications stopped, members 
of his household “were sort of at a loss to know how to plan our meals”. Similarly, P20 
described how she felt once the trial had ended: “‘Well, we haven’t had an alert, so what energy 
should I be using?’… Now it’s stopped, I keep feeling like, ‘Well, I got really used to these 
alerts and responding to them.’” 
 
When asked about his thoughts once the trial had ended, P2 likewise said: 
 
I didn’t have a guide as to when would be a beneficial or non-beneficial time [to use 
electricity] and my attitude towards consumption of electricity laxed…because I didn’t 
have a reminder saying, ‘Oops you are using electricity.’ Because when the reminder 
comes in, it’s a reminder to use or not use more electricity; but it’s also a reminder that 
you are using electricity full stop. So without it, it’s not in the forefront of our minds. 
 
                                                
 
 
102 These individuals gave up on attempting to respond during the events rather than formally withdrawing from 
the trial. 
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These comments are interesting given that many DSR programmes have been found to lead to 
lower overall electricity consumption (Stromback et al, 2011). This has been attributed to 
improved energy literacy from the additional educational measures and feedback that are often 
features of such programmes (ibid; Breukers and Mourik, 2013). P2’s comments, however, 
suggest that an additional impetus may be at play: their experiences on the DSR programme 
may make participants more conscious not only of when they are using electricity, but also of 
the fact that they are using electricity at all. The implications of this enhanced energy 
consciousness are discussed further in Theme 10 and Section 7.6.3(b). 
 
Theme 3 – Immediate need for appliance use can prevent response  
 
Several interviewees described how sometimes an immediate need to use appliances had 
prevented them from responding (P2, P7, P9, P12, P15, P17). For example, P9 explained that if 
his child had an accident in bed during the night, he would wash the sheets straight away; while 
P2 said that he washed his gym kit immediately after returning home from training. Similarly, 
P7 stated: “Vacuuming just has to be done when it has to be done. I am quite inflexible about 
that because of the busy lives we lead, but also when there’s a mess it has to be cleared up - you 
can’t just walk around it.” 
 
P15 described her need to use certain appliances at specific times as “non-negotiable”: “I was 
not willing to move what I call my ‘essential usage’, so having the lamp on in the kitchen while 
I am cooking, you know - those kinds of things that you still want at peak time.” 
 
This tendency to prioritise an immediate need to use appliances over response has also been 
found in other studies (Bourgeois et al, 2014; Buchanan et al, 2016; Parrish et al, 2015).  
 
Theme 4 -  Time pressures and fatigue can prevent response  
 
Response usually takes time - even if only to turn an appliance on or off. Several interviewees 
observed that when time pressures were particularly acute, they were much less likely to 
respond (P5, P8, P9, P18, P19). Indeed, some of these individuals (P5, P8, P19) - who once 
again tended to be from family households - felt these time pressures so intensely that they did 
not respond at all. As P19 admitted: “I didn’t feel there was much scope for us to change, 
because we are pretty busy with our lives. You just do the washing when you do it - you know, 
you just fit it in. There just wasn’t any room in the day to start shifting things around - too tight, 
time was too tight.” 
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Others found that when they were preoccupied with other activities - such as work or childcare 
– they often ended up ignoring event notifications (P8, P9, P18). In the words of P18: “Very 
often with the texts, I look at them and if I am in the middle of something, that’s it - it’s gone 
from my brain immediately and I don’t look back through my texts at the end of the day.” 
Similarly, P21 recalled that she had sometimes failed to take the final steps necessary to 
respond: “On one or two occasions, I actually forgot. I woke up, I loaded [the washing machine] 
on purpose and then I started doing other things and then I left the house. Then on the way to 
work, I remembered that I forgot to press the button.” 
 
Interviewees further reported that they had sometimes wanted to respond, but had been too tired 
to do so (P1, P9). As P1 explained: “You asked us to use more [electricity] one evening, so I 
deliberately saved up my ironing to do in the evening. But I had physically run out of steam, so I 
didn’t have the energy; so it had to be done when it was a normal time.”  
 
While physical fatigue was occasionally a constraint for some, for others response fatigue (Kim 
and Shcherbakova, 2011) proved problematic as the trial progressed and the cumulative effect of 
the notifications became increasingly draining. P23 recalled:  
 
I had a moment where I got the alert and it said, ‘Please use less electricity,’ and I was 
just looking at it and thinking, ‘No, I’m sorry – not today’… There was a phase when 
you were sending a lot of alerts very frequently, and after that when you slowed it down 
again, I was fatigued – I mean, still fatigued, even though you did slow it down again. 
 
Theme 5 – Active occupancy is a necessary requirement for response, in the absence of smart 
appliances or appliances with timers 
 
All interviewees reported that there had been times - such as while they were absent or asleep - 
when they had been unable to respond. As P23 explained: “I would get the alert and it would be 
when I was off either for work for a couple of days or for a holiday somewhere, and I would 
think, ‘Oh well, can’t do anything about that.’”  
 
Some interviewees suggested that if they had owned appliances with timers or appliances that 
could be controlled remotely, they might have sometimes been able to respond when they were 
absent or asleep (P10, P14, P20). Others felt that smart appliances which could start 
automatically during turn-up events would have facilitated response (P3, P5, P7, P9, P15). In the 
words of P3: “I think that would be the trick - to automate it somehow. Automate it with the 
appliances, so I can press a button on my washing machine to say, ‘Come on when renewable 
energy is at its highest.’” 
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Interviewees were predominantly accepting of smart appliances, viewing them as a natural 
complement to DSR programmes as they help to facilitate response when households are not 
actively occupied. Some even suggested that some form of automation would be necessary 
before they would consider participating in future DSR programmes (P4, P8). As P4 stated: “I 
don’t think I could do it if it involved a decision by me; I think things would have to happen 
automatically.” 
 
Theme 6 – Third-party control can prevent response  
 
Several interviewees reported that often the use of certain appliances in their households was 
scheduled not by household members, but rather by other individuals (P1, P4, P6, P7, P11, P12, 
P18). For instance, some said that it was not usually possible to schedule the use of vacuum 
cleaners, irons and washing machines for turn-up events because these appliances were 
primarily used by their cleaners (P1, P7, P11).  Similarly, P12 was disabled and had carers who 
came to help her with ironing and vacuuming, which meant that these activities could not be 
synchronised with trial events. Meanwhile, P4 and P18 explained that they had tenants living in 
their households during the trial and did not feel it would be appropriate to prevail on them to 
respond by asking them to reschedule appliance use. 
 
Even electric heating systems sometimes could not be used to respond since the times when 
these came on were controlled by third parties - as was the case for P11’s communal underfloor 
heating system. 
 
7.4.2 Motivation themes 
 
Theme 7 - Concerns about social rejection can prevent response 
 
Interviewees explained that sometimes they had not used certain appliances to respond because 
they were concerned that this would inconvenience others. For instance, two interviewees 
reported that they had not used their washing machines during some of the turn-up events that 
occurred early in the morning or late at night (P21, P14). As P21 elaborated: “I didn’t want to 
wake up the neighbours and I was particularly conscious of the fact that the neighbours are 
underneath me, so can hear the washing machine, and I had been asked to use it at unsocial 
hours.”  
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Interviewees also mentioned other concerns about social rejection which sometimes prevented 
them from rescheduling the use of appliances. P1, for example, reported that on occasion she 
had been unwilling to delay vacuuming until the next turn-up event because she was expecting 
guests and did not want her home to appear dirty.  
 
Theme 8 – Performance feedback can facilitate response 
 
During the trial participants received regular feedback on both their own household’s response 
and the response of all households. This was provided every three weeks103 and included 
positive or negative emoticons (!  or " ), depending on whether the household(s) had 
successfully changed their consumption patterns during trial events.  
 
For most interviewees, this feedback was welcome and increased their motivation to respond. 
P20’s comment was typical: “Getting that feedback, the very first one, made me think, ‘Well, it 
is actually doing something - my energy consumption has changed as a result of these alerts, so 
that’s good and let’s keep doing it.’” 
 
Similarly, for P24, receiving the feedback “felt good, to be honest with you, because you said 
that we were doing well”; while P17 reported: “Obviously, everyone likes a little bit of a pat on 
the back. When it I got it, I said to my partner, ‘Ooh look, we’ve done better this week.’” 
 
Some interviewees also indicated that the emoticons had strengthened their motivation to 
respond (P2, P9, P17). As P9 explained: “When you sent that first feedback text, for the days 
immediately afterwards we made more effort because we didn’t want there to be another sad 
face. We were trying to get a smiley face the next time - or at least, we were trying not to get a 
sad face.”  
 
However, the feedback did not universally increase motivation to respond. Recalling how she 
had felt after receiving feedback indicating that her household had consumed more electricity 
than normal during several turn-down events, P8 explained:  
 
I don’t think it put me off altogether, but I think that it was slightly demotivating - I 
think especially the realisation that because we had a few people staying over and 
because the house had been quite full, there wasn’t really a lot we could have done 
                                                
 
 
103 All participants received the feedback by text, while those who chose to receive notifications via email also 
received it via this medium. 
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anyway. I think that was a bit demotivating because it made it feel as if my personal 
level of agency wasn’t really that significant. 
 
In one case, even positive feedback negatively influenced an interviewee’s motivation to 
respond. Reflecting on feedback showing that his household had reduced consumption during 
turn-down events, P22 commented: “I don’t know -  maybe perhaps subtly it made me try less 
hard because I had thought I did better than expected. And I seem to remember in the second 
feedback we did less well, so maybe that’s borne out.”  
 
A growing body of literature suggests that peer comparisons of electricity use can be an 
effective way to promote energy conservation (Allcott, 2011; Arvola et al, 1993; Dolan and 
Metcalf, 2015; Steg, 2008). This was reflected in the comments of several trial interviewees, 
who felt that peer comparisons provided as part of the feedback would have increased their 
motivation to respond (P1, P4, P16, P23). As P1 suggested: “I suppose if you had been able to 
compare how you are doing with how an average group are doing, then that for me would have 
been a motivator.”  
 
More negatively, however, there is also evidence that motivation can be adversely affected 
where individuals who receive peer comparisons have performed better than average - a 
phenomenon referred to as the “destructive boomerang effect” (Schultz et al, 2007). That said, 
P22’s earlier comments suggest that sometimes even an individual’s own positive performance 
can have a similar effect and reduce motivation to respond, so the value of peer comparisons 
should not be discounted on this ground. 
 
One way in which feedback in the form of descriptive norms can motivate behaviour is by 
setting a standard from which individuals are reluctant to deviate (Schultz et al, 2007). The 
interviews revealed that for those participants who were in a position to make their own peer 
comparisons, the feedback served this purpose. P6 explained: “My manager, who I sit next to, 
and someone else in my team [P3 and P17] - we all did the trial together because we all saw the 
same advert, so we all got the texts and the feedback at the same time, and so we compared 
notes and I said, ‘Ahh, I’ve only changed by 7%.’ So I basically used them as a benchmark.” 
They also reminded each other of the timing of events and discussed the different actions they 
were taking to respond – as did P1, P7, P18 and P24, with members of their own households.  
 
P3 likewise recognised the benefits of peer comparisons and highlighted another potent 
motivator in doing so – competition: “[Perhaps] it’s more about what everyone else is doing? 
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So, being motivated by the fact that other people are doing it or your neighbours are doing it or 
other people on your street are doing it - by that competitive element.”  
 
The potential to unlock greater response by harnessing the competitive spirit of some 
participants was further emphasised by other interviewees, who suggested that being able to 
compare themselves against other households in their region or of their size (P4), or against the 
household with the greatest response (P23), would have introduced “a bit of friendly anonymous 
competition” (P23) and made them “want to try to do better, or try to do better than the others” 
(P4). 
 
Theme 9 – Feedback on environmental benefits could facilitate response 
 
The interviews – along with data from the enrolment questionnaire - revealed that many (n=13) 
participants had signed up to the trial at least in part because they wanted to reduce the 
environmental impact of their electricity use and help to combat climate change. To this end, 
several interviewees said that they would have welcomed information about the environmental 
benefits realised through their efforts as the trial progressed (P10, P16, P17, P21, P23). 
Although they were informed at the outset of the environmental benefits of response, these 
interviewees indicated that they would also have liked to receive feedback on how their own 
efforts were affecting their carbon footprint during the trial. As P10 explained:  
 
I think maybe some sort of statistics around how much carbon dioxide you are not 
creating or how much wind power you have been able to use. Or where it’s gone 
AWOL, where you’ve produced more carbon dioxide because you have operated 
appliances outside of the specified times - in which case, here’s potentially how much 
you could have saved. I think that kind of information is something I would be 
interested in - your kind of carbon score. 
 
Theme 10 – Counter-motivations can prevent response  
 
For some interviewees, the environmental commitment evident in Theme 9 meant that requests 
to respond during turn-up events were uneasily received, as apparently running counter to their 
philosophy and habits (P2, P16, P19). Even those who successfully responded expressed some 
discomfort with the phrasing of the notifications. As P19 elaborated: “It felt wrong, to be 
encouraging people to use more energy, so I didn’t really like that… I think the wording was 
kind of a bit misleading. What you are trying to do presumably is trying to get people to shift, 
rather than use more.” 
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P2 echoed this concern, while acknowledging the inherent tension where an action which itself 
appears innately counter to environmental principles in fact serves a crucial purpose in the 
broader environmental context:  
 
It’s phrased funnily in the messages, cos you’ve used more and that’s kind of a bad 
thing; but because you’ve done it in a period when it would have been more windy, it’s 
actually a positive thing… It’s a strange way of conceptualising energy consumption, 
but it felt positive because we had actually achieved what we were supposed to achieve. 
 
In some cases, this tension actively served as a counter-motivation to response. For example, P7 
sometimes did not respond by running his dishwasher or washing machine because he did not 
have a full load and did not want to waste electricity. Likewise, when it came to turn-down 
events, some interviewees were unwilling to delay doing a wash cycle because they preferred to 
avail of outdoor drying (P9, P10, P12, P14, P16).  
 
Taking this one step further, P4 reported that their experiences on the trial prompted individuals 
in her household to consider not only how they could change their consumption patterns to 
respond, but also how they could minimise their overall energy use. As a result, they sometimes 
used certain appliances during turn-down events even though this was contraindicated. For 
instance, she had sometimes used her electric shower rather than having a bath - which would 
have used gas to heat the water – because she thought that doing so would use less energy 
overall. This represents a substitution of energy vector (Grünewald, 2015) for a different 
purpose: to reduce overall consumption, rather than to load shift. As she explained: “I suppose 
we made our own decisions based on, not just, ‘Yes, we are going to be using or not using 
energy according to the availability of wind-generated energy,’ but actually looking at our 
overall energy consumption and looking at what’s going to use the least energy of any source.” 
The potential implications of this approach are discussed in Section 7.6.3(c). 
 
7.4.3 Trigger themes 
 
Theme 11 – Multi-modal event notifications can facilitate response  
 
When enrolling on the trial, participants opted to receive event notifications either by text 
message only or by text message and email. Some interviewees who had chosen to receive 
notifications via both channels reported that this increased the likelihood that they would receive 
the messages and would therefore be well placed to respond (P1, P7, P11). As P11 explained: 
“It was probably quite good because it was belt and braces; so if I missed one, I would have 
spotted the other, because I tend to look at my messages on my phone when I am out and about 
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and emails on my computer when I am in.” Similarly, P1 stated that this ensured she received all 
notifications regardless of whether she happened to be without either internet or mobile 
coverage.  
 
Conversely, in a few cases where interviewees had opted to receive text message notifications 
only, this ended up preventing response (P8, P18, P13). For instance, a member of P8’s 
household lost his phone a week into the trial and so did not receive any notifications; while P18 
opted out of receiving text message notifications when she went on holiday and then forgot to 
switch them back on once she returned home. 
 
Some interviewees suggested that had they received notifications through alternative channels, 
this would have helped to increase response; messages would have been received in a manner 
and at a time that would have made it more likely that they would have been acted upon (P2, P8, 
P17, P18, P21).  Suggestions included social media notifications, calendar alerts and ‘push’ 
notifications on smartphone apps. For example, P21 felt that calendar alerts would have worked 
especially well because they are harder to dismiss than texts and would appear automatically on 
all her various devices. Similarly, P18 thought that Facebook notifications would be particularly 
effective for her: 
 
If I was part of a group and there was a post on my wall, then in among photographs of 
my daughter and kids riding their bikes and macaroni cheese recipes, I would get a little 
reminder: ‘If you’ve got a wash upstairs sitting in the basket, go and do it tonight.’… It 
would catch me at the right time. 
 
Theme 12 – The effectiveness of in-home displays and other devices in triggering response 
 
Event notifications could not be sent through the in-home displays used on the trial  
because participants did not have smart meters in their households. However, most interviewees 
(n=14) suggested that this would have made it easier for them to respond and could help to 
promote continued response over the longer term: when household members checked how much 
electricity was being used in their households, they would also be reminded of the timing of 
upcoming events (P2, P21). As P14 observed: “You would put the two together - it would all be 
in one place… That would remind you that the wind is blowing now, so it’s a good time to do 
stuff.”  
 
When asked what might have facilitated response, several interviewees thought that it would 
have been helpful if their in-home displays could change colour to indicate when events were 
taking place (P3, P13, P17, P18, P20). As P18 stated: “If you could have a different-coloured 
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light or some sort of indication that now is a good time, that would be useful, because it’s just 
all built into a central space and you’d have it somewhere that’s visual, like under the 
telly…You’d think, ‘Oh, the light’s gone green - it’s time to get the wash on.’” 
 
P4 even wondered whether event notifications could be linked, via the in-home displays, with 
household appliances to create a network that could trigger response through appliances 
themselves: “We are meant to be living in the 21st century. If the device was hooked up to the 
appliances, so that when you tried to put them on, you got a message that, ‘You are in an alert - 
are you sure you want to put it on? You are meant to be using less,’ it might make you think 
twice.” 
 
7.5 Response and the FBM  
 
This section explores how the various enablers and constraints of response identified through 
the interviews can be conceptualised through the prism of the FBM. 
 
7.5.1 Ability 
 
The interview data revealed that, of the FBM’s six ‘ability’ elements (see Chapter 3), the 
physical effort, brain cycles, time and non-routine elements all served as constraints to response 
on the trial. For instance, having to perform non-routine behaviours – such as washing clothes 
outside existing household schedules or changing mealtimes – sometimes prevented response 
(see Theme 2). The fact that response was at times either physically or cognitively challenging 
also served as a constraint: on occasion, some interviewees were too tired to respond, or forgot 
to do so because they were distracted by other tasks or had not registered the details of events 
(Theme 4). Time pressures also prevented response (Theme 4), with the demands of family life 
proving particularly detrimental for some households.  
 
While these constraints all mapped readily to the FBM, three additional factors were identified 
which did not fit the model so easily: 
 
• Immediate need – where an immediate need to use a specific appliance arose (Theme 
3); 
• Third-party control – where someone from outside the household determined the use 
times of appliances (Theme 5); and 
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• Active occupancy – where response was difficult or impossible because household 
members were away from the home or asleep (Theme 6). 
 
The ability component of the FBM was thus expanded to include these additional factors (see 
Figure 27). 
 
Figure 27. Revised ability component of the FBM   
 
7.5.2 Motivation 
 
Analysis of the interview data revealed close correlations with the FBM’s three core motivators 
(see Chapter 3). The feedback provided on the trial - in particular, the personal feedback - 
appears to have successfully tapped into the pleasure/pain motivator. This was evident in the 
language that interviewees used to describe their reactions to the feedback: they spoke of being 
“chuffed”, said that “it felt good” and observed, “We’ve done well, which felt good.” Their 
input suggests that the pleasure which this feedback elicited helped to promote continued 
response throughout the trial (see Theme 7).  The considerable enthusiasm expressed for peer 
comparisons suggests that this motivator could be leveraged further by providing a benchmark 
against which some participants could measure themselves and even a source of competition for 
others. 
 
Meanwhile, concerns expressed about disturbing neighbours by using certain appliances late at 
night or appearing untidy to visitors by delaying vacuuming clearly map to the social 
acceptance/rejection motivator of the FBM. 
 
Regarding the hope/fear motivator, some interviewees suggested that details of the specific 
environmental benefits realised through their efforts would have increased their motivation to 
respond (P1, P7, P10, P21) (Theme 9); this would tap into fears about climate change and hopes 
that individual response could help to mitigate its effects. Communicating these benefits is 
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further recommended by Fischer et al (2013), who suggest that programmes should “convey to 
consumers the environmental benefits of load shifting (eg, avoiding peak demand and thus 
reducing carbon emissions)… and reward consent not just with money, but also with game like 
rewards or environmental praise” (p.10). 
 
However, the interview data also revealed a tension between how some interviewees prefer to 
use their appliances and how they might need to in order to respond. In those cases, the desire to 
conserve energy proved a powerful counter-motivation, with interviewees refraining from using 
certain appliances to respond to avoid increasing overall consumption - for example, by not 
running partial laundry or dishwasher loads during turn-up events, and by doing laundry during 
turn-down events to avail of outdoor drying. One interviewee (P4) even reframed her energy 
decisions around what would use less energy overall, rather than specifically around response. 
The concept of counter-motivation is therefore included in the extended version of the FBM 
presented in this chapter (see Figure 28). 
 
7.5.3 Trigger 
 
Most of the interviewees suggested that event notifications sent through their in-home displays 
would have helped to facilitate response (n=13). Within the framework of the FBM, the in-home 
display would complement the text message and email notifications by acting as an additional 
‘signal trigger’, which would be visible to everyone in the household and would further prompt 
response at appropriate times. 
 
One interviewee suggested that devices indicating when appliances should be used should be 
placed close to, or even incorporated within, energy-intensive appliances (P17). They could thus 
help to increase response by serving as “in-the-moment, localised awareness mechanisms that 
are visible as a decision is being made” (Sugarman, 2014, p.47). From the perspective of the 
FBM, such devices would act as facilitator triggers, making it easier to respond by reminding 
consumers whether it was an appropriate time to use their appliances at the precise moment that 
they were about to use them.  
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Figure 28. Adapted FBM model for DSR  
 
 
7.6 Lessons for shaping DSR strategies 
 
This section draws on the findings from the interviews - read together with the wider energy 
literature - to explore how these might inform future DSR strategies.  
 
7.6.1 Promoting acceptance of DSR programme models 
 
While the interviews primarily explored the enablers and constraints of response, they also 
provided an opportunity to seek qualitative feedback on how interviewees’ experiences on the 
trial might inform their preferences for different potential DSR programme models, to 
complement the quantitative data from the switching survey (see Chapter 5).  
 
To this end, interviewees were asked whether they would prefer to participate in similar 
programmes which were price based or information-only. Perhaps unsurprisingly, most (n=14) 
indicated that they would be more motivated to respond if their efforts could translate into 
savings on their electricity bills. This is in line with the findings of the switching survey, which 
revealed that financial incentives were powerful motivators for participation in DSR 
programmes: around 84% of respondents who opted to switch to one of the DSR tariffs cited the 
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opportunity to save money as either “Very important” or “Extremely important” in their choice 
of programme.  
 
Two interviewees stated that their experiences on the trial had made them more likely to switch 
to price-based programmes should these become available (P11, P23). P11 reported that the trial 
had made her realise that a financially incentivised tariff might suit her household: “Your study 
showed that I can change my behaviour - maybe not in huge ways, but a bit; so actually, a tariff 
that both rewarded me for it and reinforced that tendency would be good, I think.”  
 
P15 suggested that financial incentives might also help to prevent response fatigue: “If there 
was no price incentive and I was doing this year in, year out, I don’t think you would get the 
same response from me... In the long term, there is a risk that I would become disengaged.”  
  
However, other interviewees indicated a preference for information-only programmes (P8, P14, 
P21, P22). As P14 explained: “I don’t need a financial incentive to change my ways and it was 
very interesting to feel that you are in tune with the weather… I think I would probably respond 
to your methods better than a sort of midnight tariff or whatever they might come up with.”  
 
Considering the types of communications from suppliers that might encourage her to switch to a 
DSR programme, P8 suggested: “If they sent me a message saying, ‘If you switch to this tariff, 
it would probably help to promote renewables,’ then I would be more likely to switch, because 
we’ve already switched electricity supplier to be with a green electricity supplier. If that was the 
kind of sales pitch they used, I think I would be more likely to at least consider it.” 
 
The interview data thus confirmed that in deciding whether to switch to DSR programmes, some 
consumers are motivated more by non-financial considerations - such as the desire to promote 
renewables or protect the environment - than by the opportunity to save money on their 
electricity bills. In fact, P21 wondered whether a programme that financially incentivised 
response might even have perverse effects: “If we monetised this and I could actually afford the 
more expensive price, then I would just use things whenever it’s easiest for me… In a way, that 
gives me a green light to act irresponsibly because I can afford to.” The fact that financial 
incentives might sometimes negatively affect response is supported by research in other 
contexts which has shown that pro-social motivations can be ‘crowded out’ by financial 
incentives (see Chapter 2).  
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Meanwhile, comments made by P13 and P18 suggest that some consumers might be reluctant to 
switch to information-only DSR if suppliers are ultimately the sole financial beneficiaries of 
their efforts. In the words of P13: “If people used electricity when there is more available and 
didn’t receive any reward for doing that, the only people who would gain would be the 
suppliers.” Similarly, P18 suggested that receiving a financial reward for responding would 
“feel kind of fairer, because I guess whoever owns the turbine is able to make their money when 
the winds are high”.104 
 
7.6.2 Promoting penetration of smart appliances  
 
The interview data revealed that the most common constraint that interviewees experienced in 
responding related to active occupancy: if the house was empty or everyone was asleep, they 
generally could not run appliances during turn-up events. Many interviewees mentioned that had 
they owned smart appliances that could self-start at times of high renewable generation or could 
be activated remotely upon receipt of notifications, this would have facilitated response.  
 
Their feedback suggests that greater market penetration of smart appliances would help to 
increase response. However, achieving this is not necessarily straightforward. Some scholars 
have characterised it as a classic “chicken and egg problem” (Vanthournout, 2015): on one 
hand, few residential DSR programmes are currently available because consumers have limited 
capacity to respond, given that most do not own smart appliances; but on the other, the market 
for smart appliances is underdeveloped, since consumers have limited interest in investing in 
this new technology in the absence of financial incentives to do so.  
In this context, regulation may be needed to ensure a minimum level of smart functionality for 
new household appliances. This has already been introduced in other countries: for example, 
Australia’s Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency concluded that “Government 
action is necessary to create the conditions for the appliance market to introduce smart 
appliances…and to ensure that they are sold in sufficient quantities for the electricity 
distributors to be able to cost-effectively implement demand response strategies” (Department 
of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency, 2011, p.4). This led to the introduction of Standard 
AS/NZS 4755 – “Demand response capabilities and supporting technologies for electrical 
                                                
 
 
104 These comments are in line with the findings of Buchanan et al (2016): residential consumers in this study 
felt that since their response helped to provide financial value for the grid and suppliers, they should share in 
the financial benefits.  
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products” - which was designed to facilitate the roll-out of smart appliances. To comply with 
the standard, appliances must at a minimum be able to switch off automatically or operate at 
minimal load for the duration of DSR events (ibid). 
The UK government has recently taken a first step in this direction. Ofgem’s Smart Systems and 
Flexibility Plan (Ofgem, 2017) acknowledges that the “limited availability of smart appliances 
means consumers cannot realise bill savings by providing demand response”, and states that 
“the Government intends to consult on seeking powers to set standards for smart appliances” 
(p.25).105 However, although regulation should help to increase penetration of smart appliances, 
it will still take some time before these are commonly found in consumer households, given the 
lifespan of appliances. In the meantime, additional strategies such as those outlined below will 
be necessary to maximise consumer response.  
 
7.6.3 Promoting the development of DSR know-how 
 
Burchell et al (2015) use the term ‘energy know-how’ to refer to “the things that it is helpful for 
householders to know if they want to reduce their energy consumption” (p.1987). The term 
encompasses knowledge of alternative ways of doing things that would consume less energy, 
the practical skills needed to implement these alternatives, and an understanding of any 
materials that may be required and where to obtain them (ibid). 
 
The interview data suggests that helping consumers to develop similar knowledge would 
increase response on DSR programmes. This is supported by a meta-analysis of DSR 
programmes by Stromback et al (2011), which found that consumer education – including 
information about how to save energy and tips and advice on potential response – has a 
significant impact on programme outcomes (see Chapter 2): consumers reduced peak 
consumption by 50% more on ToU programmes that included these types of educational 
measures than those on programmes that did not (a 6% versus 4% decrease). 
 
The knowledge that is likely to be helpful when it comes to increasing response on DSR 
programmes is referred to in this thesis as ‘DSR know-how’. This in turn consists of three 
elements: appliance consumption knowledge, appliance know-how and practice know-how (see 
Figure 29).  
                                                
 
 
105 The government plans to focus on appliances which can be communications enabled and can thus adjust 
their energy consumption in response to signals. These would initially include cold and wet appliances, heating, 
ventilation and battery storage (Ofgem, 2017). 
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Figure 29. DSR know-how 
 
 
(a) Appliance consumption knowledge   
 
For consumers to change their consumption patterns effectively, they first need to know how 
much electricity is required for specific end uses (Fischer, 2008). However, as highlighted in 
Theme 1, the enrolment questionnaire and interview data revealed that many trial participants 
had a poor understanding of how much electricity different appliances consume. This echoes the 
results of previous studies: Kempton and Montgomery (1982), for instance, found that 
consumers frequently estimate how much energy appliances use according to their perceptual 
salience (eg, they often overestimate the electricity consumption of televisions and lighting), 
and overestimate how much energy is used by appliances that replace tasks which previously 
involved manual labour. Similarly, in a more recent US study, Chen et al (2014) found that 
consumers frequently misestimated the amount of electricity required to run overhead lighting, 
heating and cooling systems, and various electrical items. 
 
Thus, helping to develop consumers’ appliance consumption knowledge should facilitate 
response by enabling them to identify the most appropriate appliances to use when acting on 
notifications (Ofgem, 2010).   
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(b) Appliance know-how  
 
The interview data revealed that interviewees often lacked specific knowledge about their own 
appliances which would have facilitated response (Theme 1). For instance, some were unaware 
that their appliances had timers or did not know how to set them. Others were interested in 
retrofitting specific appliances with plugs that would facilitate remote control (eg, immersion 
heaters), but did not know how to do so. In each case, this lack of appliance know-how 
prevented response when households were not actively occupied. 
 
These findings suggest that helping participants to develop a better understanding of how their 
own appliances operate should increase response.106 As others have argued, the information 
provided on DSR programmes “needs to extend beyond an explanation of the tariffs to also 
include interaction with heating systems or digital control devices and appliances. Information 
on how to use devices or timers without affecting functionality will be important” (Owen et al, 
2013, p.57).  
 
Feedback from P17 further highlighted this point: “The alerts were very helpful and told you 
when to use more or less. But what I did think would be good would be some additional tips – 
say, for example, ‘Did you know that it was more economical using X, Y or Z?’” Such 
suggestions could relate, for example, to rescheduling a load using a timer, using a half-load 
setting where this function is available or using eco-settings instead of standard cycles. 
Meanwhile, to prompt response from participants (like P23) who may be unsure of how their 
appliances operate and have no manual to hand, notifications could include a tip to search for an 
online version or contact the manufacturer. 
 
Under the FBM, such notifications – combining a message about when to take action with tips 
on how to do so – would be considered ‘facilitator’ triggers, since they prompt response while 
simultaneously making response easier. 
 
                                                
 
 
106 This is also suggested by the qualitative study of consumer response on the CLNR ToU trial, which found 
that consumers with greater appliance know-how find it easier to be flexible about their energy use (Bulkeley et 
al, 2014).  
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(c) Practice know-how  
 
The final component of DSR know-how involves adjusting various household practices in order 
to respond and is informed by the concept of practice-led approaches presented by Grünewald 
(2015).  Grünewald defines ‘practice-led approaches’ as those that lead to “a change in load 
which is brought about by people doing things differently”. 
 
Many interviewees explained how they had adopted such approaches in order to respond during 
the trial. For example, during turn-down events, P24 had sometimes risen earlier and left the 
house with her daughter to avoid using electricity at home (changing the practitioner). Likewise, 
P17 demonstrated practice know-how when staying with his mother - a fellow trial participant - 
by using her standard shower rather than her power shower to consume less electricity during 
turn-down events (substituting the practice).  
 
The comments of P17’s mother in this regard confirm that helping participants to think about 
the different ways in which they can adjust household practices could facilitate response: “My 
son was participating as well and he was staying in my house during some of the alerts. I have a 
power shower and a non-power shower, and he showered without using the power shower. It 
would not have occurred to me to do that.” 
 
The interview data revealed that one area in which many interviewees already possessed 
advanced practice know-how, and drew on this to positive effect, concerned kitchen practices. 
Interviewees reported that they had responded by reheating food in microwaves rather than 
using an electric hob or oven (load reduction) or cooking on a gas hob rather than in an electric 
oven (substituting energy vector) during turn-down events, and by preparing food in advance for 
consumption later during turn-up events (shifting backwards).  Helping consumers to develop 
their practice know-how in this space might be especially beneficial given that electricity used 
for cooking represents a significant proportion of residential demand (17.5% in 2014) (DECC, 
2015) and around 20% of the evening peak (Element Energy, 2014); changes in such behaviour 
could thus unlock significant response on DSR programmes.  
 
Similarly, all three interviewees with immersion heaters exhibited advanced practice know-how 
in relation to their use and had used them during trial events in order to respond - either by 
refraining from use during turn-down events (shifting load forward in time) or by switching 
them on manually or setting timers to coincide with turn-up events (shifting load backward in 
time). This likewise suggests that helping to develop practice know-how in this regard should 
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facilitate response - for example, by promoting greater awareness of the fact that the energy 
intensiveness of immersion heaters makes heating water off peak a highly effective way to 
respond, and providing details of how long water is likely to remain hot once pre-heated.   
 
Practice know-how should also encompass an understanding of when response might be 
contraindicated so that overall load is not accidentally increased on DSR programmes. For 
instance, participants should understand that in general, washing machines, tumble dryers and 
dishwashers should not be run with partial loads in order to respond. An OECD study involving 
10,000 EU households showed that some DSR programmes resulted in increased overall 
consumption, in part because participants chose to run partial loads during low-priced periods 
(Breukers and Mourik, 2013). Similarly, although doing laundry when outdoor drying is 
possible might sometimes mean that participants cannot respond by using their washing 
machine during turn-up events, it is still important to encourage such behaviour to avoid the 
additional electrical loads associated with tumble dryer use (see Theme 10).  
 
That said, a fine line must be negotiated between preventing increases in overall consumption 
and ensuring that response is still sufficient to achieve the goals of DSR, which – as some 
participants may not appreciate – are distinct from those of energy conservation. As the 
discussion in Theme 10 illustrates, energy use decisions can be informed by competing 
motivations and objectives. Consumers – particularly the environmentally committed 
individuals who are more likely to switch to information-only DSR programmes (see Chapter 
5), and those whose energy consciousness is further heightened through participation (see 
Theme 2) – may be unaware that a focus on reducing consumption above all else could, perhaps 
counterintuitively, at times be antithetical to the purposes of DSR. For example, while what 
many consumers would understand as the accepted rules of energy use (eg, running full loads, 
utilising natural power whenever available, avoiding unnecessary use) are usually compatible 
with the demands of DSR, there may be occasions when wind generation is so abundant that any 
response at all will assist in balancing the system and avoiding the need to spill excess output.  
 
In developing practice know-how, it would thus be helpful to promote a wider understanding of 
the differences between load shifting and load reduction, and to provide concrete suggestions on 
how different types of response in different scenarios might best achieve the goals of DSR (eg, 
in cases of exceptional generation such as those outlined above, even partial loads or tumble 
drying could represent an acceptable response).  
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7.6.4 Linking event notifications to in-home displays  
 
Consumers on DSR programmes whose households have smart meters could receive additional 
notifications of DSR events through their in-home displays. While the interview data suggests 
that this should help to increase event visibility and thus facilitate response, the interviews also 
yielded additional findings about the potential use of in-home displays on DSR programmes. 
 
First, many interviewees recommended that in-house displays use different colours to indicate 
peak and off-peak periods. ‘Traffic light’ systems - with red indicating peak, amber regular and 
green off-peak - have been used with positive results on previous DSR programmes. For 
example, in a critical peak pricing pilot conducted by US utility Baltimore Gas and Electric 
Company, customers provided with Energy Orbs (a type of ambient in-home display) shifted 
loads off-peak by between 23% and 27%, compared to a control group which shifted loads by 
between 18% and 21% (DECC, 2012b). 
 
The LCL dynamic ToU trial likewise informed participants of electricity consumption in their 
households in real time through a traffic light system on their in-home displays (Carmichael et 
al, 2014). However, this particular application of the system could potentially cause confusion 
and thus hinder response: participants might attempt to use more electricity during turn-down 
events if the in-home display were green or reduce consumption during turn-up events on seeing 
the in-home display turn red. The consensus expressed in the post-trial interviews was that to 
avoid confusion, the traffic light system should relate to the different price periods, rather than 
to household electricity consumption (Carmichael et al, 2014).  
 
This approach was supported by the interview data, as P17 observed: “But if it was red, red, 
red… You’d think, ‘Oh God…’ Well, red is stop, at the end of the day; green is positive.” 
 
7.6.5 Multi-modal event notifications  
 
While in-home displays are a natural channel for event notifications, the interview data suggests 
that the potential impact of other channels - such as social media, mobile phone apps and 
calendar messages - should not be ignored. For some individuals, these might work better by 
“catch[ing] their attention at just the right time”, in the words of one interviewee - kairos in 
action, in Fogg’s terminology. 
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This is supported by a meta-analysis of response on DSR trials conducted by Stromback et al 
(2011), which found a positive correlation between response on critical peak pricing, critical 
peak rebate and real-time pricing programmes and the number of different channels used to 
notify participants about events. A qualitative study of EnergyAustralia’s dynamic peak pricing 
trial likewise revealed that when households were provided with event notifications in several 
different ways, this “heightened the sense of urgency” around impending dynamic peak pricing 
events for participants (Strengers, 2010).  
 
While this ‘heightened sense of urgency’ may be one reason why multiple event notifications 
increase response, the interview data suggests other, more prosaic reasons. Interviewees 
observed that where they had opted to receive text notifications only, they sometimes missed 
these messages – for example, if they were outside network coverage or did not have their 
phones to hand – and were thus unaware of the timing of upcoming events. The notifications 
were also sometimes ignored when they arrived at inconvenient times. Multi-modal event 
notifications may thus help to facilitate response on DSR programmes by making it more likely 
that participants will both receive notifications and register the details of events.107  
 
7.6.6 Feedback lessons  
 
Although the feedback strengthened motivation to respond for most interviewees, several 
observed that they would have also welcomed information on the environmental benefits 
realised through their efforts. This form of feedback will likely be particularly important on 
information-only programmes, given the absence of other incentives to respond. On price-based 
programmes, the pricing mechanism itself serves as an incentive: participants who succeed in 
load shifting can see their efforts translate directly into savings. However, this kind of tangible 
benefit is absent from information-only programmes, making alternative incentives even more 
necessary.  
 
Similarly, the recommendations that peer comparisons be incorporated into the feedback 
suggest that benchmarking and competition could both serve as additional motivators which 
would help to promote response in the absence of financial incentives.  
 
                                                
 
 
107 This approach may not be as beneficial in the case of static ToU programmes, since consumers on these 
programmes may begin to develop new consumption patterns based around peak and off-peak periods which 
occur at the same times each day.  
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That several interviewees voluntarily chose to compare feedback, share details of how they 
responded and remind each other about events is also a significant finding: it confirms the 
potential for creating a community of users, which can be an effective way to encourage 
behaviour change (Petersen et al, 2007). One way to achieve this would be to establish forums 
which enable participants on DSR programmes to exchange experiences and discuss different 
ways of responding; for example, Salt River Project Power and Water in Central Arizona 
introduced a platform through which customers can share their experiences of its ToU tariffs 
(SRP, 2017). This approach is further supported by research showing that participants in energy 
demand programmes are often interested in learning about alternative routines and ways of 
doing things from their peers (Hitchings and Day 2011; Simcock et al, 2014), which in turn can 
help them to identify new ways of responding (Boardman and Darby, 2000). 
 
7.6.7 Towards a tailored DSR system 
 
The interview data confirms that when it comes to DSR, one size cannot and does not fit all. As 
the preceding discussion highlights, the potential utility of a personalised approach is apparent 
from an analysis of interviewee input on all aspects of the trial – from the frequency and content 
of event notifications to the channels through which they were sent and the format and content 
of the feedback provided. In fact, such an approach was expressly advocated by P2, who 
ventured suggestions on what an ideal real-world DSR system might look like: “You could 
build the application for the user when they sign up. They would actually fill in their likes, 
dislikes and requirements…You would then be able to provide enhancement, advice, 
information, notifications, all in relation to specific lifestyle circumstances and events.”  
 
The value of this tailored approach – “persuasion through customization”, in Fogg’s words 
(Fogg, 2002) – is supported by the literature. While tailoring has traditionally been used for 
health interventions, studies have also confirmed it as a potent tool for effecting behavioural 
change in the energy context (Abrahamse et al, 2007; Fogg, 2002).  These confirm that a 
tailored programme is likely to have significantly greater effect than more generic models, as 
people tend to assign disproportionate weight to information that is highly concrete and 
personalised (Borgida and Nisbett, 1977), and are more likely to make consumption changes 
when information is tailored to their lives and contexts (Boardman and Darby, 2000; Green et 
al, 1998; Henryson et al, 2000; Steg, 2008).108  
                                                
 
 
108 Providing personalised hints and tips of this kind to consumers on DSR programmes has been found to 
increase response (Lewis et al, 2012).  
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A tailored DSR system would afford several advantages.109  First, by submitting details of the 
specific appliances they own,110 users could be provided with more accurate information on the 
amount of electricity that each consumes and the different ways in which it might be used to 
respond. An example of the kind of personalised appliance information that could be used to 
help facilitate response on DSR programmes is shown in Table 21. 
 
Table 21. Personalised response information (Source: adapted from Fischer et al, 2013) 
 
 
A tailored system could also help users to identify the most appropriate appliances to use to 
respond on an event-by-event basis by including personalised suggestions in event notifications. 
Appliances that users might not have previously considered using could be highlighted, as well 
as those whose use involves the strongest behavioural component, such as space and water 
heating (see Chen et al, 2014).111  
 
                                                
 
 
109 Although such an approach would require more complex back-end systems to administer, the increasing 
power of data analytics means that more sophisticated segmentation is becoming cheaper and easier (The 
Behavioural Insights Team, 2014). 
110 This information could also be obtained using non-intrusive load monitoring subject to participant consent 
(see Zoha et al, 2012). 
111 The latter is important because the behavioural component of electricity consumption varies by appliance so 
appliance level information policies are most effective when they target appliances with the largest behavioural 
component (ibid). 
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The system could further provide customised tips on ways in which various household practices 
could be adjusted to use the minimum electricity possible. This would be especially helpful in 
highlighting alternative approaches in case of immediate need: for example, notifications might 
point out that laundry could be washed at a lower heat setting or draw users’ attention to eco-
settings which they may be unaware of (reduce load). As P4 observed, this sort of information 
might “help you to make those judgement calls when you know you can’t respond completely, 
but at least to use a bit less than you would otherwise”.  
 
A tailored system would additionally allow users to set preferences for the channels through 
which event notifications are received (eg, text messages, emails, calendar alerts, Facebook 
posts) 112 and the frequency with which they are sent. This would help to ensure that response is 
triggered in the ways which resonate most with users and at times when they may be best placed 
to take action.  Users could also update their preferences with time and experience to ensure 
continued response. For instance, as lead participant on the trial, P3 took responsibility for 
receiving all notifications, but soon realised that he was not always remembering to forward 
them on to family members. A tailored system would have allowed him to add those family 
members as additional recipients, thus increasing his household’s ability to respond. 
 
Similarly, users could also specify their preferences for the frequency and types of feedback sent 
(eg, own household performance, peer comparisons, carbon savings).  This would enhance the 
motivational resonance of this feedback – as Lewis et al (2012) argue: “Feedback should 
furthermore be personalised…supported by tips and advice (and wherever possible also 
solutions), not based on kWh, available in both ambient and more direct form, and available 
real-time, but ultimately delivered by request, both in its timing, content, quantity and style.” 
(p.3)  
 
Despite the benefits, however, a tailored DSR system such as that discussed above would be 
significantly more costly than existing models for electricity stakeholders to implement, and 
would require greater time and resources to maintain. A detailed discussion of these increased 
transaction costs is beyond the scope of this thesis.  
 
 
                                                
 
 
112 Baltimore Gas & Electric’s Smart Energy Rewards Programme offers such a differentiated notification 
system with participants able to choose from calls, texts and email notifications of DSR events (Greentech 
Media, 2017). 
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7.7 Conclusions  
 
This chapter presents the findings from interviews with 24 of the 46 lead participants who 
participated in the information-only DSR trial. Thematic coding of the interview data yielded 12 
themes which provide insight into the various enablers and constraints of response on the trial. 
These themes were then examined through the prism of the FBM to identify measures which 
could inform future DSR strategies to help to increase response.  
 
Although these measures were derived from feedback from a relatively small sample (n=24), it 
is notable that other DSR studies support their value in facilitating response. Table 22 
summarises the main findings from the interviews, together with references to supporting 
literature and implications for future DSR strategies.  
 
Meanwhile, analysis of the interview data also made it possible to refine and develop the FBM 
as a framework for exploring the factors that influence response on DSR programmes. 
Additional ability elements – immediate need, third-party control and occupancy – were 
identified which impacted participants’ ability to respond (Figure 27). The analysis also 
highlighted that in some cases participants were unwilling to use their appliances to respond 
because a specific ‘counter-motivation’ – the desire to conserve energy – trumped their desire to 
respond. Counter-motivations were thus included alongside the new ability elements in the 
revised FBM, depicted in Figure 28. 
 
The following chapter draws on the findings from the research to present the main conclusions 
of this thesis, discusses the contribution made to knowledge in the field and provides several 
suggestions for further research which would build on the work presented.  
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Table 22. Summary of main interview findings 
Interview findings Relationship  
to FBM 
Implications for DSR 
strategies 
Supporting literature 
Participants often had a limited 
understanding of how much 
electricity household appliances 
consume 
 
Ability: brain cycles Promote DSR know-how Attari et al, 2010; Chen 
et al, 2014; Kim and 
Shcherbakova 2011; 
Lyndhurst, 2007; 
Neuberg, 2013; 
Stromback et al, 2011 
Household routines can prevent 
response 
Ability: non-routine Promote DSR know-how so 
participants learn different 
ways of carrying out 
practices and lower energy 
options 
Mourik and Breukers, 
2013; Neuberg, 2013; 
Nicholls and Strengers, 
2015; Pollitt and 
Shaorshadze 2011 
Personalised messages about 
consumption and appliances 
were preferred  
Ability: brain cycles  Use a tailored approach to 
provide personalised 
messages and information  
The Behavioural Insights 
Team, 2014; Kjeldskov 
et al, 2012; Lewis et al, 
2012 
Immediate need for appliances 
can prevent response 
Ability: non-negotiable need  Promote DSR know-how so 
participants learn different 
ways of doing things and 
lower energy options  
Bourgeois et al, 2014; 
Buchanan et al, 2016; 
Parrish et al, 2015; 
Mourik and Breukers 
2013 
Participants were interested in 
learning about alternative ways 
of doing things from their peers  
Ability: brain cycles Facilitate conditions for 
participants to share DSR 
know-how 
Catney et al, 2013, 
Hitchings and Day, 2011; 
Simcock et al, 2014 
Participants lacked specific 
knowledge – such as how to set 
timers on appliances – that 
would have facilitated response 
Ability: brain cycles Promote DSR know-how so 
participants understand 
alternative or less energy-
intensive ways of doing 
things  
Neuberg, 2013; Simcock 
et al, 2014 
Active occupancy was usually 
required for participants to 
respond 
Ability: occupancy Regulate to increase the 
penetration of smart 
appliances in consumer 
households  
Abi Ghanem, 2014; 
Neuberg, 2013; Thorsnes 
et al, 2012; Torriti, 2013 
Participants were interested in 
receiving information about the 
environmental benefits of their  
response  
Motivation: hope/fear Provide this type of feedback 
or, where a tailored approach 
is used, provide it as one of 
the options 
Fischer et al, 2013; 
Gyamfi and Krumdieck 
2011; Ofgem, 2010 
Shuling Chen Lillemo, 
2014 
Peer comparisons can be an 
effective way to increase 
response  
Motivation: pleasure/pain Provide this type of feedback 
or, where a tailored approach 
is used, provide it as one of 
the options 
Allcott, 2011; Arvola, 
1993; Dolan and Metcalf, 
2015; Steg, 2008 
Willingness to use certain 
appliances to respond can be 
reduced by noise considerations  
Motivation: social 
acceptance/rejection 
More stringent appliance 
regulations governing 
appliance sound levels 
Butler et al, 2013; Mert 
et al, 2008; Ofgem, 2010  
Offering consumers financial 
incentives to participate in DSR 
can crowd out other 
motivations  
Motivation  Offer consumers the option 
of participating in 
information-only 
programmes  
Curtius et al, 2012; The 
Behavioural Insights 
Team, 2014; Gneezy et 
al, 2011 
Providing multi-modal 
notifications facilitated 
response  
Trigger  Use multi-modal notification 
to inform participants about 
DSR 
Strengers, 2010; 
Stromback et al, 2011   
Providing notifications at 
appropriate times can facilitate 
response  
 
Trigger  Use a tailored approach 
which allows users to choose 
when they receive 
notifications 
The Behavioural Insights 
Team, 2014; Fogg, 2009 
In-home displays using a 
‘traffic light system’ which is 
linked to the timing of DSR 
events may facilitate response 
Trigger Provide consumers on 
dynamic DSR programmes 
with in-home displays which 
indicate the timing of events 
using a traffic light system 
Carmichael, 2014; 
Martinez and Geltz, 
2005; Ofgem, 2010 
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8. Conclusions  
 
8.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter presents the main conclusions of this thesis and its contribution to knowledge.  The 
research aimed to identify how to optimise the impact of residential DSR in the UK by 
examining two central questions: 
 
• What measures could electricity stakeholders implement to maximise uptake of 
residential DSR programmes?  
• What measures could electricity stakeholders implement to maximise response on such 
programmes? 
 
This chapter draws on the findings from the switching survey, the dynamic information-only 
DSR trial and the interviews with trial participants to answer these questions.  
 
Section 8.2 summarises the main findings of the research relating to uptake and response. 
Section 8.3 explains how this thesis proposes a robust theoretical framework for understanding 
DSR behaviours and has further contributed to the knowledge on residential DSR. Section 8.4 
outlines practical recommendations for increasing uptake and response. Section 8.5 concludes 
by highlighting some limitations of the research and provides suggestions for further study to 
build on the work presented. 
 
8.2 Summary of research 
 
8.2.1 Switching survey and dynamic information-only trial 
 
This thesis aimed to explore how to optimise the impact of residential DSR in the UK. As a 
starting point, a representative sample of UK consumers was surveyed to examine preferences 
for three different DSR programme models which are well suited either to the current UK 
electricity system or to conditions which are likely to prevail as renewables become an 
increasingly important part of the UK energy mix:  
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• a static ToU tariff that could help to reduce peak demand; and  
• two dynamic programmes that could help to balance fluctuating supply and demand in a 
renewables-rich electricity system: 
o a dynamic ToU tariff; and  
o a dynamic information-only programme. 
 
Detailed analysis of the survey data revealed that around 23% of respondents would be willing 
to switch to the static ToU tariff, 9% would be willing to switch to the dynamic ToU tariff and 
8% would be willing to switch to the dynamic information-only programme.113  
 
While UK consumer response to static and dynamic ToU tariffs has been examined in two 
previous large-scale projects,114 no studies have hitherto explored whether UK consumers would 
successfully modify their consumption patterns in line with available renewable generation in 
the absence of a financial incentive. As 20% of all survey respondents who indicated WTS to 
one of the three DSR programme models presented in the survey indicated a preference for the 
dynamic information-only model, a four-month trial was conducted in Summer 2015 to test how 
consumers might respond on such a programme in practice. Over the course of the trial, 
participants were sent 40 event notifications based on available generation from UK wind farms, 
asking them to adjust their consumption accordingly for specified periods. 
 
Detailed analysis of the electricity consumption data from participating households and 
qualitative data from post-trial interviews revealed that approximately 75% of trial households 
successfully changed their consumption patterns during the trial. On average, they used 9.9% 
less electricity during ‘turn-down events’ (which asked them to reduce consumption) and 4.4% 
more electricity during ‘turn-up events’ (which asked them to increase consumption).  
 
The finding that most of these households proved willing and able to vary their consumption 
based on available wind generation in the absence of a financial incentive is especially 
significant when considered in the context of the UK electricity system. Generation capacity 
from wind is growing year on year (DUKES, 2015; DUKES, 2016; DUKES, 2017), and the 
falling cost of offshore wind generation means that this trend is only likely to accelerate (Carbon 
Brief, 2017a). As more wind power comes online, the potential savings to be made from 
                                                
 
 
113 These are the percentages post-certainty correction (see Chapter 4 and Chapter 5). 
114 The CLNR ToU trial (Bulkeley et al, 2015) and the LCL dynamic ToU trial (Carmichael et al, 2015), both 
of which were supported by the Low Carbon Networks Fund. 
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dynamic DSR are likely to increase substantially (Hesmondhalgh, 2014). The promising 
findings from the dynamic information-only trial suggest that such programmes could represent 
a valuable resource for electricity stakeholders seeking to balance supply and demand as 
renewables are increasingly integrated into the energy mix.115   
 
8.3 Contribution to knowledge  
 
This thesis makes a threefold contribution to knowledge, as follows:  
 
• It contributes to the FBM by refining and developing the model as a framework for 
understanding DSR behaviours. 
• It contributes to the DSR literature by estimating the size of the resource represented by 
dynamic information-only residential DSR, examining the environmental and pro-social 
considerations that motivate participation in such programmes and testing potential 
response on such programmes. 
• It applies a novel methodological approach for validating the results of statistical 
models that are produced using stated preference data. 
 
8.3.1 Developing the FBM as a framework to understand DSR behaviours 
 
In applying the FBM to examine the factors that influence WTS and response – the key DSR 
behaviours studied in this thesis – two new conceptual elements were added to the model:  
perceived ability to respond116 and counter-motivations.  
 
Perceived ability to respond encompasses three factors – perceived consumption knowledge, 
perceived ease of rescheduling energy-intensive appliance use and perceived ability to use 
electric heating systems to respond – which were all found to increase WTS. This finding not 
only develops the FBM as a framework for understanding switching behaviour, but also has 
practical implications, since it highlights the role that certain measures which should help to 
increase ability to respond (and thus, as an anticipated corollary, perceived ability) could play in 
maximising programme uptake. Two such measures are outlined in Sections 8.4.2(a) and 
8.4.3(a).  
                                                
 
 
115 Potential applications of dynamic information-only DSR are not limited to wind generation, but could also 
be designed to help to integrate other renewable sources, such as solar.   
116 By its nature, perceived ability to respond is relevant only in regard to WTS, not in relation to response. 
 182 
 
The FBM was further developed as a framework for exploring WTS and response by 
incorporating the conceptual element of counter-motivations. According to the FBM, as 
motivation and ability increase, a behaviour becomes more likely. However, the empirical data 
collected for this thesis revealed that certain counter-motivations can serve to reduce WTS, 
while others can prevent response. For example, safety concerns relating to the unattended use 
of appliances and a desire to maximise benefits from existing solar installations can reduce 
WTS; while an overarching desire to reduce energy consumption117 can reduce response.  
 
Here again, this theoretical insight has practical implications. Fogg (2009a) contends that “the 
goal in designing for motivation is, conceptually, to move a user to a higher position in the FBM 
landscape. In other words… to have motivation increased so they cross the behavior activation 
threshold” (p.4). However, the inclusion of counter-motivations in the model highlights that 
when devising strategies to increase WTS or response, it is also essential to consider how the 
influence of these countervailing factors can be mitigated. 
 
The research further develops the FBM as a framework for understanding response by refining 
Fogg’s ‘ability’ elements, which influence performance of a target behaviour, and incorporating 
three additional elements – third-party control, active occupancy and immediate need – 
identified in the post-trial interviews which served as further constraints to response. The 
inclusion of these factors in the FBM, alongside the additional concept of counter-motivations, 
has produced a more robust framework that better reflects the diverse range of factors that 
influence DSR behaviours. 
 
8.3.2 The value of dynamic information-only DSR programmes 
 
This thesis also makes a significant contribution to the DSR literature on information-only DSR 
(Gyamfi and Krumdieck, 2011; Gyamfi et al, 2013; Thorsnes et al, 2012; Onzo, 2011; 
Strengers, 2010). It is the first study to estimate the size of the potential resource represented by 
dynamic information-only residential DSR in the UK and to examine the environmental and 
pro-social considerations that motivate participation in these programmes. To the author’s 
knowledge, the dynamic information-only DSR trial is also the first to examine how UK 
                                                
 
 
117 The motivations to use less electricity and to use less energy overall (ie, including both electricity and gas) 
were both found to conflict with response on the DSR trial.  
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consumers might respond in practice to requests to vary their electricity consumption depending 
on available wind generation. 
 
The findings of this thesis challenge the prevailing assumption – both in much of the DSR 
literature and in the industry’s current approach to residential DSR – “that there is no better 
signal than price” (Gyamfi et al, 2013, p.76). Instead, the results show that while many 
consumers who are interested in DSR might favour price-based programmes, a significant 
proportion would prefer to participate on an information-only basis. In this regard, the research 
revealed that 8% of UK consumers118 would favour information-only models which allowed 
them to contribute towards the environmental and pro-social goals of DSR without exposing 
them to the financial risks inherent in price-based programmes. Programmes which take 
advantage of this resource could thus play an important role in optimising the impact of 
residential DSR in the UK electricity system.  
 
8.3.3 Validation of statistical models produced using stated preference data 
 
A final contribution of this work is in its application of a novel methodological approach for 
validating the results of statistical models produced using stated preference data.  Although 
certainty correction has previously been applied to address hypothetical bias, its application in 
the analysis of the switching survey data was novel and could have equal utility in other 
domains beyond DSR. While previous research has used certainty correction techniques in 
contingent valuation studies to refine estimates of willingness to pay (Champ et al, 2009; Fifer, 
2011), in this thesis certainty corrected data was also used to estimate an additional statistical 
model to cross-validate the results from the initial model produced using uncorrected data. This 
represents a promising methodological approach for generating further insights when using 
statistical methods to analyse data from stated choice experiments.  
 
                                                
 
 
118 20% of all consumers who chose to switch to one or other of the DSR programmes in the switching survey. 
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8.4 Practical recommendations to maximise uptake and response 
 
8.4.1 Maximising uptake  
 
(a) Promote awareness of the non-financial benefits of DSR 
 
Respondents who were more environmentally motivated – as measured using the “Commitment 
to environmental sustainability” measure – had greater WTS to all three DSR programme 
models presented in the switching survey. This confirms that, as other commentators have 
suggested (Buryk et al, 2015; Darby and Pisica, 2013; Faruqui et al, 2010b), uptake of DSR 
programmes could be increased by highlighting the environmental benefits of DSR to the wider 
public. 
 
The research also revealed that other pro-social considerations may additionally influence WTS. 
More than half of the respondents who indicated WTS to one of the three DSR programme 
models presented in the survey stated that the fact that DSR would help to improve the 
efficiency of the electricity system, promote the integration of renewables into the energy mix 
and prevent power cuts was either “Very important” or “Extremely important” in their decision 
to switch. This suggests that highlighting these potential electricity system benefits alongside 
the environmental benefits of DSR should further help to maximise uptake. 
 
However, as discussed in Chapter 2, the way in which such information is disseminated may 
significantly affect its impact, given the prevailing scepticism towards suppliers revealed in 
previous studies (Accenture, 2011; Fell, 2015b). As such, careful consideration should be given 
to which organisations are best placed to provide this information. Ofgem and Smart Energy GB 
would both appear viable candidates to spearhead national campaigns: as non-commercial 
organisations, they are more likely to engender trust in consumers and could thus play a vital 
role in securing public buy-in by communicating the non-financial benefits of residential DSR. 
At a local level, suppliers might benefit from working with ‘trusted third-party intermediaries’ 
to convey such information, as Owen et al (2013) suggest:  
 
Working with trusted third party intermediaries, such as Citizens Advice and the Money 
Advice Service, local councils and social housing providers, is one way in which 
suppliers can get their messages more effectively across... These sorts of organisation 
are often adept at using local champions to promote behaviour change and facilitating 
peer to peer networks to provide advice and support. (p.56). 
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(b) Offer information-only DSR programmes 
 
To date, financial incentives have been the primary drivers used to prompt consumers to switch 
to DSR programmes and to respond once enrolled. However, the sizeable dynamic information-
only DSR resource revealed through the switching survey, together with the promising response 
recorded from trial participants, suggests that providing consumers with opportunities to 
participate on an information-only basis would help to optimise the impact of residential DSR. 
Indeed, the research shows that if price-based programmes are the only model available, this 
could marginalise many consumers who would be prepared to engage in DSR, but not on 
specifically financial terms.  
 
At the same time, the fact that their experiences on the trial made many interviewees more 
accepting of DSR suggests that information-only programmes could serve as a potent catalyst in 
the transition towards dynamic pricing. While Darby and McKenna suggest that static ToU 
tariffs could function as “a staging post on the road to RTP [real time pricing]” (2012, p.767), 
dynamic information-only programmes would arguably prove even more effective in this 
regard. Consumers would have the opportunity to test out different ways of responding to 
fluctuations in supply which more closely resemble the anticipated conditions of a renewables-
rich future electricity system, without any attendant financial pressures or risks.  As McKenna et 
al (2016) observe: 
 
It is reasonable to expect demand response to change over time – in scale, type and 
duration – as they [consumers] grow accustomed to the concept, the tariffs and the 
activities involved and as the technologies involved change and develop. Hence the 
importance attached to customer education and experimentation in demand response 
programmes. (p.8) 
 
The interview data further suggests that were information-only DSR programmes commercially 
available, some consumers may be reluctant to sign up if electricity stakeholders would be the 
exclusive financial beneficiaries of their efforts (see Chapter 7). Thus, to maximise uptake, 
suppliers may need to share some of the attendant financial benefits with community 
organisations or charities. This approach is recommended by Work Stream Six and has already 
been implemented on two information-only DSR pilots: the Power Saver Challenge and the 
CITYOPT DSR programme (CITYOPT, 2017; Power Saver Challenge, 2015; Work Stream 
Six, 2014). 
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8.4.2 Maximising response 
 
(a) Promote the development of DSR know-how 
 
The interviews revealed that consumers often lack specific knowledge that would facilitate 
response on DSR programmes. Given that other studies have shown that DSR programmes 
incorporating educational measures tend to see greatest response (Stromback et al, 2013), this 
finding suggests that electricity stakeholders should take steps to help consumers develop such 
knowledge so that they are better positioned to respond.  
 
Referred to in this thesis as ‘DSR know-how’, this encompasses:  
 
• appliance consumption knowledge – an understanding of how much electricity different 
appliances consume; 
• appliance know-how – an understanding of the features of specific appliances and how 
they operate; and 
• practice know-how – an understanding of how different household practices can be 
modified in order to respond.  
 
In this regard, helping consumers to develop appliance consumption knowledge may prove 
especially advantageous. While the switching survey showed that respondents with greater 
perceived appliance consumption knowledge had greater WTS to the static ToU tariff and the 
dynamic information-only tariff, the survey, trial enrolment questionnaire and subsequent 
interviews revealed that many UK consumers in fact have a poor understanding of the relative 
consumption of different appliances. Together, these findings make a compelling case for 
advancing appliance consumption knowledge among the UK public, given that this should both 
increase WTS to DSR programmes and promote greater response once enrolled.  
 
Once again, however, careful consideration should be given to how DSR know-how would best 
be cultivated. Given the traditionally low success rate of mass information campaigns (Simcock 
et al, 2013; Catney et al, 2013), alternative channels for promoting this knowledge may prove 
more effective. One potential method highlighted by this research would be to establish forums 
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which allow consumers to develop this know-how organically by exchanging experiences, tips 
and suggestions - as several participants on the DSR trial spontaneously chose to do.119 
 
(b) Provide multi-modal event notifications on dynamic DSR programmes  
 
Previous studies of dynamic DSR programmes have found that response is normally greater 
when participants are provided with event notifications through more than one communication 
channel (Stromback et al, 2011). The interview data suggests that this is because participants are 
more likely both to receive notifications when they are delivered through more than one 
medium and to receive them at a time when they well placed to register the details of events. 
These findings confirm the importance of using multiple channels – such as text messages, 
email and in-home displays – to notify consumers on dynamic DSR programmes of events.  
 
(c) Provide tailored DSR programmes 
 
The interviews highlighted the important role that tailoring could play in personalising the DSR 
experience to the needs, preferences and circumstances of individual households (see Chapter 
7). Ultimately, this approach could not only help to promote sustained response, but also 
potentially capture a wider user base than has hitherto been possible.  
 
For example, both the DSR literature and the interview data indicate that, while they may be 
sympathetic to its goals, families tend to struggle with the demands of DSR in practice.  
However, Nicholls and Strengers (2014) have also observed that family households which may 
be reluctant to adapt their routines to the vicissitudes of DSR may be more amenable to 
infrequent ‘peak alerts’ inviting them to “‘do their bit’ for the ongoing security and affordable 
supply of electricity for all” (see Chapter 2). This suggests that an interactive programme that 
provided a unique experience for each household could potentially harness the resource 
represented by this elusive cohort by allowing them to set the parameters of their engagement on 
viable terms. 
 
The “advanced signal design and multi-mode signalling” proposed by Gyamfi and Krumdieck 
(2011) to facilitate “effective, time critical demand response” (p.2995) illustrates how this 
                                                
 
 
119 Simcock et al (2013) also argue that to encourage learning it is valuable to support strategies that encourage 
and create opportunities for the exchange of ‘informal’ knowledge between peers.  
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additional resource could be integrated into the DSR matrix. Under this model, smart meter 
signals based on “cost (increased price), environment (increased CO2 foot-print) [or] security 
(risk of blackout)” (ibid) would be deployed to an increasing number of households, with the 
strength of the signal increasing concomitantly, until the requisite response was achieved (see 
Figure 30).  
Figure 30. Aggregate DSR based on signal and signal strength (Source: Gyamfi and Krumdieck, 2011) 
 
In a similar way, a tailored DSR system such as that proposed in Chapter 7 could build profiles 
of individual households based on their circumstances, inputs, preferences and other 
interactions, and stratify them according to likelihood of response. Targeted notifications could 
then be scheduled and released to each stratum in waves, depending on the urgency of the event, 
with the frequency, content and message tailored accordingly. Those users who were most 
engaged in the programme would represent the first wave of response and would be notified of 
events most frequently; at the other end of the spectrum, those least engaged would be called on 
to act only in the most urgent cases, where an excessive or unpredicted change in generation or 
demand required the greatest possible response.   
By giving them “room to act on voluntary bases, based on their capacity to respond” (Gyamfi et 
al, 2013, p.76), households could thus participate flexibly on terms which are compatible with 
their circumstances, needs and expectations. In this way, a tailored system would circumvent the 
restrictions of existing one-size-fits-all programmes and could thus expand the resource 
represented by residential DSR.  
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8.4.3 Maximising both uptake and response 
 
(a) Promote penetration of smart appliances  
 
The switching survey revealed that respondents who had greater perceived ability to reschedule 
the use of common energy-intensive appliances120 had greater WTS to both DSR tariffs. This 
suggests, as argued in Chapter 7, that measures which make it easier to reschedule appliance use 
could increase WTS – at least to price-based DSR programmes. Meanwhile, the trial interviews 
revealed that the most common constraint that participants experienced in responding was a lack 
of ‘active occupancy’ – that is, response was not possible when they were either not at home or 
asleep. This likewise suggests that measures which make it easier to operate appliances 
remotely or which facilitate autonomous operation could help to facilitate response.  
These findings highlight the role that increased market penetration of smart appliances could 
play in maximising both uptake and response on DSR programmes. In this regard, the proposals 
in Ofgem’s Smart Systems and Flexibility Plan (2017) to establish new standards for smart 
appliances in partnership with industry – which would “allow consumers to provide flexibility 
and benefit from DSR, whilst ensuring cyber security and avoiding proprietary standards which 
could limit interoperability and consumer choice” – are particularly welcome, as these should 
help to promote the advancement and adoption of this burgeoning technology.  
There is also a case to be made for including immersion heaters in these new standards: 
although these are not mentioned in the Smart Systems and Flexibility Plan, the interview data 
complements evidence from previous DSR research (Deasley et al, 2014) in suggesting that 
more flexible use of such appliances could play a significant role in facilitating response. 
 
(b) Target higher-income households  
 
The switching survey revealed that higher-income households had greater WTS to both the 
dynamic DSR tariff and the dynamic information-only programme. As such, suppliers could 
increase the number of households that switch through targeted marketing directed towards such 
households. This could represent a double win for suppliers, as such households also tend to be 
more responsive overall than lower-income households once enrolled, shifting more electrical 
                                                
 
 
120 That is, washing machines, tumble dryers, dishwashers, immersions, irons and vacuum cleaners. 
 190 
load from peak to off-peak periods (Bulkeley et al, 2015; CER, 2011; Harding and Lamarche, 
2016).  
 
(c) Target consumers with electric central heating  
 
The results of the switching survey further suggest that uptake could be increased through 
targeted marketing directed towards households with electric central heating systems (excluding 
storage heating), as these households had greater WTS to both the static ToU tariff and the 
dynamic information-only programme. Once again, therefore, targeted marketing could provide 
benefits in terms of both switching and response, given that such households would be more 
likely to switch to these programme models in the survey and may also be able to respond by 
rescheduling use of their heating systems (Mountain and Lawson, 1995). 
 
However, as noted in Chapter 5, although consumers with electric central heating may have 
greater WTS to certain DSR programmes, the use of these systems to respond will be contingent 
on whether these households have sufficient thermal inertia. In this regard, as Deasley et al 
(2014) observe, building insulation “is another important factor in determining the practicality 
and customer acceptability of demand side response capability.” (p.89) Therefore, measures to 
improve the thermal efficiency of residential buildings may additionally be needed to realise the 
full potential of the DSR resource represented by such households.  
 
8.5 Limitations and future research  
 
This section highlights certain limitations of the research for this thesis and identifies some 
promising avenues for future research which should help to overcome them, while at the same 
time extending the work presented in this thesis.  
 
8.5.1 Switching survey 
 
Approximately 40% of respondents indicated WTS to one of the three DSR programme models 
presented in the switching survey.121 However, the hypothetical nature of the stated choice 
experiment means that although certainty correction was used to produce more realistic 
switching estimates, these may not necessarily reflect the number of consumers that ultimately 
                                                
 
 
121 According to the more conservative estimates produced after the switching data was subjected to the 
certainty correction. 
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switch. As new programmes are rolled out, this will present an opportunity to build on the 
research presented in this thesis by exploring real-world preferences for different models – in 
terms of both their relative popularity and the factors that might influence switching to each. 
This would produce a more accurate estimate of predicted uptake for the different programme 
models and could also yield additional insights regarding consumer and household 
characteristics which influence WTS. 
 
8.5.2 Dynamic information-only trial 
 
Further limitations of this research relate to the short duration of the dynamic information-only 
trial, which took place over four months, and the small convenience sample (N=46) which self-
selected to participate. This raises three important questions:  
• Would the results scale up if the same trial were implemented with a larger number of 
consumers?  
• Would response increase or decrease over time if the trial continued over a longer 
timeframe?  
• Since the households that participated were recruited through channels that may have 
predisposed them to have a greater than average interest in energy issues, could 
response be matched in a commercial application of the programme?122  
 
These questions highlight the risks in presuming that the trial results could be replicated if the 
model were rolled out on a commercial basis. Once again, this suggests avenues for further 
research: the results could be supported by repeating the trial for a longer duration with a larger 
sample of consumers recruited as they would be in a real-world setting – that is, through a 
supplier or other electricity stakeholder (as was initially intended for this thesis). At the same 
time, this approach might also allow households with smart meters to be recruited, to explore 
how these might affect response (eg, whether linking event notifications to in-home displays led 
to greater response).   
 
A second point relates to the accuracy of event notifications. Although approximately 75% of 
trial households responded by making consumption changes in response to day-ahead event 
notifications, supplemented by reminders one hour in advance of each event, this model may 
have adverse consequences in cases where forecasts change unexpectedly in the meantime: 
                                                
 
 
122 Ham et al (1997) and Aubin et al (1995) discuss the bias which can be induced by voluntary participation in 
programmes and the importance of accounting for selection when using experimental data. 
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participants could end up responding in a manner which does not reflect actual generation 
during events.123 This has led scholars to suggest that participants in dynamic DSR programmes 
based on renewable generation might also need to be sent event updates to ensure that response 
is aligned with actual rather than predicted supply conditions (Peacock and Owens, 2013). 
Future research would thus be valuable to examine whether consumers on dynamic information-
only programmes can successfully act on such updates, to prevent any “negative economic and 
environmental outcomes” (ibid, p.10) from inadvertent response to outdated information. 
 
Although the event notifications on the trial were based on predicted output from UK wind 
farms, there may also be scope for using other system conditions – such as periods of supply 
instability or the carbon intensity of generation – as an alternative basis for seeking response on 
information-only DSR programmes (Gyamfi et al, 2013). Future research could thus explore 
how consumers respond to such alternative bases, facilitating a more nuanced understanding of 
which particular pro-social aims – for example, preventing power cuts, responding to generation 
levels from renewables or responding to the carbon intensity of generation - are most effective 
in facilitating response.  
 
Finally, further research into the different ways in which response triggers can be delivered 
would be valuable, to identify those which resonate best with consumers. For example, several 
trial interviewees saw potential in a colour-coded traffic light system which could complement 
the event notifications by serving as an immediate signal trigger – a proposal which supports the 
findings from the LCL dynamic ToU trial that such a system could increase ability to respond. 
Some interviewees also expressed unease at the wording of turn-up event notifications, 
suggesting that requests to use more electricity seemed antithetical to environmental principles; 
there may thus be value in investigating how turn-up messages could be best framed to address 
this disconnect, and how a greater understanding of the functions and goals of residential DSR 
could be promoted. Ultimately, as the UK transitions to a renewables-rich energy system, 
realising the full potential afforded by residential DSR may require a sea change in consumer 
perceptions, with the ‘accepted’ rules of energy use supplanted by a new conception of energy 
as a mutable resource which ebbs and flows, and which must be harnessed and used 
accordingly. 
 
 
  
                                                
 
 
123 Errors for single wind farms reportedly range from 6.9% (normalised mean absolute percentage error) for a 
one-hour-ahead forecast to 23.7 % for a 24-hour-ahead forecast (De Giorgi et al, 2011). 
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Appendix I – Methodology for literature identification 
 
Most of the literature for this review was identified through online searches carried out using 
Scopus - the world’s largest database of peer-reviewed literature, which includes scientific 
journals, books and conference papers. The following search terms were used to identify 
relevant literature on consumer preferences for DSR programmes and studies on WTS: 
 
• “Demand side response”; 
• “Demand response”; 
• “Residential demand side response”; and 
• “Switching electricity tariff”  
 
The following search terms were used to identify relevant literature on response: 
 
• “Feedback”;  
• “Load shifting”;  
• “In-home displays”; 
• “Demand response”; and 
• “Demand side response”.  
 
To complement the literature and ensure that policy-oriented papers and reports were also 
captured by the review, Google searches were also carried out. The following search terms were 
used: 
 
• “Demand response”; 
• “Demand side response”; and 
• “Preferences for demand side response”.  
 
Citation snowballing was also used to identify additional literature as well as ‘backward 
snowballing’, whereby the reference lists of journal articles are used to identify additional 
material (Wohlin, 2014). 
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Appendix II – Switching survey  
 
Household electricity survey 
This survey is about your electricity use and tariff preferences. It aims to find out about the electrical 
appliances in your home, how these are used and your thoughts on new electricity tariffs that might be 
available in the future.  
The survey - which is completely anonymous - will be used in a University of Sussex study on 
household energy use. By completing it, you are consenting for the University of Sussex to use the fully 
anonymised results in data analysis, publications and other research output.  
Please note that if you complete this survey using a PC or Mac, definitions of certain terms can be seen if 
you hover your cursor over them (these are highlighted in blue). Many thanks for taking the time to 
complete this survey.  
 
1. Do you decide which electricity supplier/tariff your household uses? 
 
 Yes 
 Yes, together with someone else 
 No 
 
2. What is your gender? 
 
 Male 
 Female 
  
3. How old are you? 
 
 18-24 
 25-34 
 35-44 
 45-54 
 55-64 
 65+ 
 
4. In which country do you live? 
 
 England 
 Scotland 
 Wales 
 Northern Ireland 
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5. Does your household own or rent? 
 
 Owns outright 
 Owns with a mortgage or a loan 
 Part owns and part rents (shared ownership) 
 Rents (with or without housing benefit) 
 Lives rent free 
 
6. Please estimate your household's total income from all sources over the last 12 months. 
 
Count income from every person included in the household. Include: all earnings (include overtime, tips, 
bonuses, self-employment); all pensions; all student grants and bursaries (but not loans); all benefits and 
tax credits (such as child benefit, income support or pension credit); all interest from savings or 
investments; all rent from property; other income (such as maintenance or grants).  Do not deduct: taxes, 
national insurance contributions, health insurance payments, pension 
payments.                                             
                   Per week/per year   
 Less than £100/Less than £5,200 
 £100 to £199/£5,200 to £10,399 
 £200 to £299/£10,400 to £15,599 
 £300 to £399/£15,600 to £20,799 
 £400 to £499/£20,800 to £25,999 
 £500 to £599/£26,000 to £31,199 
 £600 to £699/£31,200 to £36,399 
 £700 to £799/£36,400 to £41,599 
 £800 to £899/£41,600 to £46,799 
 £900 to £999/£46,800 to £51,999 
 £1,000 to £1,499/£52,000 to £77,999 
 £1,500 to £1,999/£78,000 to £103,999 
 £2,000+/£104,000+ 
 Don’t know/prefer not to say 
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7. How many people normally live in your household?  
 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8+ 
 
8. How many children aged between 0 and 5 years old normally live in your household? 
 
 None 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5+ 
 
9. How many children aged between 6 and 14 years old normally live in your household? 
 
 None 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5+ 
 
10. Do you have an Economy 7 or Economy 10 electricity tariff (which provides lower-priced off-peak 
electricity at certain times)? 
 
 Yes 
 No 
 Don’t know 
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11. Some electricity customers are on variable electricity tariffs, where their suppliers can change the 
price they pay per unit at any time. Other customers are on fixed-price tariffs, which guarantee that the 
price per unit will stay the same until a certain date in the future. Is your household on a fixed tariff? 
 
 Yes 
 No 
 Don’t know 
 
12. How do you heat your home? Please select all that apply. 
 
 Gas 
 Plug-in electric heaters 
 Electric central heating (not storage heaters) 
 Storage heaters 
 Oil 
 Solid fuel (eg, wood, coal) 
 Other (Please specify) ______________________ 
 
13. How much is your average combined electricity and gas bill per month? (If you pay your bills 
quarterly or on a meter, please think about how much this would cost per month.) 
 
 Less than £25 
 £25-£49 
 £50-£74 
 £75-£99 
 £100-£124 
 £125-£149 
 £150+ 
 Don’t know, because my electricity and gas are included in my rent 
 Don’t know 
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14. How much is your average electricity bill per month? (If you pay your bills quarterly or on a meter, 
please think about how much this would cost per month.) 
 
 
 Less than £25 
 £25-£49 
 £50-£74 
 £75-£99 
 £100-£124 
 £125-£149 
 £150+ 
 Don’t know, because my electricity is included in my rent 
 Don’t know how much my electricity bill is, because I pay for my electricity and gas together 
 Don’t know 
 
15. How knowledgeable do you think you are about the amount of electricity used by different appliances 
in your home? 
 
 Not at all 
 Slightly 
 Moderately 
 Very 
 Extremely 
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16. Please rank the following activities to show which you think use the most electricity and which use 
the least.  
 Uses the 
most 
electricity 
Uses the 
2nd most 
electricity 
Uses the 
3rd most 
electricity 
Uses the 
4th most 
electricity 
Uses the 
5th most 
electricity 
Uses the 
least 
electricity 
Fully charging a 
laptop 
      
Ironing for 20 
minutes (average 
temperature) 
      
Washing one load 
of dishes in a 
dishwasher (at 65 
degrees) 
      
Drying clothes in 
a tumble dryer for 
60 minutes (on 
the high 
temperature 
setting) 
      
Fully charging a 
smartphone 
      
Doing one load of 
washing in a 
washing machine 
(at 40 degrees) 
      
 
17. Which of the following appliances do you have in your home?  
  
Combined washer dryer  
Washing machine  
Tumble dryer  
Dishwasher  
Electric water heater/immersion  
Iron  
Vacuum cleaner  
 
18. How often is the electric water heater or immersion in your household used? 
 
 Never 
 Occasionally 
 Often 
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19. Please consider for a moment the times when the appliances below are normally used in your 
household. Please indicate how easy/difficult it would be in your household to change the times at which 
these appliances are used (for example, if using them at certain times was better for the environment or 
would make your electricity bills cheaper).  
 
 Very difficult Difficult Neither easy 
nor difficult 
Easy Very easy 
Combined washer dryer                       
Washing machine                       
Tumble dryer                       
Dishwasher                        
Vacuum cleaner                       
Iron                       
Electric water heater or immersion                       
 
20. Which of the appliances in your household listed below have timers which can be used to set a time in 
the future to start the appliance? 
 
 Yes No Don’t know 
Washer dryer    
Washing machine    
Tumble dryer    
Dishwasher    
Electric water heater/immersion    
 
21. Does anyone in your household know how to set the timers on the appliances below? 
 
 Yes No Don’t know 
Washer dryer    
Washing machine    
Tumble dryer    
Dishwasher    
Electric water heater or immersion    
 
22. Would it be acceptable to use your washing machine when everyone in your household was asleep? 
 
 Yes 
 No (please say why) ______________________ 
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23. Would it be acceptable to use your washing machine when no one was at home? 
 
 Yes 
 No (please say why) ______________________ 
 
24. Would it be acceptable to use your tumble dryer when everyone in your household was asleep? 
 
 Yes 
 No (please say why) ______________________ 
 
25. Would it be acceptable to use your tumble dryer when no one was at home? 
 
 Yes 
 No (please say why) ______________________ 
 
26. Would it be acceptable to use your washer dryer when everyone in your household was asleep? 
 
 Yes 
 No (please say why) ______________________ 
 
27. Would it be acceptable to use your washer dryer when no one was at home? 
 
 Yes 
 No (please say why) ______________________ 
  
28. Would it be acceptable to use your dishwasher when everyone in your household was asleep? 
 
 Yes 
 No (please say why) ______________________ 
 
29. Would it be acceptable to use your dishwasher when no one was at home? 
 
 Yes 
 No (please say why) ______________________ 
 
30. On how many weekdays (Monday to Friday, 9:00am-5:00pm) is there someone at home who could do 
household tasks that require the use of electrical appliances, such as ironing, laundry, vacuuming or 
running the dishwasher? 
 
 None 
 One day 
 Two days 
 Three days 
 Four days 
 Five days 
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31. On how many weekdays (Monday to Friday) is there no one at home from 5:00pm-8:00pm? 
 
 None 
 One day 
 Two days 
 Three days 
 Four days 
 Five days 
 
Please say to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statements. 
 
32. It takes too much time and effort to do things that are environmentally friendly. 
 
 Disagree strongly 
 Disagree 
 Neither agree nor disagree 
 Agree 
 Agree strongly 
 
33. The environment is a low priority for me compared with a lot of other things in my life. 
 
 Disagree strongly 
 Disagree 
 Neither agree nor disagree 
 Agree 
 Agree strongly 
 
34. I am environmentally friendly in most things that I do. 
 
 Disagree strongly 
 Disagree 
 Neither agree nor disagree 
 Agree 
 Agree strongly 
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35. The need to reduce carbon emissions frequently influences what I do - for example, by choosing to 
drive less or to turn lights off when I can. 
 
 Disagree strongly 
 Disagree 
 Neither agree nor disagree 
 Agree 
 Agree strongly 
 
36. Most people in the UK will have to make big changes to their way of life to help to solve climate 
change. 
 
 Disagree strongly 
 Disagree 
 Neither agree nor disagree 
 Agree 
 Agree strongly 
 
37. Most people in the UK need to change their way of life so that future generations can enjoy a good 
quality of life and environment. 
 
 Disagree strongly 
 Disagree 
 Neither agree nor disagree 
 Agree 
 Agree strongly 
 
38. I need to change my way of life so that future generations can enjoy a good quality of life and 
environment. 
 
 Disagree strongly 
 Disagree 
 Neither agree nor disagree 
 Agree 
 Agree strongly 
 Already changed 
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The following questions are about your household's electricity tariff. 
 
39. When choosing your electricity tariff, how important is it that you get the cheapest deal available? 
 
 Not at all important 
 Slightly important 
 Moderately important 
 Very important 
 Extremely important 
  
40. How much effort would you be willing to put into comparing electricity tariffs to get the cheapest 
deal? 
 
 None 
 A small amount 
 A moderate amount 
 A large amount 
 As much effort as possible 
 
41. How worried are you about the cost of electricity rising in the future? 
 
 Not at all worried 
 Slightly worried 
 Moderately worried 
 Very worried 
 Extremely worried 
 
Future electricity tariffs 
 
Although the cost of producing electricity varies at different times of day, most UK households pay the 
same price for their electricity at all times. Some future electricity tariffs will encourage customers to use 
appliances which use a lot of electricity - such as washing machines, tumble dryers and dishwashers - at 
certain times when there is less overall demand. This will make the electricity system more efficient, help 
to prevent pollution, delay climate change and make power cuts less likely. Three possible future tariffs 
for you to consider are described on the next page. 
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Future electricity tariffs124 
 
Daily time of use  
 
On this tariff, your electricity would be more expensive between 7:00am and 9:00am and between 
4:00pm and 8:00pm, but would be cheaper at other times, as well as all weekend. You would know the 
price you were paying, as this would be shown on an in-home display.  By using household appliances 
that use a lot of electricity at the cheaper times, households would save an average of 2% per year on this 
tariff. Households that used lots of electricity at the expensive times would pay more than they do now.  
 
Day-ahead alert  
 
On this tariff, you would pay three different rates for your electricity. Most of the time, your electricity 
would be charged at a standard rate. However, on half the days of the year, there would be a period of 
between one and six hours when you would be charged at either a more expensive rate or a cheaper rate, 
depending on electricity demand and availability. You would be informed of these periods a day in 
advance by a message on an in-home display. By using household appliances that use a lot of electricity at 
the standard and cheaper times, households would save an average of 4% per year on this tariff. 
Households that used lots of electricity at the expensive times would pay more than they do 
now. Choosing this tariff would help the UK’s share of renewable energy to grow, as customers would be 
encouraged to use more electricity at times when lots of renewable energy was being produced (eg, windy 
days).     
 
Environmental alert 
 
On this tariff, you would be charged the same price for a unit of electricity at all times so your electricity 
bill would not vary depending on when you used your appliances. However, although the price of 
electricity would not vary, you would still be encouraged by messages on an in-home display to use more 
or less electricity, depending on the level of demand and the amount of electricity being produced from 
renewable sources at certain times. Choosing this tariff would help the UK’s share of renewable energy to 
grow, as customers would be encouraged to use more electricity at times when lots of renewable energy 
was being produced (eg, windy days).   
 
42a. If you were offered these tariffs which would you choose?  (Hover over the tariffs for a brief 
summary of each) 
 
 Daily time of use 
 Day-ahead alert 
 Environmental alert 
 Remain on your current tariff 
 Don't know 
 
 
                                                
 
 
124 The order in which the tariffs was presented so that approximately an equal number of respondents received 
each possible permutation.  
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Future electricity tariffs 
 
Daily time of use  
 
On this tariff, your electricity would be more expensive between 7:00am and 9:00am and between 
4:00pm and 8:00pm, but would be cheaper at other times, as well as all weekend. You would know the 
price you were paying, as this would be shown on an in-home display.  By using household appliances 
that use a lot of electricity at the cheaper times, households would save an average of 4% per year on this 
tariff. Households that used lots of electricity at the expensive times would pay more than they do now.  
 
Day-ahead alert  
 
On this tariff, you would pay three different rates for your electricity. Most of the time, your electricity 
would be charged at a standard rate. However, on half the days of the year, there would be a period of 
between one and six hours when you would be charged at either a more expensive rate or a cheaper rate, 
depending on electricity demand and availability. You would be informed of these periods a day in 
advance by a message on an in-home display. By using household appliances that use a lot of electricity at 
the standard and cheaper times, households would save an average of 8% per year on this 
tariff. Households that used lots of electricity at the expensive times would pay more than they do 
now. Choosing this tariff would help the UK’s share of renewable energy to grow, as customers would be 
encouraged to use more electricity at times when lots of renewable energy was being produced (eg, windy 
days).    
  
Environmental alert   
 
On this tariff, you would be charged the same price for a unit of electricity at all times so your electricity 
bill would not vary depending on when you used your appliances. However, although the price of 
electricity would not vary, you would still be encouraged by messages on an in-home display to use more 
or less electricity depending on the level of demand and the amount of electricity being produced from 
renewable sources at certain times. Choosing this tariff would help the UK’s share of renewable energy to 
grow, as customers would be encouraged to use more electricity at times when lots of renewable energy 
was being produced (eg, windy days).     
 
42b. If you were offered these tariffs, which would you choose? (Hover over the tariffs for a brief 
summary of each) 
 
 Daily time of use 
 Day-ahead alert 
 Environmental alert 
 Remain on your current tariff 
 Don't know 
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Future electricity tariffs 
 
Daily time of use  
 
On this tariff, your electricity would be more expensive between 7:00am and 9:00am and between 
4:00pm and 8:00pm, but would be cheaper at other times, as well as all weekend. You would know the 
price you were paying, as this would be shown on an in-home display.  By using household appliances 
that use a lot of electricity at the cheaper times, households would save an average of 2% per year on this 
tariff. Households that used lots of electricity at the expensive times would pay more than they do 
now.   To help you decide whether this tariff would work for your household, it would come with a price 
guarantee. If, after the first three months, your bill was higher than it would have been on your previous 
tariff, you would be refunded the difference and allowed to switch to another tariff without penalty.  
 
Day-ahead alert  
 
On this tariff, you would pay three different rates for your electricity. Most of the time, your electricity 
would be charged at a standard rate. However, on half the days of the year, there would be a period of 
between one and six hours when you would be charged at either a more expensive rate or a cheaper rate, 
depending on electricity demand and availability. You would be informed of these periods a day in 
advance by a message on an in-home display. By using household appliances that use a lot of electricity at 
the standard and cheaper times, households would save an average of 4% per year on this 
tariff. Households that used lots of electricity at the expensive times would pay more than they do 
now. Choosing this tariff would help the UK’s share of renewable energy to grow, as customers would be 
encouraged to use more electricity at times when lots of renewable energy was being produced (eg, windy 
days). To help you decide whether this tariff would work for your household, it would come with a 
price guarantee. If, after the first three months, your bill was higher than it would have been on your 
previous tariff, you would be refunded the difference and allowed to switch to another tariff without 
penalty. 
 
Environmental alert 
 
On this tariff, you would be charged the same price for a unit of electricity at all times so your electricity 
bill would not vary depending on when you used your appliances. However, although the price of 
electricity would not vary, you would still be encouraged by messages on an in-home display to use more 
or less electricity depending on the level of demand and the amount of electricity being produced from 
renewable sources at certain times. Choosing this tariff would help the UK’s share of renewable energy to 
grow, as customers would be encouraged to use more electricity at times when lots of renewable energy 
was being produced (eg, windy days).     
 
42c. If you were offered these tariffs, which would you choose? (Hover over the tariffs for a brief 
summary of each) 
 
 Daily time of use 
 Day-ahead alert 
 Environmental alert 
 Remain on your current tariff 
 Don't know 
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Future electricity tariffs 
 
Daily time of use 
 
On this tariff, your electricity would be more expensive between 7:00am and 9:00am and between 
4:00pm and 8:00pm, but would be cheaper at other times, as well as all weekend. You would know the 
price you were paying, as this would be shown on an in-home display.  By using household appliances 
that use a lot of electricity at the cheaper times, households would save an average of 4% per year on this 
tariff. Households that used lots of electricity at the expensive times would pay more than they do 
now.   To help you decide whether this tariff would work for your household, it would come with a price 
guarantee. If, after the first three months, your bill was higher than it would have been on your previous 
tariff, you would be refunded the difference and allowed to switch to another tariff without penalty.  
 
Day-ahead alert 
  
On this tariff, you would pay three different rates for your electricity. Most of the time, your electricity 
would be charged at a standard rate. However, on half the days of the year, there would be a period of 
between one and six hours when you would be charged at either a more expensive rate or a cheaper rate, 
depending on electricity demand and availability. You would be informed of these periods a day in 
advance by a message on an in-home display. By using household appliances that use a lot of electricity at 
the standard and cheaper times, households would save an average of 8% per year on this 
tariff. Households that used lots of electricity at the expensive times would pay more than they do 
now. Choosing this tariff would help the UK's share of renewable energy to grow, as customers would be 
encouraged to use more electricity at times when lots of renewable energy was being produced (eg, windy 
days). To help you decide whether this tariff would work for your household, it would come with a price 
guarantee. If, after the first three months, your bill was higher than it would have been on your previous 
tariff, you would be refunded the difference and allowed to switch to another tariff without penalty.  
 
Environmental alert 
 
On this tariff, you would be charged the same price for a unit of electricity at all times so your electricity 
bill would not vary depending on when you used your appliances. However, although the price of 
electricity would not vary, you would still be encouraged by messages on an in-home display to use more 
or less electricity depending on the level of demand and the amount of electricity being produced from 
renewable sources at certain times. Choosing this tariff would help the UK's share of renewable energy to 
grow, as customers would be encouraged to use more electricity at times when lots of renewable energy 
was being produced (eg, windy days).     
 
42d. If you were offered these tariffs, which would you choose? (Hover over the tariffs for a brief 
summary of each) 
 
 daily time of use 
 Day-ahead alert 
 environmental alert 
 to remain on your current tariff 
 don't know 
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43. You have said that if it were available, you would switch to the X tariff. Please indicate below how 
sure you are that you would switch to this tariff (where 1 is "not very sure" and 10 is "very sure"). 
 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
 10 
 
44. Please say how important the following factors were in your decision to switch from your current 
tariff to the X tariff. 
 
 Not at all 
important 
Slightly 
important 
Moderately 
important 
Very 
important 
Extremely 
important 
It would be better for the 
environment 
     
It would be easy to be 
flexible about when 
appliances were used in your 
household 
     
It would help to reduce the 
risk of power cuts 
     
It would help you to save 
money 
     
It would help to increase the 
share of renewable energy in 
the UK 
     
It would help to make the UK 
electricity system more 
efficient 
     
You would be guaranteed not 
to pay more than you do now 
for the first three months 
     
You would pay the same 
price for a unit of electricity 
at all times 
     
You would be able to switch 
to another tariff without 
paying a penalty for the first 
three months 
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45. What was the most important reason why you chose the X tariff? (Your answer could be one of the 
reasons above or something else which has not been mentioned) 
 
  
46. If the tariff you chose became available, how would you like to hear about it? (Please select as many 
of the following options as you want) 
 
 Email from supplier 
 Letter from supplier 
 Text (SMS) from supplier 
 Electricity supplier's website 
 On the internet when checking or paying an energy bill 
 On a price comparison website 
 Through the media 
 
47. You have said that you would not be interested in, or are unsure about, switching to any of the future 
tariffs. Please say how important the following factors were in your decision. 
 
 Not at all 
important 
Slightly 
important 
Moderately 
important 
Very 
important 
Extremely 
important 
I don't have many appliances 
with timers 
     
I would not have been able 
to save enough money to 
make it worthwhile 
     
Changing the times when 
household appliances are 
used would have been 
inconvenient 
     
Using appliances during the 
night or when no one was at 
home might not have been 
safe 
     
Using appliances at certain 
times would have been too 
noisy 
     
I might have ended up 
paying more on the tariff 
     
It would have been too much 
hassle to switch tariffs 
     
I do not trust energy 
suppliers 
     
I am content with the tariff 
that I am on 
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48. What was the most important reason why you chose not to switch to one of the tariffs? (Your answer 
could be one of the reasons above or something else which has not been mentioned) 
 
  
 
49. Which of the following best describes your ethnic group? 
 
 White 
 Mixed / multiple ethnic groups  
 Asian/Asian British 
 Black/African/Caribbean/Black British  
 Other ethnic group 
 
50. Please tick every box that applies if you have any of the qualifications listed. If your UK qualification 
is not listed, tick the box that contains the nearest qualification. If you have qualifications gained outside 
the UK, tick the 'Foreign qualifications' box and the nearest UK equivalents (if known). 
 
 1-4 O levels/CSEs/GCSEs (any grades). Entry Level, Foundation Diploma 
 NVQ Level 1, Foundation GNVQ, Basic Skills 
 5+ O levels (passes)/CSEs (grade 1)/GCSEs (grades A*-C), School Certificate, 1 A level/2-3 AS 
levels/VCEs, Higher Diploma 
 NVQ Level 2, Intermediate GNVQ, City and Guilds Craft, BTEC First/General Diploma, RSA 
Diploma 
 Apprenticeship 
 2+ A levels/VCEs, 4+ AS levels, Higher School Certificate, Progression/Advanced Diploma 
 NVQ Level 3, Advanced GNVQ, City & Guilds Advanced Craft, ONC, OND, BTEC National, 
RSA Advanced Diploma 
 Degree (for example BA, BSc), Higher Degree (for example MA, PhD, PGCE) 
 NVQ Level 4-5, HNC, HND, RSA Higher Diploma, BTEC Higher Level 
 Professional qualifications (for example teaching, nursing, accountancy) 
 Other vocational/work related qualifications 
 Foreign qualifications 
 No qualifications 
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Appendix III – Survey design 
 
Survey bias 
 
Ordering bias occurs when the sequence in which text or questions are presented influences 
response (Krosnick and Presser, 2009). In the case of the switching survey, if the order in which 
the tariffs were presented to respondents systematically influenced their stated tariff preferences, 
this would represent a significant threat to the validity of the results.  To mitigate this risk, the 
order in which the tariffs were presented was randomised, so that approximately the same 
number of respondents were presented with the tariffs in each of the six possible permutations in 
which they could appear.  
 
Certain questions were also deliberately positioned before others in the survey, because earlier 
questions can sometimes serve as an interpretive framework for subsequent questions, affecting 
how respondents construe their meaning (Ryan et al, 2012). For instance, the questions asking 
respondents how easy they would find it to reschedule appliance use were presented before 
those asking whether they would be prepared to operate those appliances unattended. This made 
it less likely that when answering the former questions, respondents’ reflections on the factors 
which might influence their ability to reschedule appliances use would be dominated by 
considerations associated with unattended use. 
 
Another form of survey bias can arise due to divergent subjective interpretations of the wording 
of surveys (Kitchenham and Pfleeger, 2002). To mitigate this risk, specific terms such as 
‘climate change’ and ‘in-home display’ were defined, to ensure that all respondents were 
“working with the same understanding of vocabulary” (Kitchenham and Pfleeger, 2002, p.22). 
These items were highlighted in blue and definitions appeared onscreen when respondents 
hovered their cursors over the terms while completing the survey. 
 
Optimising rating scales  
 
There is a substantial body of literature examining how rating scale questions can be designed to 
minimise bias. Considerations include the ideal number of response options for rating scales 
(Beckstead, 2014; Krosnick and Tahk, 2015; Revilla et al, 2014); whether a middle response 
option should be provided (Kalton et al, 1980; O’Muircheartaigh et al, 2001); and how question 
sequencing can be used to improve data quality (Krosnick and Presser, 2009; Lietz, 2010).  
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Regarding the optimal number of response options for rating scales, the central issue is that 
“While a rating scale with too few response options may not allow the respondent to make full 
use of his/her capacity to discriminate, a scale with too many options may exceed the 
respondent's capacity to discriminate, and so contribute measurement error” (Beckstead, 2014, 
p.811). 
 
In this regard, a meta-analysis by Krosnick and Tahk (2008) found that the optimal length for 
rating scales is normally five-point for unipolar scales and seven-point for bipolar scales.125 In 
line with these findings, five-point scales were used for the unipolar scales which explored the 
influence of various factors on respondents’ tariff switching decisions. This approach was 
supported by studies which have shown that the modifiers ‘somewhat’ and ‘moderately’, which 
are frequently used together in seven-point scales, are often misplaced by respondents along the 
response continuum (Bass et al, 1974; Boote, 1981).  
 
Although Krosnick and Tahk (2015) recommend the use of seven-point scales for most bipolar 
continua, Krosnick also co-authored a study which concluded that agree/disagree scales should 
always be presented using five-point scales (Revilla et al, 2014). The authors explain that: 
“Regardless of the country, regardless of the topic, and despite what the information theory 
states, there is no gain in information when an agree disagree scale with more than five 
categories is used. There is, instead, a loss of quality.” (ibid, p.90).  
 
For this reason, the agree/disagree questions in the survey all used five-point response scales, 
notwithstanding the general recommendation to use seven-point scales for bipolar continua. 
 
Scale labels 
 
When selecting the response options for scale questions, the intervals between scale points 
should be approximately equal (Kitchenham and Pfleeger, 2002). Questions asking respondents 
to indicate the influence of various factors on their tariff switching decisions used the following 
scale options: ‘not at all important’, ‘slightly important’, ‘moderately important’, ‘very 
important’ and ‘extremely important’. Rohrmann (2003) explored the measurement features of 
words and expressions commonly used in rating scales to identify optimal scale point labels. 
The results of the study support the use of the scale labels used in the survey with the average 
                                                
 
 
125 Unipolar continua are those that extend in only one direction ‒ for example, 'not at all important' to 
‘extremely important’; whereas bipolar continua are those defined by favourable and unfavourable extremes ‒ 
for example, ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’ (Beckstead, 2014). 
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scores for the scale points used either at or very close to the optimal interval positions of 0.0, 
2.5, 5.0, 7.5 and 10.0. In Rohrmann’s analysis, ‘not at all’ was 0.0, ‘slightly’ was 2.5, 
‘moderately’ was 5.0, ‘very’ was 7.9 and ‘extremely’ was 9.6 (ibid).126 
 
Pre-testing and piloting the survey 
 
Before administering surveys, it is good practice to carry out testing to refine questions and 
identify design issues (Krosnick and Presser 2009). In this case five tests were conducted: a 
small group pre-test (N=5), a set of cognitive interviews (N=8), two pre-tests (N=17 and N=50) 
and a larger pilot (N=93).  
 
The small group pre-test and the cognitive interviews were used to explore how respondents 
understood specific questions and to identify any which were not interpreted as intended. The 
first pre-test examined how well respondents understood the tariff explanations, while the larger 
pre-test and pilot (N=50 and N=93 respectively) made it possible to perform principal 
component analysis on responses to the attitudinal questions.  
 
The various online tests were also used to check that automatic survey branching was 
functioning correctly.  This revealed that the survey software had a bug which was affecting the 
routing of respondents to different pages, which was fixed before the final version of the survey 
went live. 
 
Survey revisions  
 
Cognitive interviews produce qualitative data that can be used to improve surveys. They 
normally involve asking respondents to think out loud when answering questions and to 
elaborate on certain responses (Krosnick and Presser, 2010).  
 
During the cognitive interviews, interviewees were asked to comment on the factors that 
influenced their response to the following question: “Please indicate how easy/difficult it would 
be in your household to change the times at which the following appliances were used (for 
example, if using them at certain times would be better for the environment or would make your 
electricity bills cheaper).”  
                                                
 
 
126 The use of the labels ‘not at all’, ‘slightly’, ‘moderately’, ‘very’ and ‘extremely’ was also supported by a meta-
analysis of the value of scale labels (Beckstead, 2014). 
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Interviewees were encouraged to vocalise their thoughts when answering this question to 
determine whether it captured a range of contextual factors that influence whether consumers 
find it easy to reschedule appliance use. The diversity of the responses provided gave 
confidence that this was indeed the case. For example, one interviewee explained that ironing 
would be difficult to reschedule as items were ironed immediately before use, rather than in 
advance; another indicated that laundry was done on weekends, as household members were 
normally busy with other activities on weekdays when they came home from work; and another 
suggested that it would be difficult to change the times when vacuuming was done, because this 
was scheduled so that other household members would not be disturbed.  
 
The cognitive interviews also informed changes to the questions used to establish the measure 
“Commitment to environmental sustainability”. One of the agree/disagree questions from 
Alcock (2012) ‒ “Scientists will find a solution to climate change without people having to 
make big changes to their lifestyle” ‒ was revised for the final survey. In cognitive pre-tests, one 
respondent reported that the negation (‘without’) in the sentence was confusing.  The use of 
questions which include negations is inadvisable, as they can be cognitively burdensome, 
leading to measurement error and respondent fatigue (Krosnick and Presser, 2009). Two further 
interviewees indicated that they had wanted to answer ‘Don’t know’ to this question because 
they were unsure whether scientists would find solutions to climate change, but that this 
response option had not been available.  
 
As a result of this feedback, the question was rephrased as: “Most people will have to make big 
changes to their way of life to help to solve climate change.” As well as avoiding the use of the 
negation ‘without’, this removed the reference to scientists which some interviewees had found 
problematic. The changes were supported by the principal component analysis on the revised 
question, which showed the revised question loaded onto one of the identified components at 
0.63, compared to the loading of 0.46 for the previous iteration.127 The same question also 
originally lacked a middle ‘neither agree nor disagree’ response option, as presented in Alcock 
(2012). However, scales without middle points have lower validity, as well as higher random 
error variance, suggesting that respondents randomly choose other response options which are 
available when the middle option is lacking (O’Muircheartaigh et al, 2001).128 As such, a middle 
                                                
 
 
127 The rotated component score for this question was also higher, at 0.81, compared with the previous score for 
the question of 0.41. 
128 Further evidence that having a neutral middle point increases the reliability and validity of response scales is 
provided by a meta-analysis of 87 experiments of question design by Saris and Galhofer (2007). 
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point was added to improve data quality and standardise all the items used to create the 
“Commitment to environmental sustainability” measure. 
 
One further change was made to the questions used by Alcock (2012) to create the measure. 
One question (Q35) originally provided response options of ‘frequently’, ‘sometimes’, ‘rarely’ 
and ‘never’. This question was reformulated as an agree/disagree to standardise the questions 
used to create the measure, and because research has shown that certain modifiers ‒ including 
‘frequently’ ‒ are often interpreted differently by different individuals, leading to increased 
measurement error (Lietz, 2010). 
 
A final important change to the survey was made after one of the pre-tests (N=50). In this, all 
but one of the respondents indicated that they would switch to the DSR programmes. The fact 
that nearly all respondents indicated that they were willing to switch strongly suggested that 
hypothetical bias was influencing the responses provided. This led to the inclusion of the 
certainty question in subsequent iterations of the survey, which made it possible to produce 
more conservative estimates of WTS. As Loomis (2014) cautions, “stated preference surveys 
would be wise to include a question asking respondents to indicate their level of certainty for 
their response” (p.42).  
 
Data cleaning 
 
Strikes 
 
Respondents sometimes complete surveys without making the cognitive effort necessary to 
choose the optimal responses that truly reflect their views (Krosnick and Presser, 2010). One 
indication that this might be the case is where respondents provide answers to sets of closed 
questions in vertical, horizontal or diagonal lines, known as ‘straight-lining’ (Cole et al, 2012).  
 
However, sometimes responses may appear in these patterns because they represent 
respondents’ considered choices (ibid). Since a single instance of straight lining might plausibly 
be down to chance, a ‘three strikes' rule was adopted, whereby any survey response with 
straight-lining through three sets of questions was discarded.129 
 
                                                
 
 
129 The question sets which were evaluated for this purpose contained an average of seven questions. 
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In addition to straight-lining, two further question responses were considered ‘strikes’ which, 
when combined with one or more instances of straight-lining, led to the rejection of a survey 
response. These included instances where respondents indicated that: 
 
• the number of children living in their household was greater than the total number of 
household members; or 
• their gas and electricity bill was lower than their electricity bill alone.  
 
Speeding 
 
Data quality can also be compromised when respondents complete surveys very quickly (Zhang 
and Conrad, 2013). The average time taken to complete the pre-test and pilot versions of the 
survey was 12 minutes and 57 seconds. Respondents who completed the questionnaire much 
faster than this were thought unlikely to have provided considered responses.  
 
To determine whether the quality of the data collected was inferior when respondents completed 
the survey quickly, the quality of responses which were provided in between five and seven 
minutes (N=58) was compared with those provided in between seven and nine minutes (N=97) 
by examining the number of ‘strikes’ in each set of responses.  
 
Responses were awarded one point for each of the ‘strikes’ described above, as well as for each 
instance of straight-lining. The mean number of strikes per response was 0.71 for the seven to 
nine-minute group and 1.2 for the five to seven-minute group. An independent samples t-test 
revealed a statistically significant difference in the mean number of strikes for these groups 
(P=0.00), and that the difference in the number of strikes between the two groups was between -
0.84 and -0.17 with a 95% confidence interval. This confirmed that data quality declined in 
responses completed in under seven minutes and supported the rejection of these responses.  
 
Respondents who completed the surveys very quickly might also have been more prone to 
defaulting to a ‘Don’t know’ response to the tariff choice question. However, although a larger 
proportion of respondents who completed the survey in between five and seven minutes 
answered ‘Don’t know’ to this question than those who completed the survey in between seven 
and nine minutes (26% versus 18%), a chi square test found that this difference was not 
statistically significant (P=0.28). 
 
In some cases, respondents took a long time to complete the survey: nine respondents on the 
pilot (N=93) took over 30 minutes to do so. These responses were retained because long 
completion times may reflect the fact that subjects were distracted while answering, which 
might also occur when people choose an energy contract in real life (Momsen and Stoerk, 
2014). 
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Appendix IV – Rationale for switch/remain survey questions 
 
When deciding which factors to include in Questions 44 and 47 of the switching survey, 
particular reference was made to the findings of the UK Energy Research Council project 
“Transforming the UK energy system – Public values, attitudes and acceptability” (Parkhill et 
al, 2013), which developed a comprehensive picture of public perspectives and acceptability 
with regard to energy system change. 
 
Factors influencing the decision to switch 
 
The survey found a “set of clear preferences for particular energy system elements that people 
feel should be integral to energy system change” (ibid, p3). These included a strong 
commitment to renewable forms of energy production and the importance of efficiency in 
minimising waste and overall energy usage. The survey also found a strong preference for an 
energy system that protects the environment. As DSR programmes would contribute towards 
electricity system efficiency, environmental protection and, in the case of the two dynamic DSR 
programmes, the growth of renewables, respondents who opted to switch were asked to rate the 
importance of each benefit in their decision. 
 
Other factors were included due to the importance that they are afforded in the DSR literature. 
For example, flexibility in scheduling appliance use is often cited by consumers and experts as a 
necessary requirement for participation in DSR (Ofgem, 2009; Powells et al, 2014; Salies, 
2013). Likewise, saving money is often an important consideration for consumers in making 
purchasing decisions (Leijten et al, 2014; Whitehead and Cherry 2007), with lower electricity 
bills often cited as an important reason for choosing to switch to DSR tariffs (Dütschke and 
Paetz, 2013; Namerikawae et al, 2015). At the same time, a number of studies have highlighted 
consumer concerns about electricity blackouts (Gyamfi and Krumdieck, 2011; Ipsos Mori, 
2012; Parkhill et al, 2013) and 49% of people interviewed in an opinion tracker poll expressed 
concern about power cuts becoming more frequent in future (DECC, 2014b). 
 
Factors influencing the decision not to switch 
  
The factors that respondents who opted to remain on their current tariff were asked to rate were 
likewise informed by a review of the DSR literature. For example, UK consumer mistrust of 
energy suppliers is well documented (Energy and Climate Change Committee, 2013; Fell et al, 
2015a; Parkhill et al, 2013), and trust is regarded as an important influence on consumer interest 
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in new energy-related products. As Smart Grid GB (2013) explains: “The level of trust between 
consumer and energy provider is a factor that can either act as barrier or enabler to consumers’ 
interest in either participating in schemes, or simply in listening to what is on offer” (p.24). 
 
Concerns about the risk of increased electricity bills was also presented as one of the factors, as 
such concerns are often raised when consumers are asked whether they would be interested in 
switching to DSR tariffs (Darby and Pisica, 2013; Pollitt and Shaorshadze, 2011). Similarly, the 
inability to make sufficient savings was included as it has also been recognised that the modest 
savings which might be realised from DSR for the foreseeable future may discourage some 
consumers from participating (Owen et al, 2013; Kim and Shcherbakova, 2011). 
 
Respondents were also asked to indicate the extent to which contentment with their existing 
tariff had influenced their decision not to switch, because in survey pre-testing respondents 
frequently cited this reason in an open-ended question asking whether any additional factors had 
influenced their decision.  
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Appendix V – Ethical approval for DSR trial 
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Appendix VI – Invitation to participate in DSR trial 
 
 
 
 
Environmental alert trial 
 
You are invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide whether to take part, it is 
important to understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. Please take the 
time to read the following information carefully. 
 
The purpose of the study is to learn whether electricity customers are able to use more or less 
electricity in their homes at certain times of day, depending on the amount of renewable energy 
available from wind. This is important since renewable electricity generated from wind needs to 
be used at the time it is produced; otherwise it often goes to waste, as it cannot be stored. 
 
 
 
Why have I been invited to take part? 
 
You have been invited to take part because you have asked to receive more information about 
the trial. The study will involve 60 households and will take place between April 2015 and July 
2015. 
 
Do I have to take part? 
 
It is up to you to decide whether to take part and you are free to withdraw at any time without 
giving a reason. If you decide to participate, please keep this information and sign and return the 
attached consent form.  
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What will happen if I take part? 
 
If you decide to take part, you will first be sent a short online questionnaire which will take 
around 10 minutes to complete. The questionnaire includes questions about your home and the 
people who live there. It also includes questions about your electrical appliances and heating.  
 
After completing the questionnaire, you will be sent a free electricity monitor, which will tell 
you how much electricity you are using in your home. In the first month of the trial, you will set 
up and get used to your new electricity monitor. This will involve plugging in the device and 
setting it up so that your electricity consumption data can be accessed via the internet. Only 
members of your household and the lead researcher responsible for the trial will have access to 
this data.  
 
Over the next two months, you will receive a maximum of one text message a day – to 
encourage you to use more or less electricity at certain times – on the mobile phone numbers 
you have provided (you can also choose to receive emails if you wish). On around half of the 
days during the trial, you will not receive any text messages. 
 
At the end of the trial, participants will be contacted to see whether they would be willing to 
take part in a 45-minute telephone interview. Interviewees will be asked about their experience 
of the trial and what things made it easier or more difficult to make changes to the appliances 
they used at certain times. These interviews will be recorded and it is entirely up to you whether 
you would like to participate. 
 
What are the benefits of taking part? 
 
Through using their electricity monitors, participants will have a better understanding of how 
they are using electricity in their households, which should help them to reduce their electricity 
bills. The electricity monitor will be theirs to keep at the end of the trial. The trial will also help 
to develop a wider understanding of how residential customers can help to promote the use of 
renewable sources of electricity by changing the times at which they use household appliances. 
 
What should I do if I want to take part? 
 
If you would like to take part in the study, please return your completed consent form by email 
to M.J.Gross@sussex.ac.uk by April 22 2015 to register for the trial. Please be aware that the 
trial is only open to 60 households and these will be selected on a first come, first served basis.  
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Will my information in this study be kept confidential? 
 
All information collected about you and other members of your household, as well as your 
electricity consumption data, will be kept strictly confidential. In order to protect the 
confidentiality, privacy and anonymity of participants, only the principal researcher (Matthew 
Gross) will have access to electricity consumption data and interview recordings. Individuals 
will be assigned a number which will be used instead of their name in all publications and 
outputs generated as part of the study. 
 
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
 
The results of this trial will contribute to doctoral research being carried out at the University of 
Sussex. A copy of this research can be obtained by contacting Matthew Gross at 
M.J.Gross@sussex.ac.uk. 
 
Who is organising and funding the research? 
 
Matthew Gross is conducting this research as a student at the University of Sussex within the 
Science Policy Research Unit. The research is funded by the Engineering and Physical Sciences 
Research Council (EPSRC). 
 
Who has approved this study? 
 
The research has been approved by the Cross-Schools Research Ethics Committee (C-REC). 
 
Further information 
 
If you would like any further information about the trial, please contact Matthew Gross at 
M.J.Gross@sussex.ac.uk. If you have any concerns about the way in which the study is being 
conducted while participating, please contact Dr Steve Sorrell, who is responsible for 
supervising this project (S.R.Sorrell@sussex.ac.uk). 
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Appendix VII – DSR Trial consent form 
 
 
CONSENT FORM  
 
 
Project title: Environmental alert trial  
 
Project Approval Reference: ER/MJG29/3 
I agree to take part in the above University of Sussex research project. I have read and understood 
the Information Sheet, which I have kept for my records. I understand that agreeing to take part 
means that I am willing to:  
• Complete a short survey about my household and the electrical appliances it contains before 
the trial starts 
• Receive a free electricity monitor and keep this connected in my home for the three-month 
trial period 
• Allow the principal researcher from the University of Sussex access to my electricity 
consumption data during the trial 
• Receive up to one text per day in the final two months of the trial on all mobile phones that I 
register informing me of periods to try to use more or less electricity 
• Take part in a 45 minute recorded telephone interview with the researcher at the end of the 
trial (optional) 
I understand that my name and all identifying details will remain anonymous in the report of the 
project and in any related publications.  
I understand that my participation is voluntary, that I can choose not to participate in part or all of the 
project, and that I can withdraw at any stage of the project without being penalised or disadvantaged 
in any way.  
I consent to the processing of my personal information for the purposes of this research study. I 
understand that such information will be treated as strictly confidential and handled in accordance 
with the Data Protection Act 1998.  
Please enter the mobile numbers on which you would like to receive messages during the trial below. 
A minimum of one number is required – however, the more mobile phones that are registered, the 
more your household will be able to engage with the trial. Before entering any additional numbers 
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below please ensure that you have shown the owners of the phones the information and consent 
forms, and have obtained their consent.  
 
Please note that you can stop receiving messages on any numbers that you provide below by replying 
‘stop’ from that phone to any message received. 
 
Main trial mobile telephone number:__ _______________ 
2nd mobile telephone number:_______________________ 
3rd mobile telephone number:_______________________ 
4th mobile telephone number:_______________________  
 
Full name: ____________________ 
 
Date:          ____________________ 
 
Completing this form and returning it to M.J.Gross@sussex.ac.uk constitutes acceptance of the trial 
as described here, as well as in the accompanying information form. 
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Appendix VIII – DSR trial information form 
 
 
 
 
 
Environmental alert trial 
  
The environmental alert trial is due to start soon. It aims to examine whether households can vary the 
amount of electricity they use at certain times, depending on the amount of wind power available. This 
information sheet answers some of the questions you may have about how the trial will work. 
  
Why are the members of my household being asked to try to use more or less electricity at certain 
times? 
  
When you are sent messages asking you to try to use more electricity at certain times, this is because 
more renewable electricity will be available from wind at those times. When you are sent messages asking 
you to try to use less electricity at certain times, this is because not much electricity will be available from 
wind at those times. 
  
Since electricity produced from wind is very difficult to store, it is important that this electricity is used at 
times when there is lots available, so that it does not go to waste. At the same time, if households can use 
less electricity when less wind power is available, this will mean that not as much electricity needs to be 
produced from non-renewable fossil fuels to meet demand at those times. 
  
If you are sent a message asking you to try to use less electricity during a certain period, please try to 
avoid using appliances that use a lot of electricity at these times – for example, washing machines, tumble 
dryers, dishwashers, vacuum cleaners and irons. 
  
On the other hand, if you are sent a message asking you to try to use more electricity during a certain 
period, this is a good time to use those electrical appliances. At these times, it is good if your electricity 
monitor shows that you are using a lot of electricity carrying out your household tasks – the bar on your 
monitor will turn red and the display will indicate that you are using more electricity than 
normal.  Remember, however, that the aim is only to carry out household tasks that you would have to do 
at some point anyway – not to increase your electricity use unnecessarily! This is because you are only 
trying to change when you use electricity, not to increase the amount of electricity that you use overall. 
  
When will I receive messages by text message or email? 
  
This week you will start receiving messages asking you to try to use more or less electricity at certain 
 252 
times. You will receive text messages on most days on the mobile phone numbers that you provided on 
your consent form, as well as emails if you asked to receive these when you completed the registration 
survey. Don’t worry if on some days you don’t receive a message: this will be because neither especially 
windy weather nor especially still weather is forecast for the following day. 
  
How will I know how well I am doing at changing the amount of electricity I use during the alert 
periods? 
  
Over the first few weeks that your energy monitor has been connected, information about your electricity 
use has been saved to your Energynote account. This will be compared against the amount of electricity 
that you use during the alert periods, to measure whether your household has been able to change its 
electricity use in response to the alerts. 
  
So that you know whether you have succeeded in using more or less electricity during a particular alert 
period, you will also receive messages letting you know whether the amount of electricity used during the 
last alert period was more or less than the average for your household at that time. 
  
Smart plugs 
  
Smart plugs can be used with your Geo Solo II monitor to learn more about how much electricity 
individual appliances in your home are using. They can also be used to turn appliances on and off 
remotely from your Energynote account; it might help you to save energy by turning appliances on and 
off when you are not at home. These appliances are available online if you search for “Geo Solo II smart 
plugs”. 
  
Your broadband connection 
  
If possible, please keep your broadband switched on while the trial is taking place (your router does not 
use much electricity). However, do not worry too much if your broadband is switched off briefly, as the 
Geo Solo II will store your electricity data for short periods. Similarly, if you want to move your Geo 
Solo II, don’t worry - just unplug it and plug it in again at the new location. 
  
If you experience any problems with your Geo Solo II or Energynote account, you can contact Geo’s 
technical support number on 01223 850210 during normal office hours and from 9:00am to 12:30pm on 
Saturdays. Alternatively, please feel free to contact me at M.J.Gross@sussex.ac.uk with any questions 
you may have about your involvement in the trial. 
 
Thank you very much for taking part in the University of Sussex environmental alert trial.  
Kind regards 
Matthew Gross 
Sussex Energy Group 
